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Forward 
Less than five years ago, my family and I leapt off a proverbial cliff.  Weary from juggling 
demanding careers, two small children, home ownership and all the rest of it, we wanted to make 
a change.  I had dreamt for years about getting my PhD but had resigned myself to the reality that 
moving my family across the U.S. for a poorly-paid, highly-demanding position was unlikely to 
fit our lives.  However, I had also begun to look at PhD programs internationally, and was 
impressed by Copenhagen Business School (CBS).  The Scandinavians do sustainability better 
than anyone else in the world, I reasoned, so coupling that with Denmark’s competitive business 
environment and CBS’s steadily increasing rankings made it an attractive option.  However, I 
hadn’t even been in an academic environment for more than a decade, much less had any sort of 
access to or familiarity with the literature.  So, when a PhD scholarship was announced I toiled to 
pull together an application, rationalizing that at least I could feel like I tried even if the likelihood 
was slim and logistics seemingly insurmountable.  As I finished my application one Sunday during 
my children’s naptime and hit the “submit” button, I turned to my husband and said, “Wouldn’t 
it be hilarious if I actually got this and we sold our house and cars and everything and moved our 
family across the world?!”  Much to our surprise, just a few months later that’s exactly what 
happened.   
Now on the far side, I’m even more grateful for the Scandinavian model of PhD education which 
vests its fellows with independence, support and resources.  Just like children, it also takes a 
village to raise a PhD, and I am ever so grateful for the community which has helped me attain 
mine.  First and foremost, I would like to thank my incredible supervisors to whom I will be 
forever indebted.  Jeremy Moon took a leap of faith by selecting me to be his first PhD in his 
newly-minted position as Velux Chair of Corporate Sustainability at CBS.  In addition to his 
career stature and brilliance, Jeremy is also a nice guy with incredible patience and a smashing 
sense of humor.  His door was always open to me, and no matter how busy he may have been, he 
always made time to help me.  Always.  He supported me through research challenges, teaching 
crises, data drama, grant applications, visa problems, and more than few hair-brained ideas.  
Whether it was reviewing materials over evenings and weekends, patiently sitting with me to talk 
through yet another theoretical reframing of a paper or bringing me into the fold of his own 
network and connections, Jeremy was a steadfast support every step of the way.  I could not have 
chosen a better supervisor.     
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I often referred to my supervisors at the “all-star team”, as I had the distinct privilege of also 
working with the renowned Andreas Rasche.  Equal parts brilliant, organized and funny, Andreas’ 
ability to provide constructive and pragmatic feedback was invaluable to my development as a 
scholar.  He’s undoubtedly the most efficient person I know, and his adeptness and breadth of 
knowledge brought immeasurable value to me and my PhD.   
 
Many other scholars also helped me along the way.  Thank you to Jette Steen Knudsen for your 
feedback, humor and research partnership, and to Dirk Matten and Jean Pascal Gond for your 
thoughtful and constructive reviews of my work throughout the process.  I’m also appreciative of 
Stefano Ponte and Juliane Reinecke for their feedback and assistance, particularly in the early 
days of my PhD work.  Sofie Pedersen has also been instrumental to my successful fieldwork 
trips, as well as shaping my understanding of things “actually” work on the ground.    
 
The Department of Management, Society and Communications (MSC) also provided critical 
support to me throughout my journey.  I am grateful to Dorte Salskov-Iversen for helping select 
me for the PhD position in the first place as well as her deft leadership ever since.  Whether it be 
complicated contract issues, never ending questions about teaching hours and policies, or other 
administrative challenges, I could not have made it through without the proficient and perpetually 
friendly support from Annika, Majbritt, Lisbeth, Lise and the rest of the administrative support 
team.  As well, the PhD cohort with whom I’ve commiserated and celebrated with along the way 
has provided a close community and incredible support; thank you Anna, Kristian RN, Daniel, 
Arni, Jacob, Tina, Henrik, Luisa, Kristian SN, Anestis, Majbritt, Sara, Lara, Robin, Sarah, and 
everyone else.  I’m also grateful to the many other marvelous colleagues whom have always been 
quick to offer assistance and words of encouragement, particularly Lauren, Hans, Peter, Søren, 
Thilde, Louise, Steen, Lucia, Maha and Sarah, though there are many others.  MSC is truly a 
special place.   
 
Time is a resource none of us have enough of, and I’m thankful to both the Accord and Alliance 
– the private governance organizations on which my PhD is based – for their generosity in this 
regard.  I am also appreciative to the many brands and other organizations which similarly 
provided me access for interviews and other information gathering.  Without this my PhD would 
not have been possible.  Thank you as well to the Velux Foundation, which provided the funding 
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to support my PhD, as well as CBS, the Organization and Management Studies PhD School, and 
the Governing Responsible Business research environment for providing resources to support 
fieldwork, conferences and other activities integral to my PhD work.   
 
Last but hardly least, I am deeply grateful to my family for their unwavering and steadfast support 
of me throughout my PhD journey.  My in-laws Nadya and Bob have eagerly awaited updates, 
provided advice, and even forgave me for moving their grandchildren across an ocean.  My dear 
husband Nick has been my rock through it all, risking his career ambitions to support our move 
from the U.S. to Denmark so that I could pursue my dreams.  He’s seen me through frustration, 
celebration, tears, accomplishment, seemingly never-ending work, long fieldwork trips, and all of 
the other ups and downs that come along with the PhD journey.  Our family and lives have 
blossomed in Denmark, and I couldn’t be more grateful for my best friend, co-parent, and partner.  
I am also ever so thankful for Nolan and Elsa whom bring such joy and love to my life and are as 
supportive and understanding of the PhD process as any children could possibly be.  Thank you 
to my family for joining me on this wild ride and all your love and support along the way.   
 
While this marks where my PhD journey ends, the page turns also signifies the beginning of next 
chapter.  Moving forward, I have the distinct opportunity to continue building on the work begun 
during my PhD through the Danida-funded project, The Regulation of International Supply 
Chains: Lessons from the Governance of Occupational Health & Safety in the Bangladesh Ready-
Made Garment Industry.  Through this I will continue to have the opportunity to work with Jeremy 
and many of my other good colleagues at CBS and beyond.  I am grateful for the knowledge, 
skills and capacities that I’ve built over the last four years of the PhD and intend to put them to 
good use in the next stage.  The sustainability challenges which face us are both acute and 
pressing, and I hope that through continued work, we can make progress, one country, one 
industry and one initiative at a time.  I couldn’t have made it this far or continue to move forward 
without the whole village.  I am deeply grateful.   
 
Thank you to all whom have been part of the journey so far, and I look forward to the challenges 
that lie ahead.   
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English Abstract  
This study investigates how and why companies engage in private governance in varied ways and 
the implications thereof.  It compares how companies – as ‘political actors’ – engage in private 
governance differently, even if in response to the same institutional pressures.  In doing so, it 
examines the interplay between context (structure) and choice (agency).  Overall, it contributes 
to our understanding of why companies understand their political roles and responsibilities 
differently, and the implications of these differences for the private governance of sustainability 
issues.  In doing so, it contributes to our understanding of the organization and dimensions of 
private governance, the logics of different models of private governance and their potential for 
addressing different types of sustainability challenges, and the powerful role of actors’ agency in 
shaping the environments in which companies provide governance.   
 
To complete this task, the PhD thesis is based on a comprehensive comparative case study of two 
competing private governance initiatives that emerged in the aftermath of the 2013 collapse of the 
Rana Plaza complex in Bangladesh.  The first was the Accord, a substantive and legally 
enforceable agreement governed equally by business and labor and allowed for NGO members 
(thereby constituting a multi-stakeholder initiative, MSI).  It garnered more than 220+ members 
during its tenure, including all of the European brands.  Some North American companies cited 
the Accord’s legal provisions and inclusion of labor as intolerable, and therefore walked away 
and created their own competing initiative, the Alliance, a business-led initiative (BLI) which was 
softer and principle-based.  Both organizations formed during the same period and in response to 
the same pressures, yet took vastly different approaches to the shared end goal of factory safety.  
Their membership divide down country (U.S. vs. EU) and configurational lines (MSI vs. BLI) 
make it a robust case from which to investigate the influence of different institutions and contexts 
on the resulting private governance choices.   
 
The PhD is comprised of three individual papers and an overarching document that outlines the 
overall study.  Paper 1 explores how domestic contexts shape approaches to private governance 
internationally, finding that companies conceptualize their responsibilities within their dominant 
institutional environments (home), and seek to replicate similar structures and strategies in their 
international private governance engagements.  Paper 2 explores how the logics differ between 
different private governance models, concluding that MSIs embody a collective logic and BLIs a 
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benevolent one.  MSIs are therefore best suited to address systemic and structural problems, while 
BLIs can be effective at issues that are more narrowly defined and outcome-oriented.   Paper 3 
explores how a novel enforcement clause in one of the private governance initiatives affected how 
companies understood and fulfilled their responsibilities.  It found that while actors interpreted a 
similar ‘illusion’ of the clause, companies reacted in divergent ways – based upon their 
institutional environment – and made private governance choices accordingly.   
 
The PhD study yields three primary contributions.  First, by adopting a historical institutionalism 
perspective, it enables a greater appreciation of the role of actors’ agency in navigating within and 
between institutions in their environment.  It found that while the dominant institutions shaped 
actors’ understanding and sensemaking, actors were able to ‘enact’ illusions in their environment 
that had not existed previously, demonstrating the powerful role of agency.  Second, the thesis 
explores how the confluence of structure and agency interplay in private governance, 
demonstrating that the dominant institutions in companies’ home environments shape – but do 
not constrain – how they approach private governance.  This develops our understanding and 
appreciation of the role of context in private governance.  Finally, the thesis contributes to the 
development of the understanding of political roles of corporations – and in particular, the concept 
of political CSR – by suggesting inclusion of the concepts of context and agency into the debate 
so as to more usefully theorize about the implications of these factors.    
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Dansk Resumé 
Dette studie undersøger, hvordan og hvorfor virksomheder engagerer sig i ’private governance’ 
på forskellige måder og implikationerne heraf. Studiet sammenligner, hvordan virksomheder som 
”politiske aktører” engagerer sig i private governance på forskellige måder; selv når deres 
engagement har til formål at imødekomme samme institutionelle pres. Herved undersøges 
samspillet mellem kontekst (struktur) og valg (agens). Alt i alt bidrager studiet til vores forståelse 
af, hvorfor virksomheder forstår deres politiske roller og ansvar forskelligt, samt hvilke 
implikationer disse forskelligheder har for private governance af bæredygtighedsspørgsmål. 
Herved bidrager studiet til vores forståelse af forskellige dimensioner af private governance og 
organiseringen heraf. Det bidrager også til vores forståelse af de underliggende logikker i 
forskellige modeller for private governance og deres potentiale for at adressere forskellige typer 
af bæredygtighedsudfordringer samt den indflydelse, som aktørers agens har i forhold til at forme 
de kontekster, som virksomhederne leverer governance i. 
 
For at løse denne opgave er dette PhD-projekt baseret på et omfattende komparativt casestudie af 
to konkurrerende private governance-initiativer, som udsprang af bygningskollapset af Rana Plaza 
i Bangladesh i 2013. Det første initiativ var the Accord; en vægtig aftale, der kunne håndhæves 
ved ret, som blev styret af virksomheder og af fagforeninger på lige fod med hinanden og hvor 
NGO-medlemmer var velkomne (herved udgjorde the Accord et multi-stakeholder initiativ, MSI). 
Initiativet havde mere end 220 medlemmer i den periode det eksisterede, inklusive alle europæiske 
mærker. Nogle nordamerikanske virksomheder fandt the Accords lovbestemmelser samt 
inklusionen af fagforeninger uacceptable og brød derfor med initiativet for at skabe deres eget 
konkurrerende initiativ, the Alliance, som var et blødere, mere principbaseret og virksomhedsledet 
initiativ (business-led initiative, BLI). Begge disse initiativer blev til i den samme periode og som 
reaktion på det samme pres og alligevel valgte de to initiativer ganske forskelligartede tilgange til 
at nå det fælles mål om bedre sikkerhed på tøjfabrikkerne. Medlemmernes forskellighed i forhold 
til oprindelsesland (USA vs. EU) og sammensætning (MSI vs. BLI) gør dette til et robust 
udgangspunkt for at undersøge, hvilken indflydelse forskellige institutioner og kontekster har på 
valg af private governance-tilgange. 
 
Denne PhD består af tre individuelle artikler samt en overordnet kappe, der beskriver studiet i sin 
helhed. Første artikel undersøger, hvordan nationale forhold former tilgange til private 
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governance internationalt og finder, at virksomheder forstår deres ansvar indenfor de dominerende 
institutionelle rammer (hjemme) og søger at replicere lignende strukturer og strategier i deres 
internationale private governance-engagementer. Artikel nummer to undersøger, hvordan 
logikker varierer mellem forskellige private governance-modeller og konkluderer, at MSI’er 
underbygges af en kollektiv logik, mens BLI’er underbygges af en godgørende logik. Derfor er 
MSI’er bedst i stand til at adressere systemiske og strukturelle problemer, mens BLI’er kan være 
effektive i forhold til mere snævert definerede og resultatorienterede spørgsmål. Tredje artikel 
undersøger, hvordan en ny håndhævelsesklausul i et af private governance-initiativerne 
påvirkede, hvordan virksomheder forstod og levede op til deres ansvar. Denne artikel finder, at 
mens aktører fortolkede en ”illusion” af denne klausul på samme måde, så reagerede 
virksomhederne på ganske forskellige måder – afhængigt af deres institutionelle kontekst – og 
traf private governance-valg i henhold hertil.  
 
Dette PhD-studie tilvejebringer tre primære bidrag. For det første bidrager studiet ved at benytte 
historisk institutionalisme til at synliggøre og fremhæve den rolle, som aktørers agens spiller i 
forhold til at navigere indenfor og imellem forskellige institutioner i deres respektive kontekster. 
Studiet fandt, at selvom dominerende institutioner formede aktørers forståelse og ’sensemaking’, 
var aktører stadig i stand til at ’enacte’ illusioner i deres respektive kontekster, som ikke havde 
eksisteret førhen, og herved demonstrere den indflydelsesrige rolle, som agens har. For det andet 
undersøger denne afhandling samspillet mellem struktur og agens i private governance og 
demonstrerer herved, at de dominerende institutioner i virksomheders hjemmekontekster endog 
former men ikke begrænser, hvordan de tilgår private governance. Dette udvikler vores forståelse 
for og påskønnelse af den rolle, som konteksten spiller i private governance. Slutteligt bidrager 
denne afhandling til at udvikle forståelsen af de politiske roller, som virksomheder spiller, og i 
særdeleshed til begrebet politisk CSR ved at foreslå at inkludere begreberne kontekst og agens i 
debatten for på en mere anvendelig måde at teoretisere over implikationerne af disse faktorer. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
With globalization has come the internationalization of supply chains, as well as social 
sustainability problems within them, such as child labor, unsafe working conditions, lack of living 
wages, modern slavery, and more.  Social sustainability issues came to the fore nearly 40 years 
ago when Nike was famously implicated for producing their products under sweatshop conditions; 
the exposé spurred Nike to be one of the first brands to lead efforts to address such problems.  
Today, companies – particularly multi-national corporations (MNCs) – are increasingly seen as 
sharing responsibility for the problems, as well as privileged with a position of power to address 
them; consequently, they are too being tasked with contributing to the mitigation of such issues 
(Amaeshi, Osuji, & Nnodim, 2008; Levy, Reinecke, & Manning, 2016; Locke, 2013; Young, 
2008).  Attributions, both for responsibility and irresponsibility, coupled with the overall 
internationalization of business, have thrust new expectations upon companies to contribute to the 
public good (Lange & Washburn, 2012; Scherer, Palazzo, & Baumann, 2006).   
 
Business’ engagement in contributing to the public good widened the scope of their societal roles 
from solely economic to also political (Moon, 2002).  Early work drew upon a political science 
perspective to explore the “political” responsibilities of business as “corporate citizenship”, 
highlighting the role of companies in providing government-like governance, such as through the 
provision of healthcare or education (Crane, Matten, & Moon, 2008; Matten & Crane, 2005).  As 
supply chains shifted from domestic to international, thereby transcending the jurisdiction of 
individual nation states, so did the need to conceptualize what international “political” roles for 
companies might look like. Subsequent scholarship built upon the corporate citizenship concept 
by further exploring its implications vis-à-vis  globalization, offering the perspective “political 
CSR” as a way to examine companies’ activities in response to the eroding divide between 
traditionally political and economic spheres (Scherer & Palazzo, 2007, 2011).  Accordingly, 
Western MNCs engaged in a variety of activities to address the gaps in governance in their 
international supply chains, such as implementing codes of conduct and joining collaborative 
efforts like multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs), industry associations, roundtables, and the like.  
Herein arises a primary avenue through which companies fulfill their political (CSR) roles: 
engaging in governance (Doh, McGuire, & Ozaki, 2015; Ruggie, 2017).   
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The political CSR perspective has thus far been largely theoretically descriptive, contending that 
firms have become political actors by virtue of their (new) roles in “contributing to global 
regulation and providing public goods” vis-à-vis global governance gaps apparent in their 
international supply chains (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011, p. 901).  This work has focused in large 
part on describing what types of political activities that firms’ undertake – such as providing 
public goods like schools or roads, or engaging in governance to address sweatshop conditions in 
their production factories – as a way to demonstrate that firms have thusly become political actors 
themselves (Scherer, Palazzo, & Matten, 2014).  Therefore, this PhD thesis investigates private 
governance (PG) as a way in which companies enact their political responsibilities.  In doing this 
is uses the term PG to refer to voluntary, non-market governance efforts that companies utilize to 
fulfill their sustainability imperatives in their supply chains (Cashore, 2002).   
 
Whilst the notion of firms as political was not new (e.g. Moon, 2002; Moon, Crane, & Matten, 
2005), the political CSR perspective helps explain on a macro level why actors outside of 
government – like companies – have become political, as well as what types of activities fall 
within this scope.  Yet, little is known about why companies engage (or not) in political CSR 
activities like PG, or about how companies go about carrying out “political” activities (Frynas & 
Stephens, 2015; Scherer, Rasche, Palazzo, & Spicer, 2016).  Not all companies engage in the same 
ways in political CSR, and not all political activities hold the same potential.  Using the case of 
the Bangladesh ready-made garment (RMG) industry post-Rana Plaza, this thesis explores two of 
the major PG initiatives (the Accord and Alliance) which arose in the aftermath.  In doing to, it 
seeks to contribute to our understanding of why companies understand their roles and 
responsibilities differently, and the implications of these differences for the private governance of 
sustainability issues.  Indicative questions that arise include: Why do companies engage in 
political CSR and governance?  How do different conceptions of responsibility influence the 
activities firms choose?  How do their institutional environments shape their behaviors?  Why do 
practices differ so greatly?  What are the differences between them?  What are the implications of 
different approaches?  These questions map out the quest of this PhD study.   
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1.1 Motivation 
1.1.1 Personal Experience 
The motivational underpinning of the study arose initially out of the author’s professional 
experience post-Rana Plaza.  Working in CSR at a large MNC sourcing RMG from Bangladesh 
around the time of  the Rana Plaza collapse, she experienced her company walking away from the 
first PG initiative that was created (the Accord) in favor of joining an emerging second option 
(the Alliance).  A particularly formative moment arose when speaking with a member of the 
company’s supply chain sustainability team integral to that decision, who said, effectively, 
“We’re a retailer.  We buy t-shirts and sell t-shirts.  Why are we now being asked to be responsible 
for buildings that we don’t own, in another country halfway around the world?!”, and then 
continued to speak to the relative virtues of the second PG initiative as compared to the first.  This 
perspective seemingly represented yet another key aspect to be explored: the role of interpretation, 
cognition and motivation in shaping companies’ CSR engagements.  Why was this company – 
which had a strong track record of philanthropic engagements and responsible business practices 
– walking away from the Accord and helping form the Alliance?  Indeed, there are numerous calls 
in the literature to better understand the “inside out” perspective of CSR; that is, how actors within 
firms reconcile notions of responsibility and CSR with (often conflicting) traditional business 
objectives, and make choices accordingly (Haack, Pfarrer, & Scherer, 2014; Scherer, Palazzo, & 
Seidl, 2013; Scherer et al., 2016).  As well, understanding the “inside out” perspective can help 
to explain differences that neo-institutional theory alone cannot.   
 
1.1.2 Phenomenon Driven  
Whilst details of the Rana Plaza tragedy and its responses are detailed later on in the thesis, the 
magnitude of the event – and its commensurate responses – demonstrated something 
fundamentally different about this particular crisis for the RMG industry.  Poor, inhumane and 
even lethal working conditions had been prevalent for decades, spawning the creation of a variety 
of PG organizations and certifications in the late 1990s and early 2000s.  The Fair Labor 
Association (FLA) – which included both industry and labor representatives – started up in 1999, 
with a faction of labor advocates protesting the inclusion of corporates and creating the Workers’ 
Rights Consortium (WRC) in 2000.  The American Apparel and Footwear Association created an 
accreditation working group in 1997 that was split off into its own organization in 2000, 
Worldwide Responsible Accredited Production (WRAP).  These efforts helped set the stage for 
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the use of PG as a principle way to address the social sustainability problems rife within the RMG 
industry (for a further discussion of these and other efforts see O’Rourke, 2003).  Yet, despite 
these efforts, dangerous working conditions remained.  Between 1990 and the collapse of Rana 
Plaza in 2013, at least 424 workers died and another 1,855 were injured in Bangladesh’s RMG 
sector alone (Hasan, Mahmud, & Islam, 2017).  As detailed in the methodology and empirics, the 
scale of the Rana Plaza crisis and the attributions of buyer’s culpability and hence responsibility 
was qualitatively different.  In addition to the Accord and Alliance – the PG organizations at the 
heart of this study – more than 100 other efforts were launched, ranging from programs of 
individuals brands, like Adidas’ SMS campaign to improve working conditions (Ignatzi, 2013),  
to intergovernmental efforts like the import of the successful ILO BetterWork program to the 
country (Polaski, 2006), to major increases in development and aid money from governments in 
both Europe and North America.  While the existence and trajectories of the PG which came 
before indisputably shaped the Accord and Alliance and other efforts, Rana Plaza served as a 
crisis which called into question prevailing norms, responsibility attributions, and overall action.  
Hence, the flurry of ensuing activities and attention in the post-Rana Plaza environment 
represented a compelling phenomenon which served as the locus of this study.    
 
1.1.3 Theoretical Basis    
Institutional theory would suggest that when subject to the same environment and pressures, firms 
in the same field will respond similarly due to isomorphic effects (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  
Yet, when looking at the post-Rana Plaza Bangladesh RMG industry1, a plethora of diverse 
responses arose; focusing on the responses by brands and retailers, two different PG initiatives 
emerged – the Accord and the Alliance – which shared the same standards and the same end goal 
to remediate physical safety problems within the RMG factories supplying Western brands and 
retailers.  But, these governance initiatives varied greatly in terms of membership, organizational 
structure, internal governance as well as strategic elements, such as their conceptualization of the 
problem and the logics used to frame and address the issue.  Why?  By adopting a historical 
institutionalism perspective, this thesis contends that a deeper appreciation of context can help 
explain the range of PG choices that emerged.  Divergences appeared between organizations 
assumed to be part of the same “organizational field”, that is, brands and retailers which sourced 
                                                          
1 The Rana Plaza case and MNC responses – creation of the Accord and Alliance – are detailed in the “Case 
Overview” section below.   
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apparel products from Bangladesh and commonly identify each other as peer companies or 
competitors (Hoffman, 1999; Wooten & Hoffman, 2017).  Further, the PG initiatives were created 
in response to the same cause, at the same time and due to the same pressures put forth by the 
same actors, suggesting that their “strategic responses” should have been the same (Oliver, 1991). 
Such a bifurcation of responses within the same institutional field runs counter to neo-institutional 
theory  However, the divergence in the PG created confound this presumption.  Hence, this 
phenomenon served as the first point of motivation for this PhD study.   
 
1.1.4 Gaps in the Literature  
A review of the literature with the previous points in mind revealed several gaps, which serve as 
the principle points which guided the thesis’ three papers.  When comparing how CSR practices 
differ, existing scholarship focuses almost exclusively on home or domestic CSR practices, and 
in particular, the role of home environments and governments in shaping those practices 
(Aguilera, Rupp, Williams, & Ganapathi, 2007; Campbell, 2007; Kang & Moon, 2012; Knudsen 
& Moon, 2017; Knudsen, Moon, & Slager, 2015; Maignan & Ralston, 2002; Matten & Moon, 
2008; Rasche, 2015).  Overall, this literature contends that CSR seeks to mirror, substitute, or 
otherwise complement the prevailing systems and structures.  Yet, it is unclear how structures, 
actors, underlying logics, norms or pressure affect companies’ CSR practices in international 
contexts: which prevails, home or host?  Indeed, the literature includes many calls for research on 
the role of institutional context (Frynas & Stephens, 2015; Scherer et al., 2014, 2016; Whelan, 
2012).  Thus, context serves as a principle gap in the CSR literature which the thesis seeks to 
address.   
 
Next, while the notion that PG is the primary mode through which companies fulfill their 
(political) CSR responsibilities, the focus of scholarship in this and related realms has focused 
rather narrowly on MSIs (Bures, 2014; Cashore, 2016; de Bakker, Ponte, & Rasche, 2015; Mena 
& Palazzo, 2012; Rasche, 2010, 2012; Scherer et al., 2016) largely to the exclusion of other types 
of collaborative governing.  Yet, we know from both theory and practice that other types of 
collaborative organizing – principally business-led initiatives (BLIs) – are also prevalent; just a 
few examples include the, Business and Social Compliance Initiative, Sustainable Forestry 
Initiative and Worldwide Responsible Accredited Production (WRAP).  We know little about 
these single-sector collaborative models, particularly as compared to their multi-sector 
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counterparts (Fransen, 2012; Marques, 2016).  The case design of this PhD study lends itself well 
to conducting a comparison between the two types of PG organizing models (the Accord is a MSI 
and the Alliance is a BLI), thereby expanding our understanding of the variety of structures, 
strategies, logics and potential of different models and modes of PG.       
 
Finally, and related to the previous point, scholarship to date has not robustly explored the means 
or mechanisms by which PG – MSIs or otherwise – carry out their work, particularly from a 
theoretical perspective (e.g. Gilbert, Rasche, & Waddock, 2011; Gjølberg, 2011).  While there is 
debate in the political science and law literatures about the roles and interactions of hard and soft 
law (Abbott & Snidal, 2000; Kobrin, 2009; McBarnet, Voiculescu, & Campbell, 2007; McBarnet, 
2009), such nuances remain under-explored in business and management.  Appreciating how CSR 
is conducted is of paramount importance to understanding the implications of different approaches 
and structures for encouraging or impeding different kinds of corporate activities.   
 
Overall, this thesis contributes to our understanding of why companies understand their roles and 
responsibilities differently, and the implications of these differences for the governance of 
sustainability-related issues.  It’s not just enough to know what companies do to fulfill their 
political responsibilities, but also why and how they do it.   
 
1.2 Scope of the Study (RQs)  
Situated within the business and management literature generally and in CSR specifically, the 
thesis adopts a case study approach to research the aforementioned gaps in the literature.  It 
considers companies’ engagement in PG as a manifestation of CSR in keeping with the political 
CSR perspective (explored in further detail below).  Hence, the scope of the empirics explored 
focus almost exclusively on private actors and their relationship with the Accord and Alliance, 
competing PG initiatives in the post-Rana Plaza Bangladesh RMG industry.  It seeks to answer 
the overarching question: Why do companies understand their political roles differently, and how 
does this shape their private governance choices?  It addresses this overall question via three 
papers, all single-authored, each of which addresses a contributing sub-question:  
1) Paper 1.  How do different domestic institutional contexts shape firms’ approach to PG 
internationally?   
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2) Paper 2.  How do the logics between MSIs and BLIs for private governance differ, and 
what does this mean for their potential to address different types of sustainability 
challenges?   
3) Paper 3.  How did the inclusion of a “hard” enforcement mechanism affect how companies 
understood and fulfilled their responsibilities? 
In answering these questions, this thesis seeks to understand the interplay between institutional, 
individual and organizational levels to offer a broader perspective that integrates and appreciates 
the interactions and dependencies between these various levels.  To do this it considers the 
institutional level – manifest through national business systems (NBSs), norms of CSR practices, 
stakeholder expectations, etc. – as the structure in which individuals evaluate and make choices.  
Institutions provide reference points, rules and norms which individuals’ draw upon to understand 
and make sense of their CSR responsibilities (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008).  By shaping individuals’ 
sensemaking and cognitions, dominant institutions thereby set the parameters for individuals’ 
scope of agency (Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012; Weick, 1979).  This view suggests that 
dominant institutions shape individuals’ conceptions and choices by setting broad parameters 
based on dominant rules, norms and structures; this leaves significant scope for agency and 
therefore eschews a “path dependent” perspective.  Linking the macro to the micro in this way 
helps to explain the why questions of CSR by explicating the role of institutions (context) in 
influencing and shaping individual cognitions and choices.   
 
Individuals’ understandings and motivations underpin their CSR choices.  Actors may choose to 
engage in CSR activities or not, and have a wide array of activities from which to choose from, 
which themselves may be complementary, overlapping, contradictory, or otherwise.  In this study 
actors’ CSR choices are manifest via two different PG initiatives (the Accord and Alliance).  The 
translation of actors’ choices into political CSR activities elucidates the how actors choose to 
operationalize their political CSR responsibilities.  Indeed, better understanding the connections 
and interdependencies between the various levels has been called for in political CSR scholarship.  
“Future political CSR studies can usefully construct multi-level frameworks combining the wider 
changes in global governance at the macro level, the strategic organizational factors at the meso 
level, and individual perceptions at the micro level, which requires the application of multiple 
theoretical perspectives.” (Frynas & Stephens, 2015, p. 497).  This is done empirically in the 
papers by exploring how domestic institutional contexts (U.S. and Europe) shaped actors’ 
sensemaking and understanding, which informed their PG choices (MSI Accord and BLI 
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Alliance).   Herein we can observe how the dominant institutional environments set the stage for 
actors’ agency and choices for how they would engage in PG.  Figure 1 presents a representation 
of this conceptualization.  This concept is further developed in light of the study’s findings, and 
detailed further in the Discussion section below.   
 
Figure 1.  Interplay of institutions, sensemaking and private governance choices.   
 
 
 
 
1.3 Scope Limitations  
The scope limitations of this study are numerous.  First, whilst the thesis draws to some extent 
upon scholarship from political science, international political economy, law, sociology and 
related fields, it itself is situated within the business and management literature generally and CSR 
specifically.  But even within the limited scope of CSR, it does not necessarily address all of the 
issues within it, for example, the many questions about democratic legitimacy of private 
governance or any of the other many philosophical perspectives.  As the scope of the thesis is 
delimited to answering why and how companies engage in political CSR, it does not offer a 
normative evaluation of the private governance modes or mechanisms themselves, though it does 
discuss their varying potential to address different types of sustainability issues.   
 
Next, its empirics are restricted to the Accord and Alliance initiatives themselves, and focus on a 
private sector perspective.  Accordingly, views of civil society, factory owners and workers are 
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limited.  Even within that narrow scope, the private sector perspective is primarily a MNC one.  
In this particular case, size matters, as it was primarily the biggest companies which were the most 
involved in establishing the PG initiatives, designing their parameters, and ultimately providing 
governance.  Therefore, while a few small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have been 
included, subjects were predominately MNCs.  Large MNCs have vastly different resources, 
organizational structures, and sourcing practices than smaller businesses, meaning that there are 
likely notable differences in their engagement in CSR and in the provision of governance (D. 
Baumann-Pauly, Wickert, Spence, & Scherer, 2013; Wickert, Scherer, & Spence, 2016).  For 
example, large companies like H&M and Gap employ full-time staff on the ground in Dhaka to 
oversee production locally; in contrast, SMEs often work through “buyers’ agents” – third-party 
businesses which rely upon their own networks to source specified products for their SME clients 
– meaning that many SMEs prior to Rana Plaza did not even know which factories produced their 
products, much less audited them (Jorgensen & Knudsen, 2006).  Differences like these underpin 
obvious differences in aspects like brands’ relationships with suppliers and their 
operationalization of the tenets of the Accord or Alliance agreements (Wickert, 2014).  So, whilst 
institutional environments for MNCs and SMEs can be the same, their reference points in terms 
of power, leverage, and agency may be quite different, not to mention the role of stakeholders and 
top management (Gilbert & Rasche, 2008).  So, it is recognized that the experience or perspective 
of SMEs may differ and therefore may differ from the MNC perspective which dominates the 
overall findings of the thesis.   
 
Additionally, given the focus on the Accord and Alliance, the scope of “social sustainability” is 
set narrowly on the express purpose of these private governance initiatives: building, fire and 
construction safety in the Bangladesh RMG factories which produce for their Western brands 
members.  While recognizing existing literature on these organizations (e.g. Banerjee, 2017; 
Barrett, Baumann-Pauly, & Gu, 2018; Donaghey & Reinecke, 2017; Koenig-Archibugi, 2017; 
Reinecke, Donaghey, Wilkinson, & Wood, 2018; Scheper, 2017; Schuessler, Frenkel, & Wright, 
2018), much of the work has evaluated the Accord and Alliance on their ability (or not) to promote 
labor rights more broadly, cover factories outside of their scope, or address power asymmetries in 
international supply chains.  While important and laudable issues, neither the Accord nor Alliance 
set out expressly to address – much less accomplish – any of these tasks. However, as argued in 
Paper 2, the problem of factory safety was seen by the Accord to stem from lack of labor rights, 
yet the scope of the Accord’s work focused on improving structural and fire safety.  While perhaps 
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debate about whether or not the Accord and Alliance should have taken on a broader agenda 
merits discussion, the focus of this thesis is on understanding how these organizations and their 
limited scope on factory safety can help improve our understanding of why and how companies 
engage in CSR – and specifically PG – differently.  However, this thesis does discuss which types 
of PG models are most propitiously suited for addressing particular types of sustainability issues.   
 
The data collection for the thesis wrapped up in mid- to late-2018, meaning that developments 
after this time are not included in this work.  This timing aligned with the scheduled closing of 
both the Accord and Alliance so promised a logical cut-off point; however, realities on the ground 
didn’t unfold as anticipated, and political battles ensued.  Both the Accord and Alliance 
recognized that their work wasn’t completed, and both acknowledged that the government of 
Bangladesh was not yet prepared to take over the work.  Therefore, both organizations sought to 
continue in some sort of fashion.  While the Alliance’s strategy was to fly under the radar by 
“transitioning” a modified version of its model to a new organization, the Accord proclaimed that 
it would soldier on, a promise met by fierce resistance by the government of Bangladesh.  Lengthy 
court proceedings and political battles ensued which called into question if and how the Accord 
could also continue its work.  The latest decision immediately before going to print (19 May 2019) 
indicated that the Accord would be allowed to continue on until early 2020.  Such differences and 
discord bring to the fore a host of additional implications and avenues for further research; yet, 
the timing of these came too late for meaningful exploration in this thesis.  Therefore, temporality 
serves as another principle scope limitation of this thesis.   
 
Finally, there are various other scope limitations of the work which are outlined as applicable 
within each of the individual papers.     
 
1.4 Structure of the Kappe  
The kappe is structured as follows.  First, it provides an overarching frame for its three papers by 
further exploring the literature on CSR as “political”, as well as background on the historical 
institutionalism perspective.  The review and positioning seeks to further elucidate existing gaps 
in the literature as well as to draw out and problematize some of the existing assumptions or over-
simplifications to which this study contributes more nuanced understanding.  Next, it outlines its 
methodology, providing detail on the case and its context, as well as the study’s approach to data 
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collection and analysis.  Next, it offers an overview of the thesis’ papers, both in individual detail 
as well as in relation to each other and the overarching research question.  Finally, the discussion 
section draws upon the findings of the individual papers to construct the overall findings of the 
study in relation to the overarching research question.   
 
2. POLITICAL ROLES OF CORPORATIONS  
2.2 CSR as Political  
The concept of corporations as “political” is not new.  Indeed, as early as the 1960s scholars 
recognized the importance of interactions between business and society, positing “corporate 
constitutionalism”: companies’ position of power came with  inherent social responsibilities  
(Davis, 1960).  This was followed by research that looked at the business-society relationship 
through the lens of a social contract, leading to the introduction of Integrative Social Contract 
Theory (Dunfee & Donaldson, 1994).  Both focused on the role and agency of firm leadership in 
negotiating companies’ responsibilities with the world around them.  Such perspectives have been 
referred to as “political theories” of CSR (Garriga & Melé, 2004).  They facilitated a new stream 
of research which focused on the power, position and responsibilities of business in society, a 
departure from the traditional economic view of the firm.   
 
From this literature grew the concept of corporate citizenship, which evolved, in part, to recognize 
the role of corporations in administering citizenship-like rights as if they were government (Crane 
et al., 2008; Matten & Crane, 2005).  It also showed how corporations could engage in citizenship 
activities, like providing a government-type function.  It went on to note the applicability of this 
concept in areas of governmental retreat or absence, as well as in areas which transcended 
individual nation states such as sustainability issues like climate change (Crane et al., 2008).  The 
concept of corporate citizenship highlighted the governance function that firms were beginning to 
play, seeing this as a “reconfiguration” of the business-society relationship.  This work set the 
scene for the next chapter in exploring the political nature of CSR.   
 
The next wave of research built upon the corporate citizenship notion in the context of 
globalization, arguing that companies had become politicized by taking on duties for the public 
good.  They argued that firms were  increasingly compelled to provide governance in weak 
institutional environments, such as in weak or failed states where companies’ supply chains often 
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originated (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011; Scherer et al., 2006).  This was termed “political CSR” and 
premised upon 1) weak or ineffective institutional environments (primarily governments) where 
companies’ did business, and 2) firms’ provision of “governance” in these areas so as to contribute 
to “public goods”, activities which put them into a government-like, “political” role (Scherer et 
al., 2014; Scherer & Palazzo, 2011).  Later work sought to further develop the notion of political 
CSR, culminating in a proclaimed “political CSR 2.0” (PCSR) (Scherer et al., 2016).  According 
to the authors, in the decade since the first political CSR paper was introduced, society has 
changed rapidly into “another phase of globalization”, necessitating the reconsideration of some 
of the original work’s basic assumptions (Scherer et al., 2016, p. 279).  Evolving the concept of 
political CSR to a 2.0 version offers an updated definition of political CSR as, “those responsible 
business activities that turn corporations into political actors, by engaging in public deliberations, 
collective decisions and the provision of public goods or the restriction of public bads in cases 
where public authorities are unable or unwilling to fulfil this role” (2016, p. 276).  Overall, it 
argues that there has been a shift in recent years in how companies understand and practice 
political CSR, with several key differences arising: increasing institutional heterogeneity, more 
reliance on hard and soft law, and growing complexity in supply chain governance.  The full 
summary table created by the authors can be found in Appendix 1: PCSR 1.0 to 2.0.   
 
Whilst the shift from a political CSR 1.0 to 2.0 perspective highlighted many interesting 
developments, the veracity of the claims is not without question.  Is the governance of supply 
chains more “complex”, and if so, is this universally true?  Aren’t international supply chains 
inherently institutionally heterogeneous?   Do companies now always integrate economic and 
social rationalities?  These and other questions demonstrate the necessity of empirical exploration 
of such shifts, particularly if the use-value of the political CSR perspective is to explain or predict 
MNC behavior.   
 
Criticisms of the political CSR perspective largely call for a broader interpretation of the term, as 
well as further research to better understand under-explored aspects.  The current notion of 
political CSR does not adequately acknowledge or afford a role for the state in shaping companies’ 
CSR practices (Schrempf-Stirling, 2018).  Some have also sought a further investigation of the 
relationship between CSR and corporate political activity (den Hond, Rehbein, de Bakker, & 
Kooijmans-van Lankveld, 2014; Frynas, Child, & Tarba, 2017; Rasche, 2015), though “corporate 
political activities” such as lobbying fall outside the domain of this study.  Other research argues 
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that political CSR doesn’t address inherent power asymmetries between corporations and more 
vulnerable stakeholders, highlighting the need to better understand the breadth and diversity of 
relationships between CSR and stakeholders (Banerjee, 2017).  A more pluralistic research agenda 
which could integrate perspectives as well as domains has also been suggested (Frynas & 
Stephens, 2015).  For purposes of this study, CSR is considered to be political when corporations 
engage in activities which contribute to the public good, such as social sustainability, and which 
reach beyond their core business.  Indeed, while there is has been much excitement and dialogue 
about the political CSR concept, it could benefit from continued development and theorization.   
 
While there has been debate about whether political CSR is a cause or consequence of 
globalization, empirically, we can observe political CSR as a form of globalization (Whelan, 
2012).  “Globalization” can be broken down to be viewed as a post-national constellation – in 
keeping with the Habermasian perspective – where companies now must operate in a variety of 
different nation states and business systems.  Such an array of environments results in institutional 
fragmentation of norms, rules, authority, basis of legitimacy and more (Scherer et al., 2014).  As 
activities move internationally beyond traditional bounds of individual nation states, institutional 
heterogeneity has ensued and global institutions – like the United Nations and ILO – have arisen 
to help fill the void (Abbott & Snidal, 2013).  Some scholars have argued that such trends signal 
that companies need more robust boundaries between business and politics, and in particular, 
steering by international governance bodies (Mäkinen & Kasanen, 2016); yet, paradoxically 
perhaps, the rise of and deference to international bodies and standards may actually further 
institutional fragmentation and complexity as these add layers of norms, rules, and standards 
without removing existing layers of regulation from national and local governments (Ruggie, 
2004).  Businesses now have even more institutions in which to navigate.   
 
Companies are now faced with institutional plurality as a normal aspect of business, and ever 
more so when sourcing internationally.  The national business systems (NBSs) which host the 
production of MNCs’ products may be structured in vastly different ways than those in their home 
environments.  Political, legal, economic and education and labor systems may all vary, and these 
differences form the dominant frame which actors’ draw upon to interpret and make sense of their 
roles and responsibilities.  Differing interpretations – shaped by the dominant institutional 
contexts – motivate different CSR activities which complement the structures and norms within 
that particular context (Matten & Moon, 2008; Whitley, 2007).  Scholarship has explored how 
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CSR (including political CSR) varies between various political systems, with the blurring of 
boundaries between public and private responsibilities a seeming point of commonality (Mäkinen 
& Kasanen, 2016; Mäkinen & Kourula, 2012).  Companies face both institutional and CSR 
pluralism.   
 
Institutional plurality necessitates firms’ navigation of disparate environments, meaning that 
companies must make choices about where and how to engage. Whilst “globalization” may indeed 
signify a new era of business operation, it is perhaps less useful to think of supply chains as 
“global” than “international” given that they are not rooted in global-level systems of rules and 
governance so much as they are fragmented between various (local) national environments 
(Abbott, 2011).  Institutions vary in their features and systems, meaning that companies must 
operate dually on “global” and “local” levels simultaneously, “glocal” (D. Brown & Knudsen, 
2012).  The differences between environments and the choices companies make have been under-
explored, and there has been little emphasis in exploring how context shapes the types of political 
CSR activities in which firms engage (Frynas & Stephens, 2015; Scherer et al., 2014, 2016; 
Westermann-Behaylo, Rehbein, & Fort, 2015).  PG activities vary in both strategy and structure, 
yet little is known about these differences (Ahrne & Brunsson, 2011; Cashore, Auld, & Newsom, 
2004; Levi-Faur, 2012; Rasche, de Bakker, & Moon, 2013).  Hence, Paper 1 of this thesis takes 
its point of departure in the comparative CSR literature – which draws heavily upon National 
Business Systems literature – to explore how home institutional contexts shape firms’ approaches 
to private governance engagement internationally.    
 
Companies must continually navigate not just between institutions, but also within them.   Within 
institutions actors must make choices about how to engage, underscoring the importance of 
institutional agency by actors (DiMaggio, 1988).  Institutional agency is congruent with the 
political CSR notion that actors co-create the institutional environments in which they operate 
(Scherer, Rasche, Palazzo, & Spicer, 2016).  But, we know little about why actors choose the CSR 
activities they do, and even less about the implications of these different choices.  As companies 
make determinations about which political CSR activities to undertake as well as how they 
implement them; “we must look to people's creativity at the local level, as well as the 'rules of the 
game' to understand how organizations work” (Binder, 2007, p. 568).  Institutional plurality and 
heterogeneity result in great complexity for actors’ perception of responsibilities, their 
administration of activities, and the varying outcomes those activities may attain.  The exploration 
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of companies’ CSR rationales and choices, along with the implications thereof, is therefore 
paramount.  All of the papers seek to advance our understanding of the role of agency in political 
CSR in their own way by adopting differing lenses for the investigation of the interplay of 
structure and agency. Paper 1 draws upon a typically structuralist perspective – in the form of 
comparative political economy (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Matten & Moon, 2008; Whitley, 1999) – 
to investigate and explain the range of agency for PG within these structures.  Paper 2 draws upon 
the institutional logics perspective – which bridges actors’ agency with institutional structures – 
to compare different models and modes of CSR activities and their significance (Thornton et al., 
2012).  Paper 3 investigates the role of individuals’ sensemaking in “enacting” the environments 
in which companies practice PG (Weick, 2001).   
 
Overall, the political CSR perspective highlights the need to better understand context and its role 
in shaping decision-making and behavior, not the least for better explaining and predicting PG 
behavior (Whelan, 2012).  To accomplish these goals, we must better understand the sensemaking, 
cognitions and motivations which underpin and shape companies’ choices in PG practices, and 
juxtapose them with the institutional contexts in which these activities take place.     
 
2.3 Private Governance  
A cornerstone of the political CSR literature is companies’ provision of governance, which serves 
as the locus of this study.  Governance itself is multi-faceted and this thesis uses a broad definition 
of governance as “self-organizing, interorganizational networks” (Rhodes, 1996, p. 660).  
Governance can be a structure (rules, norms, institutions, hierarchies), a process (dynamic, 
ongoing steering and coordination), a mechanism (procedures of decision-making) or a strategy 
(design, creation, and adaption of governance systems) (Levi-Faur, 2012, pp. 8–9).  While distinct, 
these features are also interdependent; a governance strategy informs the chosen governance 
structure and mechanisms which provide the basis for the process of governing.  Viewing 
governance in such a manner reveals its confluence of structural and agentic dimensions.   
 
While companies have “governed” their own supply chains via codes of conduct, buyer audits 
and similar for some time, political CSR focuses on “governance” as deliberation and collective 
decision-making in an effort to promote public goods or restrict public bads (Scherer et al., 2016).  
The former was primarily used ex post to punish violations, whereas the latter has signaled a shift 
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to an ex ante, proactive approach, often via capacity building-type efforts (Locke, Amengual, & 
Mangla, 2009; Locke, 2013).   Indeed, a collaborative approach to governance has been led to the 
creation of “governance networks”, defined as “networks of interdependent actors that contribute 
to the production of public governance”, a fitting definition vis-à-vis political CSR (Torfing, 2012, 
p. 99).  Numerous terms have been used to refer to collaborative governance approaches2, 
underscoring the need to better understand the differences between them.   However, for purposes 
of this study, PG is conceptualized as non-state, non-market voluntary approaches through which 
companies exercise responsibilities for their sustainability imperatives (Cashore, 2002).  In 
essence, PG embodies a collective approach to the practice of political CSR.   
 
PG itself is shaped by dominant institutional structures and systems.  The comparative exploration 
of CSR practices on each side of the Atlantic has revealed significant differences in the practices 
of North American (typically U.S.) and European companies.  While American companies tend 
to take a more “explicit” approach that is, a focus on philanthropy and external communication, 
European companies are more “implicit” through their focus on fulfilling their societal 
expectations (Blindheim, 2015; Matten & Moon, 2008).  This has been attributed to institutional 
complementarities and mirroring (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Kang & Moon, 2012; Whitley, 1999). 
Paper 1 explores how such factors may also be relevant for PG, and in particular, what this means 
for the structures and strategies deployed internationally (Chandler, 1962; Rasche et al., 2013).   
 
The collaborative approach to PG has been emblazoned by the United Nations Sustainable 
Development Goal 17, Partnerships for the Goals (United Nations General Assembly, 2015).  
Whilst the philosophical underpinnings of partnerships and collective decision-making are 
                                                          
2 The literature on governance mechanisms is diverse and employs a variety of names as it relates to the governance 
of sustainability-related issues, some of which include new governance (Moon, 2002), private governance (Brammer, 
Jackson, & Matten, 2012; Hahn & Pinkse, 2014), multi-stakeholder governance (Fransen, 2012), collaborative 
governance (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Bendell, Miller, & Wortmann, 2011; Rasche, 2010; Rogers & Weber, 2010; 
Zadek, 2006; Zadek & Radovich, 2006), voluntary governance (Eberlein et al., 2014; Haar & Keune, 2014; Rasche, 
2010), alternative governance (Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2011; J. Doh et al., 2015; Parella, 2014), private 
sustainability governance (Abbott, 2011), and non-state market driven governance (Cashore, 2002).  The final term 
– non-state market driven governance – has arguably been the most well-defined, being “deliberative and adaptive 
governance institutions designed to embed social and environmental norms in the global marketplace that derive 
authority directly from interested audiences, including those they seek to regulate, not from sovereign states”, and 
which includes five features: 1) authority comes from outside of the state, 2) are collective and collaborative in nature, 
3) authority emanates from the market’s supply chain, 4) aim to reconfigure markets, and 5) monitor and enforce its 
activities (Cashore, 2002).  Whilst acknowledging the breath of terminology and approaches, this thesis uses the term 
private governance.   
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laudable, we know little about how disparate modes and models of collaboration differ.  As 
discussed previously, the vast majority of the literature to date has focused on MSIs, yet cross-
sector partnerships are hardly the only type of collaborative organizing model (Marques, 2016).  
Thus, Paper 2 seeks to understand how different philosophical underpinnings reflect 
fundamentally different logics which guided the design and implementation of the Accord and 
Alliance, thereby advancing our understanding of when and why particular PG approaches – e.g. 
MSIs and BLIs – might emerge.  It explores how modes differ between the empirical PG models, 
finding distinct differences in actors’ conception of the problem and subsequent solution deployed 
to reach the shared goal of safety.  Further, it theorizes about how these differences might align 
with varying potential for different kinds of sustainability challenges, bringing to the fore 
consideration of the means used to achieve the ends.  
 
Finally, knowledge is limited about the rules, procedures and mechanisms to effectively 
administer private governance.  The enforceability of voluntary, “soft law” nature of PG has been 
an ever-present challenge and criticism of it (Ahrne & Brunsson, 2004; Vogel, 2008), in part 
because participation is itself often a strategy of “hard” regulatory avoidance (Maxwell & Decker, 
2006; Steurer, 2010).   As novel enforcement approaches are utilized, how do these steer 
companies’ behaviors?  Do they attract companies, or deter them?  Increase their adherence or 
provide an avenue for greenwashing?  We know little about how different mechanisms might lead 
to different interpretations and choices. Hence, Paper 3 analyzes the opposite reactions (aversion 
and adherence) to a “breakthrough” hybrid soft-and-hard law enforcement mechanism used in the 
Accord.  A sensemaking perspective advances our understanding of how context shapes actors’ 
cognitive frames and subsequent actions (“enactment”), which have the potential to lead to very 
different realities (“enacted environments”) (Weick, 1995).  The analysis contributes to our 
understanding of “hardened” approaches to PG, as well as demonstrating the powerful role of 
sensemaking in shaping actors’ behaviors.   
 
2.4 Historical Institutionalism  
Institutional perspectives have dominated the CSR field.  While this makes a great deal of sense 
given the centrality of institutions in CSR, it is also fraught with challenges.  A major point of 
critique is neo-institutional theory’s inability to adequately account for agency, seemingly 
reducing it to path dependence, rational choice, and utility maximization (Hay & Wincott, 1998).  
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Given the inability of isomorphic pressures to explain the empirical plurality of CSR activities or 
PG, a fresh perspective is needed to account for the powerful role of institutions as well as actors 
agency within them.  The point is not to determine which is more influential – agency or structure 
– but rather, to find explanations that “situate agents within a context that frames and shapes the 
strategies they are likely to pursue and with which they are likely to be able to effect real change” 
(Thelen, 2010, p. 56).  Better appreciating the role of agency within institutions can help further 
our understanding of how prevailing structures shape interpretations, strategies and behaviors, 
thereby transcending narrow “institutional” interpretations and sharpening the theoretical lens of 
institutional theory (Alvesson & Spicer, 2018; Thelen, 2010).    
 
Context is critical in shaping actors’ choices.  The interplay between organizations and institutions 
has been underexplored, in part because of the lack of appreciation of how different forms of 
organizing interact with institutions (Meyer & Höllerer, 2014).  “Even when faced with the same 
institutional pressures, there will be organizational heterogeneity because of the play of 
contingency factors.  And we need to understand it” (Greenwood, Hinings, & Whetten, 2014, p. 
1216).  Individuals play an important role in this, necessitating an approach which is more 
reflexive and encompassing (Willmott, 2011).  Indeed, the multitude of processes of organizing, 
as well as the plethora of organizations themselves, empirically demonstrate the need to better 
understand the relationship between institutional heterogeneity and agency.   
 
A harkening back to some of institutional theory's historical roots can help overcome these 
shortcomings.  Traditional institutional theory appreciated the role of agency of actors within 
institutions (Selznick, 1996), something brought back to the fore with the concept of institutional 
work (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Lawrence, Suddaby, & Leca, 2011), though this is frequently 
positioned as a sub-set of neo-institutional theory rather than a fundamental change to it 
(Lawrence, Leca, & Zilber, 2013; Willmott, 2011).  Until then, agency was only acknowledged 
by neo-institutionalists as exceptional, in the form of institutional entrepreneurs and the paradox 
of embedded agency (Battilana, Leca, & Boxenbaum, 2009; DiMaggio, 1988).  Further, neo-
institutional theory has rarely grappled with the histories, events and legacies which have resulted 
in the phenomenon in question, therefore resulting in a rather shallow, positivist and limited view 
of institutions where individuals are largely seen as rationally-deductive utility-maximizers 
(Suddaby, Foster, & Mills, 2014).  Neo-institutionalism has “become obsessed with the outcomes 
of historical and institutional processes at the expense of studying the processes themselves” 
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(Suddaby et al., 2014, p. 115).  Contexts, processes, and actors’ agency stand as commonalities in 
some of the challenges currently facing institutional theory (Greenwood et al., 2014).   
 
Historical institutionalism, in contrast to neo-institutionalism, addresses these issues.  In a 
historical institutionalism perspective, institutions are historical processes which result from 
interactions between individuals; the interactions bear social significance, though interpretations 
may change over time (Thelen, 2010).   This has led to the definition of historical institutionalism 
as “the socio-historical process by which habituated actions and meanings become reified as 
objective social structures” (Suddaby et al., 2014, p. 111).  Institutions are not just structures or 
things, but processes that evolve over time (Mahoney & Thelen, 2015).  Comparative research 
between organizations and institutions can help advance our understanding of processes by 
unearthing “…the intersections of separately structured developments that often account for 
outcomes we wish to understand” (Skocpol, 1995, p. 104).  Institutions are interconnected and 
interacting, and neither institutions nor organizations can be understood in isolation (Pierson & 
Skocpol, 2002).  An understanding of institutions in this way accounts for their deep histories and 
therefore affords endogenous explanations for institutional changes, rather than solely exogenous. 
 
Adopting a historically-informed view of institutions can also help advance our understanding of 
political CSR, and in particular, why and how companies engage in PG differently.  The 
proclaimed shift in political CSR from 1.0 to 2.0 illustrates important shifts and differences in the 
practice of CSR and private governance (Scherer et al., 2016).  However, the findings from the 
review of the literature and the research presented here problematize the assumption that shifts 
are entirely attributable to globalization and temporality.  Those factors alone cannot explain the 
empirical heterogeneity in PG practices, seemingly pointing to similar shortcomings as neo-
institutional theory (Alvesson & Spicer, 2018; Greenwood et al., 2014; Meyer & Höllerer, 2014).  
Therefore, by adopting a historical institutionalism perspective, this research explores the role of 
institutional contexts, actors’ agency, and changes over time to better understand the differences 
in the practices and process of political CSR and PG.   
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3. METHODOLOGY   
3.1 Philosophy of Science  
The motivation for this study arose from the author’s personal experiences with her company 
post-Rana Plaza, which manifest in various ways.  First, there was the observable phenomenon 
that the company, which had been in conversations with the Accord, walked away and instead 
joined Walmart and Gap in creating a competing version (the Alliance).  The emergence of two 
organizations to do the same work ran counter to the traditional business logic of efficiency, so 
served as an observable artifact.  Yet, the occurrence gave rise to queries about why the company 
did this, and what the implications may be.   
 
There are four research philosophies in management research, each with its own ontological and 
epistemological considerations: positivism, realism, interpretivism, and pragmatism (Saunders, 
Lewis, & Thornhill, 2009).  Ontology refers to the nature of reality, and informs the understanding 
about how the world works (Saunders et al., 2009).  Views range from objectivism to subjectivism.  
On the objectivism end of the scale, social phenomena exist independently of and external to the 
actors themselves, while on the subjectivism end, these are created only through perception and 
action.  For example, differences in what an “organization” means can vary based upon the 
ontological consideration.  In objectivism, organizations exist of their own accord – manifest 
through rules, structures, policies and hierarchies – leading studies of organizations in this view 
to examine how changes affect the components of organizations (e.g. Ouchi, 1977).  In contrast, 
subjectivism views organizations as constituted of the social interactions and interpretation of 
actors; the communication as constitutive of organizations (CCO) model is one such example 
(Schoeneborn & Trittin, 2013).   
 
The ontological viewpoint informs epistemology, which is concerned with what constitutes 
acceptable knowledge within a discipline.  Epistemological considerations define the parameters 
of what types of data and analysis are appropriate for creating knowledge within a particular field, 
which comprise the research philosophies (Bryman & Bell, 2003).  Akin to the natural sciences, 
positivism believes that phenomena are observable, testable, objective and normative-free.  
Interpretivism’s subjective view doesn’t believe in testable explanations, but rather, 
understanding human behavior.  In between is realism, which holds that reality can be understood; 
variant is critical realism, which believes that conceptualizations reflects reality (e.g. hierarchies) 
35 
 
and that “knowledge” may not be directly observable (e.g. theories, ideal types) (Bryman & Bell, 
2003).  Lastly, pragmatism holds that the best research philosophy is the one that best matches 
the research question, as “knowledge” is dependent upon the nature of the phenomenon in 
question.   
 
This PhD study adopted a pragmatic perspective, reflecting the nature of the data inputs which 
arose from the empirical phenomenon.  Some phenomenon are observable in positivistic sense: 
number of factories, the presence of fire extinguishers, workers’ wages, and so forth.  Other 
phenomena are not: interpretations, motivations, the “hardness” of a law, logics, and more.  
Therefore, the philosophy of science deployed in the study was guided by the nature of the 
phenomenon at hand.  This tended to skew toward an interpretist view given the RQ’s focus on 
understanding how and why, inherently subjective queries.  Following, the majority of the data 
and its analysis was of the interpretive nature where a critical realism perspective guided the work.  
Conceptualization – guided by rigorous data analysis methods – is capable of reflecting how and 
why companies understand and select PG, and understanding that phenomena can entail analysis 
and explanation via theoretical models (e.g. a model detailing the structural and strategic elements 
of PG).  These models help us to specify meanings so as to drive for shared understandings (e.g. 
what it means to embody a collective logic versus a benevolent one), and ultimately, knowledge 
production.   
 
3.2 Qualitative Case Study Approach  
The nature of the research query – understanding interpretations and choices – coupled with the 
author’s philosophy of science lent itself to a qualitative design.  Further, its phenomenon-driven 
motivation made a case study method logical; both approaches are in keeping with dominant 
research traditions in management.  Further, deep diving into empirical realities in the form of 
cases allows for the development of reliable and valid theory (Strauss & Corbin, 1998).  
Qualitative research capable of building theory must follow rigorous processes in design, 
implementation, and analysis, which this study sought to adhere to (Eisenhardt, 1989).  The study 
involved bringing together multiple data points and followed best practices in its processes and 
practices (ibid).   
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The use of the term “case” is done broadly throughout the thesis, in keeping with the multi-level 
nature and dimensionality of the research phenomenon and context.  Further, this is reflective of 
the many organizations included, multiple levels analyzed, and abundant amount of data collected.  
Starting at the bottom, each of the individual organizations – such as H&M and Walmart – 
constituted their own “case”; in particular, this is the label used in NVivio software to differentiate 
each as unique bundles of data which could be compared.  Further, the Accord and Alliance – 
each organizations in their own right, yet simultaneously comprised of organizations as members 
– served as the foci of the study, thereby constituting their own “cases” which could stand alone 
and/or be compared.  Finally, as the research query and study design was analogous in nature, the 
Accord and Alliance are referred to as a “comparative case”. 
 
The choice of a comparative case was motivated by the author’s personal experience and 
substantiated via the gaps found within the literature.  The study totaled four years, and the 
longevity of this design allowed for an overlap in the periods of data collection and analysis, 
allowing the study to adopt an abductive approach.  The data collection and early analysis was 
guided by the data, but informed by the literature and theory.  The duality helped sharpen the line 
of inquiry.  The inherently comparative design lent itself well to pushing the researcher to examine 
various perspectives and angles, as well as the identification of points of commonality and 
contrast.  Finally, the data were fully analyzed and situated within the literature to reinforce points 
of commonality and develop emergent concepts (Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 2012).  The study’s 
specific approach to data collection and analysis are detailed below, and overall sought to allow 
for a grounded theory approach when needed (Suddaby, 2006).   
 
3.3 Data Collection  
This qualitative PhD study draws upon multiple data sources to thoroughly investigate actors’ 
insights, interpretations and motivations – and the manifestations thereof – to explicate why and 
how firms engage in political activities like PG.  The study began in March 2015 and data 
collection ended in mid-2018.   
 
3.3.1 Desk Research & Historical Documents  
Focusing in this section on empirical data collection (rather than academic literature), the study 
began with empirical desk research to capture data from a comprehensive array of sources.  The 
early targets of the research were the websites of the Accord and Alliance.  The author sought to 
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immerse herself in all of the information available, both to learn in-depth about the organizations 
but also to look for clues about what was “interesting” about them.  What was the subject matter 
and framing of their press releases?  What kind of progress reports and communications were they 
producing?  What promises or pledges were they making? What brands were signing on, and at 
what pace?  These kinds of questions allowed the data to lead the research, an inductive approach.  
Lessons yielded from this research led to other sources, such as media articles or announcements 
on brand members’ websites.  These two domains – media and brands – served as the next two 
principle areas of data collection.   
 
Online media was searched regularly for stories relating to Rana Plaza or the Accord or Alliance.  
This was done primarily in for Western media outlets via Google News searches, as well as native 
searches of The New York Times, The Guardian, Reuters, and BBC.  English language Bengali 
media was also searched: The Daily Star, The Daily Sun and BD News 24.  Relevant stories were 
collected either by saving PDFs of the stories, or by using the NCapture feature of NVivo, the 
data analysis software used in the study.  Brands and the labor and NGO members of the Accord 
were the other primary targets of the research, where the author retrieved CSR reports, statements 
and other data relevant to the case.  Data was discovered both through direct navigation through 
websites as well as via searches for relevant terms (e.g. Bangladesh, Rana Plaza).  Websites, press 
releases, reports and the like were also gathered as relevant from NGOs, labor and other civil 
society organizations, like the Sustainable Apparel Coalition.  This broad category sought to 
include expert opinions on the Bangladesh RMG industry and/or the Accord or Alliance 
themselves.  Government databases were also accessed to access relevant policies and business 
disclosures, such as quarterly lobbying filings required by the U.S. government and EU directives.  
An overview of the types of data collected is detailed in Table 1.   
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Table 1. Overview of desk research data sources and types.   
Category Subject / Source Data 
Media Reports  
 
Major Western outlets (N. American 
and European)  
Bengali media (English)   
News articles  
Opinion pieces, commentary   
 
Private Governance 
Organizations  
Accord on Bangladesh Fire Safety 
Alliance for Bangladesh Worker 
Safety  
Online self-presentations (i.e. 
websites)  
Published data (e.g. factory 
remediation data)  
Membership agreements, bylaws and 
any other governing documents   
Progress reports, annual reports  
Members of the 
Accord and 
Alliance 
Brands, labor unions, NGOs, ILO, 
board members  
CSR reports, NGO reports  
Organizational communications (e.g. 
press releases, blog posts)  
Social media communications 
(Facebook and Twitter)  
Disclosures, legal filings  
Civil Society Expert civil society organizations  Reports  
Communications  
Public Sector National Governments (e.g 
Bangladesh, Denmark, U.S.)  
European Union  
United Nations  
International Labour Organization  
Permanent Court of Arbitrations in 
the Hague  
Policies, regulation, compacts, trade 
agreements, etc.  
Communications  
Lobbying disclosures  
Financial disclosures (tax)  
Court documents and filings  
 
 
 
The desk research yielded more than 800 files of the above data points.  Documents were 
organized into “cases” which represented broad groupings such as individual actors (e.g. H&M, 
IndustriALL, Accord) and well as more general categories for instances with fewer files (e.g. 
Expert Reports, NGOs).  A full listing of all of the PhD thesis’ cases can be found in Appendix 2: 
Organizational Cases.  Insights gained from this research informed the design of the remainder 
of the data collection.   
 
3.3.2 Qualitative Interviews  
The study’s primary data source is comprised of qualitative, semi-structured interviews conducted 
with actors throughout the Bangladesh RMG industry whom were either directly or indirectly 
involved with the Accord and Alliance.  Standard themes were identified which guided the 
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creation of the interview guide.  Accord and Alliance brand members served as the principal 
research subjects, so the themes for this version of the interview guide consisted of:  
• Creation and/or signing of the Accord/Alliance agreement 
o What caused them to join  
o Why they joined, and why that particular PG instead of the other  
• Perceived roles and responsibilities of different actors groups as related to ensuring the 
sustainability of international supply chains in both an ideal world as well as the real 
world: brands, governments, international governing bodies (e.g. ILO), civil society 
organizations, consumers   
• Dynamics with the other stakeholders: Accord/Alliance organization, other brand 
members, involved civil society organizations, customers  
• Perception of the Accord’s legal enforcement clause   
• Operationalization of the Accord/Alliance within the organization: resources 
required/dedicated, change in sourcing practices, position of CSR within the organization 
and sourcing process  
 
Interview guides for other actor groups like trade union members focused on these same general 
themes but were adapted fittingly to the research subject.  Whilst always including these themes, 
interviews were also tailored to specific research subjects.  For example, H&M negotiated but 
refused to sign the agreement which preceded the Accord, but it was boastful afterwards for being 
the “first” brand to sign the Accord.  So, H&M’s interview also included many questions related 
to the processes and decisions surrounding those events.  Similarly, interview guides were also 
adapted to reflect terminology consistent with that of the research subjects.  For instance, whilst 
most companies refer to their employees as such, Target calls theirs “team members”, so this 
terminology was adopted for the sake of ensuring clarity of concept for the interviewees.  Example 
interview guides can be found in Appendix 3: Interview Guides.  Three have been included which 
illustrate the tailored nature of the research: Gap as an Alliance interview, Bestseller as an Accord 
interview, and Danish Fashion & Textile as an “expert”, non-brand source with extensive 
knowledge of the industry and actors.  While the wording of the questions may change, the themes 
remain consistent.   
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The study included interviews with representatives of brands, labor unions, NGOs and the Accord 
and Alliance organizations themselves.  The study first targeted those closest the phenomenon at 
hand: the Accord and Alliance organizations.  The Accord was very generous with its time and 
insights, something it had done for many researchers.  The Alliance, however, was much more 
closed and greatly limited access by researchers; fortunately, after more than a year of persistence 
and networking the researcher finally gained good access to the Alliance’s leaders and board of 
directors.  For brands, the study targeted those which played a role in the establishment of the 
initiatives, such as Gap, H&M, PVH, Bestseller and Target.  Other key players in the Accord and 
Alliance were also targeted, which included IndustrALL Global Union, Clean Clothes Campaign 
and the ILO.  From these interviews, snowball sampling was employed, with the author gaining 
referrals to additional research subjects. Saturation was reached when interviewees referred the 
researcher to those that had already been targeted for the research.   
 
The author also sought out experts not directly involved in either of the PG efforts to gain an 
“outside” perspective, but still within the industry; indeed, many of the organizations were those 
mentioned by research subjects during the interviews.  The Sustainable Apparel Coalition and 
IDH Sustainable Trade Initiative are examples of organizations which weren’t directly involved 
in the Accord or Alliance, but were brought up by multiple interviewees during the course of the 
research.  Connections to research participants were made either through the author’s own 
network or though “cold calling”, usually via targeted LinkedIn messages or emails.  A large 
number of the research subjects came from Scandinavia, reflective both of the author’s location – 
and hence, network – in Denmark, as well as the actions of many of the Scandinavian brands as 
leaders within the Accord.   
 
Interviews were conducted primarily in two “rounds”.  The first eleven interviews were conducted 
by Master’s thesis students supervised by the author.  The interview guide was developed in 
tandem, and the interviewees were selected together.  These served as pilot interviews for the 
main data collection of the PhD study.  In this spirit, the author obtained the full transcripts from 
the interviews but conducted her own coding of the data.  The author herself conducted all of the 
remaining 30 interviews.  Data from the pilot was only used in this PhD if it provided unique 
perspectives or insights that the author was not able to collect; for example, one interviewee from 
the pilot study declined to participate in a follow-up in interview, and in others, the passage of 
time sometimes also resulted in different reflections and insights from respondents. Interviews 
41 
 
were conducted in person when possible, including during fieldwork in Bangladesh in June 2016.  
Research travels allowed the author to conduct in person interviews in Canada, Denmark, the 
Netherlands, the UK and the U.S.  When meeting in person was not possible, interviews were 
conducted via Skype or phone.  In all, 36 research subjects from 30 organizations participated in 
a total of 41 interviews; some interviews included two research subjects at a time, and other 
subjects were interviewed twice.   
 
Table 2.  Account of interviews by category. 
Organizational Affiliation n= 
Accord members 23 
Represents approx. 
10% of members 
Alliance members  8 
Represents 28%  
of members 
No official affiliation  10 
 
HQ Location  
North America 9 
Scandinavia  18 
Continental Europe + UK  9 
Bangladesh  5 
 
Sector  
Private sector (brands)  22 
Civil society organizations (labor 
unions, NGOs)  
12 
Accord and Alliance organizations  6 
Public sector (ILO)  1 
 
Those interviewed twice include many of those whom were previously interviewed by the 
author’s Masters students, which offered the opportunity to ask follow-up or more specific 
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questions based on the subjects and themes from the first round of interviews.  Bestseller was an 
example of this, and the interview guide provided in Appendix 3: Interview Guides reflects the 
areas of follow-up that a second round of interview afforded.  Other research subjects interviewed 
multiple times were staff of the Accord and Alliance.  An overview of the research subjects can 
be found in Table 2.  In all, the interviews yielded a total of 42+ hours of audio recordings.  The 
substantive content portions of the interviews were fully transcribed; sidebar or irrelevant 
conversations – such as about the weather, travels, children or the like – were not.  All told, the 
study-related portions relevant for the research resulted in around 900 pages of single-spaced 
transcripts.   
 
3.3.3 Participant Observations  
In addition to interviews the author also attended in several related meetings and events in both 
Bangladesh and Europe.  Each of these convenings served one and/or two primary purposes: 
disseminate learnings, information or updates about the state of social sustainability in the RMG 
industry, and/or engage participants in discussion to facilitate problem-solving for issues in the 
industry.  Events all began with the dissemination of results, findings or insights related to the 
ethics and sustainability of global apparel sourcing, with three of the four focusing on Bangladesh 
specifically.  Two of the events also included working sessions where participants interacted with 
one another to discuss or otherwise help develop ideas further, and in which the author engaged 
as an active participant.  One of the events in Bangladesh was a dissemination conference of 
learnings from academics to practitioners about the business benefits of occupational health and 
safety improvements in the RMG sector.  The other Bangladesh event was a duel presentation-
and-working session hosted by another PG initiative of the Joint Ethical Trade Initiatives, which 
brought together the ethical trade organizations from Denmark, Norway and the UK to open an 
office in Dhaka to work on social dialogue in the RMG sector.  The Danish event was a similar 
teach out of learnings for practitioners, hosted by the Danish Ethical Trade Initiative, which 
included sessions on both the work on the ground in Bangladesh, as well as insights from its 
members companies, like Bestseller and H&M.  The London event was co-hosted by the UK 
Ethical Trade Initiative and London College of Fashion and entitled “Ethical Insights: Fast 
Fashion”, where one of the speakers was H&M’s head of sustainability.  The author actively 
participated in all of the events, which collectively spanned a total of more than 18 hours.  
Extensive notes were taken, and when allowed, relevant portions of the meetings were audio 
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recorded and selectively transcribed.  Meetings materials and other handouts were retained, and 
when possible, PowerPoint slides or other presentation materials were acquired.    
 
3.3.4 Ethical Considerations  
Denmark and Copenhagen Business School – where this PhD research was undertaken – do not 
have a formal approach to research ethics in the social sciences unless one is working with 
children or other vulnerable populations.  In the absence of formal rules nationally or 
institutionally, the researcher sought to adhere to the principles outlined by other relevant 
guidelines by consulting the ethics codes by the American Sociological Association, British 
Educational Research Association, European Research Council (EU), Social Research 
Association, and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.  While a 
review and synthesis of these various guidelines is beyond the scope of this document, the most 
relevant points of commonality for this research project were identified to be: informed consent, 
privacy/detriment arising from participation in research, and the use of data.   
 
Regarding informed consent, the author began the research by drawing up and presenting a formal 
document to interviewees which outlined the purpose of the research, right of participants to 
withdraw their participation at any time, use of the data, data storage practices, and similar.  
However, the presentation and signing of this document seemed to start interviews off on a rather 
uneasy footing; subsequently, the author ceased usage of the written document and instead 
outlined the salient points either or both via email in advance, as well as verbally before beginning 
the interview.  These conversations, including participants’ consent to participate and be recorded, 
were captured on tape.   
 
Privacy proved to be important points for the majority of the research subjects, many only 
speaking on the record on the condition that their responses would not be directly attributed to 
them as individuals or organizations.  Therefore, the research subjects have been anonymized.  
However, the author has attempted to provide transparency to the reader by identifying the 
relevant attributes of the research subjects in the papers by positioning illustrative quotes as from 
“a North American brand”, “Accord member”, “labor representative” or similar.  Indeed, 
anonymity was a precondition of speaking with many of the research subjects and necessary to 
protect them professionally.  For example, one interviewee had been integral in two of the key 
organizations involved in establishing and scaling one of the PG initiatives, so provided invaluable 
44 
 
insight into the internal operations and working; s/he contacted me the day after the interview to 
ensure that either s/he could remain completely anonymous, and if not, needed to withdraw 
consent for use of the interview data.  After assurances that his/her identity would remain private, 
s/he agreed to continue to be included in the research.  Hence, the author has opted to use 
descriptive labels to identify the nature of the perspective represented by the respondent rather 
than an identification of the organization represented as is done in other research by providing 
pseudonyms (e.g. Amengual, Distelhorst, & Tobin, forthcoming).    
 
Finally, all of the data has been used solely for academic work, as promised to research 
participants.   
 
3.3.5 Validity & Methodological Limitations  
Every effort has been made to ensure validity of the data and analysis used in the study.  First, as 
discussed above, the study used a classic snowball sampling approach to reach saturation.  While 
by the end of the data collection the themes arising from the research appeared consistent to the 
author, it is possible that the inclusion of additional research subjects could have brought to light 
new insights.  Despite persistence and networking, not all organizations approached agreed to 
participate in the research.  The author received several refusals (or simply silence) in response to 
requests for participation in the research.  While these number higher than ten in all, three of which 
may have added additional insight into the research, particularly Loblaw, Primary and Walmart, 
which all had production in Rana Plaza.  A fourth – the FairWear Foundation which was highly-
involved with the Accord – could have also been helpful.  The inability to access these 
organizations for interviews is a limitation of the study.  In lieu of interviewing these 
organizations, purposeful desk research sought to capture their perspectives. With this approach, 
no new insights or themes emerged after the data analysis, lending credibility to the validity of 
the overall findings from the data.   
 
Further, as outlined under the “scope limitations” section of this document, the perspective of this 
study is of the brands and PG organizations themselves.  Therefore, these organizations were the 
primary targets of the research, and the individuals which participated were highly-involved 
and/or knowledgeable about that scope of work within their respective organizations.  However, 
the research overall aimed to capture both insider and outsider perspectives, as well as the points 
of view of different actors.  So, whilst the research can say a great deal about the case from brands’ 
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and the PG organizations’ perspectives, its findings do not seek to take a position on the 
perspective of labor, government, factory owners, workers or others.   
 
Finally, by design the study targeted those most involved with the establishment and operation of 
the Accord and Alliance.  Accordingly, the “sample” of respondents (see above, Table 2: 
Research Respondents) is not directly “representative” of the members of the Accord.  Indeed, 
many of the Scandinavian companies were leaders within the Accord – particularly H&M and 
Bestseller – and hence appear to be “oversampled” in comparison to their relative numbers as 
members of the Accord, yet offered insights and perspectives that “regular” Accord members 
could not.  This was by design, given that the purpose of the research was to understand how and 
why companies understand and actualize their responsibilities differently.   
 
3.4 Data Analysis  
Data analysis in the PhD thesis employed an abductive cross-case analysis (CCA) approach (Miles 
& Huberman, 1994), considering the Accord and Alliance as comparative cases.  CCA allows for 
the in-depth exploration of data within and across cases, and can results in insights suitable for 
theory-building (Eisenhardt, 1989; Suddaby, 2006).  It draws upon multiple sources of evidence 
to explore and understand similarities and differences that collectively allow for validity 
assurance, greater generalizability and the postulation of theoretical predictions for future 
research.  It takes observations and insights about the cases in question, as applicable, to generalize 
about other cases (Gioia et al., 2012).   
 
3.4.1 Analytical Categories  
The data analysis was predicated upon the premise that the Accord and Alliance represented the 
analytical categories of a MSI and BLI, respectively.  While there aren’t necessarily clear, agreed-
upon definitions of these constructs in the literature – as there are for stakeholders, for example 
(Freeman, 1984) – the use of MSI and BLI are conceptually consistent with prior work.  For 
example, O’Rourke (2003) doesn’t expressly discuss MSIs and BLIs, but defines PG 
“governance” by which stakeholders are represented, argued to be a key differentiator.  While 
their inclusion isn’t discussed directly, the argument presented deals with the movement from 
privatized industry models of self-policing to more collaborative models of governance, 
underscoring the inclusion of actors as an analytical category (O’Rourke, 2006).  Similarly, work 
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by Anner takes it point of departure in the exploration of PG by “how and whether different social 
actors participate in the establishment and implementation of the program” acknowledging 
differences between the foci of “corporate-influenced programs” and those with a leading role for 
“progressive NGOs”.  (2012, p. 610).  Work within business and management studies has used 
these constructs directly, notably work by Fransen on the legitimization of PG (2012) as well as 
Marques who – similar to this study – directly compares and contrasts MSIs and BLIs (Marques, 
2016).  Therefore, by building on like conceptions and usage in the literature, this study considers 
the Accord as a MSI and the Alliance a BLI for analytical purposes.   
  
3.4.2 Data Coding  
According to Miles and Huberman, “coding is analysis”, and codes are tags that assign meaning 
to the data (1994, p. 56).  Coding within this methodological approach involves three rounds of 
coding.  The first round is comprised of “descriptive” codes, which reflect the research subject’s 
terminology and intent as closely as possible, meaning that little to no interpretation is needed; 
this has also been referred to as “open coding” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998).  Using NVivo qualitative 
data analysis software, the first round of coding yielded 158 “descriptive” codes.  A full listing of 
all of the codes generated from the study can be found in Appendix 4: First Order Codes. The 
first round of coding was consistently analyzed for use across the whole of the study and its papers.    
 
These inductively-generated codes were then grouped into “interpretive” codes which reflect the 
researcher’s understanding of the data.  In keeping with the study’s abductive approach, this round 
of analysis was conducted distinctively for each paper.  Whilst the data was still inductively 
analyzed in the sense that it was the data that drove the analysis, interpretations from the author 
were informed by the knowledge, models and reference points garnered from the review the 
literature (Mantere & Ketokivi, 2013).  In this way, the analysis was abductively informed.  For 
example, it became clear early on in the study that the novel enforcement clause used by the 
Accord (detailed in the Case Overview section) would be one of the main lines of inquiry; thus, 
in the data coding structure, many child nodes are nested under the parent node “Legal”.   
 
Finally, interpretive codes are grouped further into “pattern codes”, which represent the true 
analysis of the data.  Pattern codes usually consist of themes, associations or correlations, 
relationships, and/or theories.  They help to illustrate the bigger picture that emerges from the 
minutia of the data, elaborate concepts, and lay the groundwork for analysis across cases.  Overall, 
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the analysis sought to identify multiple exemplars across the cases to ensure the reliability and 
validity of findings, as well as to surmise the potential for generalizability.  Details of the specific 
analyses for each of the sub-RQs as well as specific codes and/or coding trees resulting from the 
data analysis within the individual papers.   
 
NVivo qualitative data analysis software was utilized for the storage and overall coding of the 
data.  All of the project data was loaded into NVivo, organized into “cases”, as discussed 
previously.  For example, each company served as a unique “case” within the software, within 
which all of the data – interview transcripts, CSR reports, media stories, press releases, lobbying 
disclosures – was filed.  All of the first-order, descriptive coding was completed in NVivo,  Due 
to software limitations, the same data cannot be distinctively analyzed.  The author created a copy 
of the project to conduct the data analysis for Paper 3, but found that managing multiple NVivo 
files during simultaneous data collection and analysis risked losing data.  Therefore, subsequent 
coding rounds – interpretive and pattern – for Papers 1 and 2 were conducted by hand.   
 
3.4.3 Reflexivity  
The author’s personal motivation for undertaking the study – observing how the Rana Plaza 
tragedy played out at the company she worked at – also necessitated a great deal of reflexivity 
when approaching the research.  Personal networks built throughout the author’s career prior to 
the PhD helped facilitate access to and credibility with research subjects.  From a data collection 
standpoint, biases were attempted to be mitigated through the use of a common-themed, semi-
structured interview guide.  Additionally, efforts were made to inform the research subjects about 
the researcher’s purpose – academic exploration – and therefore that only information disclosed 
during the research could be used.  Prior knowledge may have helped inform the questions, but 
the data used and analyzed throughout the course of the research were all purposely and solely 
collected for this study.   
 
Following, the author’s past knowledge and career experiences also obliged the adoption of a very 
careful approach to the data analysis so as to ensure that she did not impose her own meanings 
and interpretations onto the data.  The data analysis approach which started with inductively 
assigning descriptive codes to the data – as close as possible to respondents’ own words – helped 
to assure that the data led the findings, not presumptions about the data.  As coding continued on 
into further rounds, the abductive approach which then drew upon the literature to deductively 
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make sense of the inductively-derived codes also helped to ensure rigor in and replicability of 
findings.  Additionally, findings – in the form of papers – were presented at many conferences 
and paper development workshops, which provided valuable outsider perspective on the work.   
 
Overall, the author considers her past experience as an attribute to the research, rather than a 
liability.  Prior experience helped her understand the phenomenon at play, how large MNCs 
operate internally, and industry “lingo”, which ultimately allowed her to ask better questions.  
Indeed, in many interviews, research respondents whom had previously been interviewed many 
times by other researchers would note, “That’s a really good question!  No one has ever asked 
me that before.”  Biases were sought to be mitigated through rigorous research which adhered to 
the highest standards in ethics and methodology.  The study has benefited from a combination of 
insider knowledge and methodological rigor.   
 
4. CASE OVERVIEW  
4.1 Rana Plaza & the Bangladesh RMG Industry 
Bangladesh is among the world’s largest producers of ready-made garments (RMG), second only 
to China.  It is home to thousands of factories (estimates range from 4,000-8,000), which 
collectively employ 5+ million workers, 80% of whom are women.  Wages are amongst the lowest 
in the world at about US$65/month until December 2018 when they rose to US$95/month.  Rock-
bottom labor costs have been fundamental in propelling Bangladesh’s growth into the low-cost, 
high-volume sourcing hub for low- to mid-segment retailers like H&M, Primark and Walmart.  
The RMG industry has fueled the Bangladesh economy for the past three decades, with RMG 
representing 80% of the country’s exports, currently around US$30 billion annually and growing.  
Indeed, industry and governmental leaders in Bangladesh have set ambitious targets for growth 
of their RMG exports – US$50 billion by 2021 – while at the same time committing to maintaining 
their reputation as a low-cost producer.   
 
The expansive growth of the industry has been fraught with all of the classic challenges of a 
typical race-to-the-bottom associated with the competition to be a low-cost, high-volume 
producer: poor working conditions, lack of freedom of association or collective bargaining, major 
health and safety problems, harsh management practices and the like.  Western brands and 
retailers sourcing from Bangladesh have steadily increased their involvement in and 
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responsibilities to their international supply chains, where virtually all of the major Western 
brands have a history of conducting regular audits with first-tier suppliers.  With regards to social 
sustainability issues, these audits typically evaluate the general working conditions directly 
related to the production of a brand or retailer’s product, such as number of working hours, access 
to clean water, number and frequency of rest breaks, availability and use of protective equipment, 
and so forth.   Traditionally, governmental authorities have been assumed to be responsible for 
infrastructure and regulatory dimensions related to the industry, such as building permits and 
infrastructure standards, as well as their enforcement.  Yet, while audits may be common, the 
RMG industry in Bangladesh and elsewhere has been plagued by a lack of follow-up and 
accountability for ensuring basic safety.    
 
Buyers’ audits and governmental oversight have historically proven to be insufficient in ensuring 
workers’ health and safety in Bangladesh.  In the morning of 24 April 2013 in a suburb of Dhaka 
one of the deadliest industrial accidents in history unfolded: the collapse of the Rana Plaza 
complex which included six RMG factories.  On the day prior to the collapse, large cracks had 
appeared in the building’s structural columns and the entire building was evacuated.  However, 
RMG workers were forced back in to work the next, even while commercial offices on the lower 
floors remained no-go zones.  RMG workers were falsely told that necessary repairs had been 
made and that they would lose their entire month’s wages if they didn’t (Foxvog, Gearhart, Parker, 
Vanpeperstraete, & Zeldenrust, 2013).  Just hours later, the building collapsed, killing 1,135 
workers and injuring at least twice as many more.   
 
The story of Rana Plaza is one of failure on nearly every front.  Structurally, the original six-story 
building of the complex did not have the proper permits nor was constructed to house 
manufacturing; two additional stories had been constructed on top and an additional (ninth) floor 
was underway at the time of the collapse.  Adding to this, six garment factories comprised the 
third through eighth floors of the building – constructed originally as a commercial property – 
which added intolerable weight and stress from the machinery.  Management practices were harsh 
and workers by and large were not aware of their rights, nor had received any safety training.  
Government oversight was effectively non-existent and buyer’s standards and codes didn’t extend 
to construction, fire or electrical safety.  This concoction created the lethal recipe for Rana Plaza’s 
workers.   
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4.2 Accord and Alliance  
The Rana Plaza collapse happened not long after a series of other lethal accidents plagued 
Bangladesh’s RMG factories.  In 2005, 64 workers died when the Spectrum Factory collapsed, 
another 50 perished in two factory fires in 2010, and a major fire at Tazreen Fashions in 2012 
killed 112 and injured some 300 more, among many other incidents which harmed and killed 
RMG workers in Bangladesh (Hasan et al., 2017).  Basic worker safety had clearly been a major 
problem in the Bangladesh RMG industry for some time.  A voluntary initiative amongst brands 
to help address these types of issues had been underway for two years prior to Rana Plaza, but it 
required four brand signatories to come into force and had only been able to secure two (PVH and 
Tchibo signed, while H&M and Gap declined), leaving it idle.   But, in the wake of Rana Plaza, 
the agreement served as the basis for a bigger and broader initiative (Clean Clothes Campaign, 
2013a).  Then, brands and retailers came together under enormous pressure from labor and 
advocacy organizations to found the Accord on Fire and Building Safety and Bangladesh 
(hereafter, “the Accord”), a multi-stakeholder private governance initiative (MSI) championed by 
European brands that aimed to identify and remedy major fire, construction and electrical safety 
issues in the country’s RMG factories.  Yet, at the eleventh hour, several of the major North 
American firms – namely Gap and Walmart, who had helped negotiate post-Rana Plaza deal – 
walked away, stating that they couldn’t agree to the terms of the Accord.  Just two months later 
after individual company efforts proved ineffective at curtailing public pressure, they succumbed 
and came together to create the Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety (hereafter, “the Alliance”), 
a business-led initiative (BLI) with essentially the same standards and goals as the Accord, but 
with a vastly different approach.  The scale of the crisis of Rana Plaza, coupled with the tensions 
and conflicts that arose in the aftermath, makes the environment a particularly fertile avenue from 
which to explore the social and political responsiveness of firms (Westermann-Behaylo et al., 
2015).   
 
The Accord was established as a five-year agreement unprecedented not only in scope by putting 
brands effectively in charge of ensuring structural and electrical safety in the factories that they 
sourced from, but also in enforceability.  Governed in equal proportion by business and organized 
labor and chaired by the ILO, the Accord agreement stated that signatories must continue as active 
members for the full five-year lifecycle of the agreement, maintain sourcing volumes from 
Bangladesh for the first two years, and ensure financially and otherwise that necessary upgrades 
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were made to the factories they sourced from.  Uniquely, it created an enforcement clause where, 
for the first time, brands could ultimately be held responsible via international binding arbitration 
to make good on their commitments.  The Accord created a private governance arrangement 
distinctive in its cooperative governance approach, change in (buyers’) business model, and legal 
enforceability.  More than five years on, the Accord had more than 220 signatories, including all 
of the European brands and a handful of others from around the world.   
 
The North American companies which protested the Accord’s terms and formed the Alliance still 
elected to share the same fundamental goals and commitments: the physical safety of factories, 
achieved through worker safety training and the remediation of construction, fire and electrical 
problems.  The Alliance set out the same safety standards and five-year commitment (as a PG 
organization) as the Accord, giving credence to the perspective that the Alliance sought to mimic 
aspects of the Accord.  However, it was governed effectively by the brands themselves and 
required only a two-year minimum commitment from brand members.  Most noted, however, was 
its lack of financial liability or legal enforceability.  Rather than holding individuals brands liable 
for ensuring the remediation, it created a common pool of funds which members – at their sole 
discretion – could elect to contribute to or not.  These funds were then used to pay out liabilities 
to workers as required by Bangladesh law; for example, in instances of factory closure for repairs, 
buyers and suppliers are required to split the cost of workers’ wages.   
 
Membership of the Alliance started at seventeen and grew to 29 throughout its tenure, collectively 
representing more than 80% of RMG imports from Bangladesh to North America.  Other than 
PVH, all of the major North American companies which joined one of the PG initiatives after 
Rana Plaza chose the Alliance: e.g. Walmart, Gap, Target, VF Corporation (parent company of 
Timberland, The North Face, Vans, Jansport, and others) and Canadian Tire.  A high-level 
comparison between the two agreements can be found in Table 3.  Further details about the two 
initiatives are presented as applicable in the thesis’ papers.   
 
4.3 Accord and Alliance as Political CSR  
As the differences between the Accord and Alliance are explored through a political CSR lens, a 
harkening back to political CSR 1.0 and 2.0 conceptions may help provide a useful framework for 
examining the differences between the two initiatives.  In addition, empirical exploration of the 
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conceptions also creates the potential to grapple with the voracity of theoretically descriptive 
claims (Scherer et al., 2016).   
 
Table 3. Comparison of the key aspects of the Accord and Alliance.   
  Accord (European) Alliance (North American) 
# Members 220+ 29 
Type of Collaboration MSI  BLI 
Internal Governance Steering Committee:  
ILO (chair), Brands (3 seats), Labor 
Unions (3 seats) 
Board of Directors: Brands, Private 
Sector reps  
Minimum Term  5 years 2 years 
Financial Liability to 
PG Organization 
Annual membership dues (sliding 
scale)  
Audit costs  
Annual membership dues (sliding 
scale)  
Financial Liability for 
Factories’ Safety 
Brand members are responsible for 
ensuring the “financial feasibility” 
of necessary upgrades, and to 
makes loans, grants, or favorable 
business terms to suppliers when 
necessary   
Members can optionally contribute to 
common funding pools which 
suppliers can apply for  
 
Other Rules Must continue responsibility for 
current suppliers regardless of 
future sourcing; must maintain 
sourcing volumes from Bangladesh 
for 2 years  
No additional formal rules or 
requirements  
# Factories Covered  
(as of 2017)  
2,000+ 652 (+65 shared with Accord) 
Remediation Progress  
As of 2017  
As of Sep 2018 
 
74% (2017)  
89% (2018)  
 
85% (2017)  
92% (2018)  
 
The Accord is an exemplary case of PCSR 2.0.  It involved brands of all sizes, vastly increased 
the scope of responsibilities of private companies, demonstrated and addressed the complexity of 
supply chain issues, and did so via a MSI approach and a combination of soft and hard law.   
 
The Alliance, in contrast, is a BLI comprised primarily of large companies – which collectively 
represent 80% of all RMG imports from Bangladesh to North America – relied on a principle-
based agreement, and sought to ensure nimbleness and freedom in business practices.  Table 4 
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draws upon the work of Scherer et al. to demonstrate the Alliance’s and Accord’s alignment with 
the political CSR 1.0 and 2.0 conceptions.   
 
Table 4. Alignments of Alliance and Accord as political CSR 1.0 and 2.0 conceptions 
  PSCR 1.0 Alliance PCSR 2.0 Accord 
Types of 
responsible 
business orgs 
MNCs Members are all 
large companies  
Firms of all sizes Members are both 
MNCs and small 
and medium-
sized businesses  
Role of 
government 
regulation 
Soft law Principle-based  
Soft law  
Complementarity of 
hard and soft law 
Substantive 
agreement 
Used hard law to 
enforce soft law 
Institutional 
complexity 
MNCs in 
fragile states  
Members view 
Bangladesh as a 
weak state in need 
of (top-down) 
Western assistance  
 
Alliance 
organization 
conducts work on 
behalf of its 
members   
Institutional 
heterogeneity 
between host 
countries of MNCs  
 
The Accord aims 
to build capacity 
of local experts  
 
Accord 
organization 
requires brands 
to fulfill explicit 
obligations  
Efficiency of 
private 
governance 
Simple supply 
chain 
governance 
BLI 
 
Focus on outputs  
Complex supply 
chain governance 
with foci on both 
form and process 
MSI with equal 
governance 
structure 
between brands 
and labor  
 
Attention focused 
on processes, 
procedures and 
compliance   
Sensemaking 
of PCSR 
Selective 
analysis of 
management 
issues  
Narrow focus 
(factory safety)  
 
Business-as-usual 
approach  
Extended analysis of 
management issues 
(comprehensive)  
Broad focus (labor 
+ factory safety)  
 
Changes business 
model for brands  
 
 
By juxtaposing the Accord and Alliance in this way, it helps to both further our understanding of 
the differences between the two private governance initiatives, as well as demonstrates the 
problematique of the proclaimed shift from political CSR 1.0 to 2.0.  While the authors originally 
positioned political CSR 1.0 as evolving into a 2.0 conception reflective of a new world order, 
these versions may more fittingly describe different types of or approaches to political CSR 
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activities – like PG – rather than a temporal perspective of “old” and “new”.  Perhaps differences 
are not entirely attributable to the passage of time and the societal changes within that span so 
much as they reflect different conceptions of political responsibilities, perhaps in alignment with 
differing institutional frames.  A further discussion on the bifurcation of the political roles of 
companies and their empirical manifestations in the form of the Accord and Alliance is elaborated 
in the Discussion section.  
 
5. OVERVIEW OF THE PAPERS  
The PhD thesis presents three stand-alone papers as its primary content, but also aims to make a 
contribution on the whole that is greater than the sum of its parts.  Hence, the following tables 
first detail the papers as individual bodies of work, then present a view of how the papers relate 
to each other to collectively answer the overarching RQ.   
 
5.1 Summary of the Papers  
Table 5. Summary of the thesis’ individual papers.  
RQ Paper 
Paper 1 
 
 
 
How do different 
domestic 
institutional 
contexts shape 
firms’ approach to 
PG internationally?   
How Domestic Contexts Shape the Organization 
 of International Private Governance: the Case of the  
European Accord and American Alliance in Bangladesh 
Numerous studies have explored the impact of national business systems 
on companies’ domestic CSR practices, yet little is known about what 
factors shape CSR practices like private governance (PG) internationally.  
Despite the claim of PG to establish ‘global’ rules, private governance 
has national origins, and multiple efforts to address the same issue 
frequently co-exist.   Therefore, this study seeks to understand how 
differing home institutional environments shape firms’ approaches to 
private governance engagement in host contexts, which it explores 
empirically through the comparative case study of competing PG in the 
post-Rana Plaza Bangladesh garment industry.  In doing so, it builds a 
framework of the structural and strategic dimensions of PG, one of the 
study’s principle contributions.  It also combines empirical findings with 
the comparative CSR literature to hypothesize about ideal types of PG 
organizing in U.S. and European contexts.  Finally, by explicating 
linkages between the dimensions of PG with prevailing institutional 
environments, this study also extends our understanding of how and why 
the PG practices of companies varies for firms in different environments. 
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Paper 2  
 
 
How do the logics 
between MSIs and 
BLIs for private 
governance differ, 
and what does this 
mean for their 
potential to address 
different types of 
sustainability 
challenges?   
Shared Goals, Different Logics: Comparison of Multi-Stakeholder 
and Business-Led Initiatives as Private Governance Models 
Multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs) and business-led initiatives (BLIs) 
constitute major models for the provision of private governance, yet little 
is known about how the models differ or the implications thereof.  
Adopting an institutional logics perspective, this paper compares MSIs 
and BLIs as private governance models by examining their underpinning 
logics and theorizing about what these differences mean for their 
potential to address different types of sustainability challenges.  Is it 
better to give a hungry person a fish or a fishing rod, and under what 
circumstances?  It draws on the comparative case of a MSI and BLI in 
the Bangladesh apparel industry which were created at the same time and 
which shared the same broad goals, yet deployed very different means to 
achieve them.  It develops a framework of differing logics of private 
governance, with MSIs embodying a collective logic and BLIs a 
benevolent one.  It proposes, therefore, that MSIs are best suited for 
addressing systemic issues, while BLIs are most effective at addressing 
narrowly-defined, outcome-oriented problems.  Overall, this study 
contributes to our understanding of the logic, potential and implications 
of different models of private governance.   
Paper 3 
 
 
How did the 
inclusion of a 
“hard” enforcement 
mechanism affect 
how companies 
understood and 
fulfilled their 
responsibilities?    
A Sheep in Wolf’s Clothing?: How the Illusion of Hard Law 
Enacted Divergent Approaches to Private Governance 
After the horrific collapse of the Rana Plaza garment factory in 
Bangladesh, the resulting private governance initiative - the Accord on 
Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh – chose a new tactic of using hard 
law to enforce the (soft) voluntary agreement. But some companies 
refused to join because of it and instead created their own (soft) rival 
initiative.    Throughout the duration of the Accord the ‘legally binding’ 
mechanism was exercised in only two cases, representing 99% 
compliance.  These polar opposite reactions – extreme aversion or 
compliance – begs the question: how did the inclusion of a ‘hard’ 
enforcement mechanism affect how companies understood and fulfilled 
their responsibilities?  This paper investigates the novel approach through 
a sensemaking lens, concluding that the strength of the approach was due 
primarily to the ‘enactment’ of an illusion of hard law by member 
companies.  The paper offers the term “illusory law” to refer to the 
phenomenon, and further contributes to the debate about hard and soft law 
as ends of a spectrum, rather than binary constructs.  Overall, the paper 
contributes to our practical knowledge about how to effectively structure 
private governance arrangements, as well as our theoretical understanding 
of the powerful role of sensemaking in shaping companies’ behavior.     
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5.2 Contribution of the Papers to the Thesis  
As mentioned previously, the thesis aims to be able to draw upon the findings from the papers 
collectively – as well as the research project overall – to offer an original thesis contribution.  As 
such, Table 6 outlines the relation of the papers to each other and the overarching thesis RQ.   
 
6. DISCUSSION  
The sum of the papers and this guiding document seek to answer the overarching RQ: Why do 
companies understand their political roles differently, and how does this shape their private 
governance choices?  In doing so, it not only sheds light on the phenomenon of the Accord and 
Alliance, but also advances our theoretical understanding of the role of context in political CSR 
practices.  A historical institutionalism perspective, discussed vis-à-vis the study’s overarching 
findings, helps fill gaps left by a neo-institutional theory perspective through its ability to account 
for interconnected institutions, the role of actors in navigating within and between them, as well 
as macro-social factors  like the legacies and norms of relationships between stakeholders.  This 
perspective enables a critique and refinement of some of the assumptions of political CSR in an 
effort to help advance the framework to provide further explanatory or predictive power.   
 
6.1 Choice in Private Governance  
Building upon the notion that dominant institutions provide the structures and reference points 
which individuals draw upon when making sense of demands and choosing subsequent activities 
to address them, the dominant institutions of actors’ environments shaped their understandings of 
both the problem as well as their motivation for and operationalization of solutions.  Actors 
created and/or selected the private governance initiative which seemed in greatest alignment with 
their perspective.  Europeans aligned exclusively with the Accord, whilst the overlapping rules, 
norms and structures resulted in some North American brands – primarily smaller ones – choosing 
the Accord, while other frames dominated for most North American brands, primarily the large 
ones, which then opted for the Alliance.  Dominant institutions – when viewed in this way – 
demonstrate their ability to shape and constrain behavior while still affording a role for actors to 
exercise agency within.  A representation of the influence of institutional structures and their 
resulting impact on Accord and Alliance brand membership in presented in Figure 2.   
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Figure 2. Illustration of how dominant institutional contexts shaped companies’ choice of 
Accord or Alliance membership.   
 
 
The findings here do not just explicate why two private governance approaches emerged, but also 
why the means differed between them.  Not only did dominant institutions provide the frames of 
reference which companies’ drew upon when deciding how to fulfill their CSR responsibilities 
via private governance, but their underpinning logics, structures and strategies were replicated by 
actors when designing and providing their own governance.  The interplay between actors and 
institutions demonstrates the significant differences which can result from and be replicated by 
actors through the exercise of their agency.  How private governance is practiced matters.   
 
6.2 Role of Context in Private Governance   
One of the major contributions of the thesis is its appreciation and understanding of the role of 
context in shaping political CSR activities, and in particular, private governance.  Whilst dominate 
perspectives in the field thus far held that CSR practices mirrored the environments in which they 
operate, findings here rather suggest that CSR practice mirror the environments in which they 
originate (Jackson & Bartosch, 2016).  This finding aligns well with the hypothesis that macro 
institutional structures provide the reference points and parameters in which individuals within 
firms make choices about how to engage in political CSR.  Motivations and cognitions are shaped 
in large part by the institutional structures which dominate actors’ environments, and it is within 
these structures that actors exercise their agency, as known as institutional agency or embedded 
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agency (DiMaggio, 1988; Thornton et al., 2012).  A historical institutionalism perspective helps 
account for agency within macro institutional structures (Suddaby et al., 2014; Thelen, 2010).  
The resulting modes of organizing, mechanisms deployed to govern them, and underlying 
rationales all differed significantly between actors engaged in the Accord and Alliance.  Not only 
does this advance our understanding about the role of context in shaping CSR practices, it also 
elucidates which context dominates.  Figure 3 illustrates how dominant institutions shape 
individual actors’ agency, which lead to different operationalization of political CSR 
responsibilities.  While not expressly a multi-level study, the historical institutionalism 
perspective facilitates a deeper understanding of the interplay of institutions and agency at 
different levels, which is the perspective represented here.   
 
Figure 3.  Illustration of the role of institutions in shaping agency and organizations.   
 
 
The differences in context can be attributable, in part, to different historical differences.  These 
may be differences in the founding and building of dominate national-level institutions, e.g. labor, 
education, financial, political. They may be the legacy of stakeholder relations within a country 
or even a single company (e.g experience with and tenor of trade union relations) (Thelen, 2010).  
Certainly, companies have varying brands, relationships and practices/policies which account for 
their legacy and history with particular stakeholder groups, and which shape their present-day 
imperatives (Schrempf-Stirling, Palazzo, & Phillips, 2016).  Argued in detail in the papers, it is 
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such contextual differences which shape and constrain the agency of actors and set the parameters 
from which governance is crafted and conducted.   
 
6.2.3 Context and the Crossover Brands 
Motivated by the phenomenon of divergent private governance initiatives in the Bangladesh RMG 
industry, this thesis sought to understand what could account for their emergence and differences.  
There had been an apparent bifurcation of members down country lines; all European members 
joined the Accord while the majority of North American companies (U.S. and Canada) joined the 
Alliance.  Yet, the handful of North American brands which joined the Accord cannot be resolved 
by neo-institutional theory, nor do the country contexts alone account for the great variation 
between the two approaches.  Applying a historical institutionalism lens can help explain the 
“crossover” brands.   
 
The handful of North American companies which joined the Accord problematized the otherwise 
neatly “European” and “American” initiatives.  What can explain this?  To begin, PVH was the 
first North American brand to sign, and had been not just one of the principle negotiators for the 
Accord, but had been one of only two companies to proactively engage in creating a mechanism 
to address safety issues prior to Rana Plaza.  The company itself had a much more progressive 
history on labor and MSI engagement than did its Alliance counterparts, perhaps making the 
Accord a better fit with its particular mode of business operation.  A similar logic carries through 
for many of the Accord’s North American members.  For example, the Fair Labor Association 
(FLA) is a MSI that “is dedicated to protecting workers’ rights around the world” which is does 
by placing “the onus on companies to voluntarily meet internationally recognized labor standards 
where their products are made” (Fair Labor Association, n.d.).  When looking at the Accord’s 
signatories, seven of its 22 U.S. members were also members of the FLA, demonstrating their 
prior experience working with labor, and collaboratively on supply chain issues.  In contrast, not 
one of the Alliance members are part of the FLA.  As the Accord set up its continuation function 
– as the Transition Accord – it had to (re)recruit members, and as of the time of writing (early 
2019), only 13 U.S. brands had joined, along with the original two Canadian brands, bringing the 
North American proportion of members of the Accord further down to just 8% of total members.  
One brand “crossed over” to the Alliance (Abercrombie & Fitch), but no Alliance brands joined 
the Transition Accord.  Collectively, these points help reinforce the findings from Paper 1 about 
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how dominant institutions and legacies of stakeholder dynamics in companies’ lexicons shaped 
their engagement.   
 
Further, these “crossover” brands in a historical institutionalism perspective also elucidate the 
earlier point about organizational fields.  While prior to Rana Plaza all of the brands which sourced 
from Bangladesh, and which subsequently joined the Accord or Alliance, could have been 
considered in the same organizational field as peer companies and competitors.  An alternative 
field formulation could have been down political economy lines, differentiating those brands 
between U.S. and EU organizational fields.  However, the crossover brands demonstrate that – in 
this case – fields may be constituted differently according to their dominant institutional contexts, 
rather than by sector or country of origin (Wooten & Hoffman, 2017).  While a full exploration 
of what comprises that organizational field, specifically, is beyond the scope of this study, the 
empirical findings suggest that in addition to NBSs, legacies of labor relations and past 
engagements with other PG (e.g. FLA) were decisive in shaping companies’ PG choice in 
Bangladesh.   
 
6.3 Political CSR Critiques & Refinements  
While a "political" notion of CSR tells us what companies do, thus far it hasn't been able to provide 
much explanatory power about how or why.  A historically-informed view can help advance our 
understanding not just of what types of political CSR practices companies engage in, but more 
importantly, why and how they do it.  The thesis provides a powerful empirical exploration of the 
political CSR concept, which to date has been highly theoretically descriptive and therefore 
lacking in its ability to predict or explain MNC behavior.  The findings from this thesis help to 
surmount this shortcoming.  First, the findings reinforce the point made by other scholars that 
political CSR does not necessarily indicate a lack of government (Gond, Kang, & Moon, 2011; 
Knudsen, 2017; Knudsen & Moon, 2017; Schrempf-Stirling, 2018).  Rather, the interests and 
protections of government may function according to different systems, norms and priorities than 
the dominant environments and conceptions of Western buyers.  Applying a historical 
institutionalism perspective to the case of the Bangladesh RMG industry, shows that the 
government of Bangladesh has been very effective at growing the industry and protecting the 
interests of suppliers, and in particular, factory owners.  But, aggressive growth strategies and 
targets have come at the expense of health and safety protections – among other sustainability 
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issues like low wages and the lack of freedom of association – for the workers themselves.  Such 
differences do not necessarily represent a ‘lack’ of government, but rather a difference in the 
expectations and imperatives of government.  Therefore, Western brands and retailers engaged in 
the Alliance and Accord to safeguard workers in accordance with the dominant frames of their 
institutions and expectations of their stakeholders (e.g. living wages, human rights).   Companies 
may engage in political CSR not because of the lack of government, but because of the inadequacy 
of government in addressing and satisfying their norms and expectations.  The case of the Accord 
and Alliance revealed that government regulation pertaining to factory building safety in 
Bangladesh was actually quite good; indeed, many interviewees made the point that the Accord 
and Alliance weren’t instituting new regulations, rather, they were simply enforcing the existing 
ones.  Here, it wasn’t necessarily that the Bangladesh government was unable or unwilling to 
regulate so much as the uptake and enforcement of the regulations was inadequate. Yet, this alone 
doesn’t necessary demonstrate government’s unwillingness or inability to act.  Virtually all of the 
codes of conduct which companies sourcing from Bangladesh used to ensure compliance included 
provisions that local laws and building codes must be followed, yet none followed up to ensure 
factories’ compliance.  While a nuanced point, perhaps, it highlights the need to better understand 
the role of government and other actors – as well as their interactions – in the provision of 
governance (Amengual, 2015; Amengual & Chirot, 2016; Börzel & Risse, 2010; Levy & Kaplan, 
2007).  
 
Second, the concepts of “global governance gaps” or even “globalization” do little to advance our 
understanding of how firms operate and govern their supply chains.  Whilst recognizing that there 
are global organizations and norms (e.g. ILO, UN Guiding Principles), the term “global” remains 
an inherently ethereal concept which fails to appreciate the plethora of institutions, structures, 
norms, and even local and national regulations that companies must navigate when sourcing 
internationally.  Companies do not source “globally”; clothing labels bear attributions such as 
“Made in Bangladesh” or “Made in China”, not “Made Globally”.  Recognizing the international 
environments from which companies source is a first step in appreciating and understanding the 
institutional fragmentation and plurality that companies face, and which shapes their agency, 
when sourcing internationally.  While Paper 1 shows that – similar to CSR – preferred PG 
practices largely vary by national context, yet the crossover brands demonstrate that NBSs and 
political economy are not the only factors which shape companies’ choices.  While country 
contexts may dominate, they are not the only institutional factors in play, demonstrating the need 
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to better understand both the plurality and heterogeneity of institutions which shape actors’ 
sensemaking and subsequent action.   
 
Third, the thesis provides a much-needed exploration of different modes and mechanisms of 
private governance, thereby extending our understanding of the different ways companies can 
operationalize their political CSR responsibilities.  Not all collaboration can be painted with the 
same broad brush.  In the Accord and Alliance case, the MSI seemingly was more effective at 
including and incorporating a broad array of stakeholder interests and concerns, building capacity 
within the industry, and took a more holistic view on how to meet particular obligations than its 
BLI counterpart.  In contrast, the BLI was nimble and fast, reaching safety targets faster, though 
perhaps less effective at addressing the underlying issues which resulted in problems in the first 
place.  Both modes of organizing private governance – MSIs and BLIs – come with their own 
merits and drawbacks, and understanding the differences between them is paramount for 
understanding, explaining and predicting future firm behavior and private governance outcomes.  
By teasing apart differences between the two, we can better understand the utility and potential of 
the models, and how they might most effectively be applied to particular types of sustainability 
challenges.   
 
Finally, the findings of the thesis reveal some of the fundamental challenges with the proclaimed 
shift from a political CSR 1.0 to 2.0 perspective.  The alignment of the Accord with a 2.0 and the 
Alliance with a 1.0 conception demonstrate that the two notions can co-exist simultaneously.  
Rather than reflect changes in globalization and the passage of time, it is more helpful to think 
about the two constructs as underpinned by different institutions and historical legacies.  The 
differences between the political CSR 1.0 and 2.0 perspectives seemingly speak more to the 
institutions and contexts from which actors interpret and take action on their responsibilities than 
they do to the temporality of political CSR.  PG fitting within both the 1.0 and 2.0 conceptions 
are being provided at the same time, but in different ways.  Akin to different CSR orientations – 
where some CSR practices are highly instrumental while others may be integrative or strategic 
(Garriga & Melé, 2004) – political CSR might more usefully be considered in a similar manner.  
The comparative case used in this study demonstrated how the Alliance stood as an example of 
political CSR 1.0 and the Accord as 2.0 (see Table 3 in the Case Overview portion of the 
Methodology section for an overview).  Combined with the findings from the thesis’ papers, it 
suggests that an evolution of the constructs isn’t entirely dependent upon globalization and 
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temporality – though certainly these play a part – but rather a represent the different orientations 
of political CSR itself.  The practice of PG - as an example of an activity which companies use to 
fulfill their political responsibilities – may be reflective of an instrumental rationale (e.g. reducing 
risk in a brand’s supply chain), integrative orientation (e.g. brands comply with stakeholder 
demands to do more to ensure factory safety), or an ethical perspective (e.g. brands feel a duty or 
obligation to help raise standards).  When viewed in this way, this study suggests that rather than 
viewing “political CSR” as a “type” of activity in which companies engage, that it can be far more 
useful to view what companies do as an indication of how they understand their political roles and 
why they operationalize them in particular ways.   
 
6.4 Implications for Practice  
The findings from this PhD study hold insights which can be useful in practice.  While the 
perspective and focal point was on brands (buying companies), learnings about their perspective 
have applicability more broadly for other actors whom are also involved – either directly or 
indirectly – in governance.   
 
6.4.1 Buying Firms    
The trifecta of the in-depth case study, synthesis of the related academic knowledge, and 
continued real-world pressures decidedly demonstrate the vast and increasing nature of business’ 
“political” responsibilities, and companies must determine how to fulfill these expectations.  This 
is becoming ever more evident in companies’ supply chains which frequently extend to countries 
where oversight by public authorities is often inadequate to ensure acceptable standards of safety 
and sustainability.  Therefore, those companies which source from these locales are tasked with 
governance provision, and the plethora of PG options available can lead to questions about which 
is the best suited for the task and/or the company.  While PG claims to set global rules and 
standards, they have national origins which tend to reflect the systems and structures of that 
environment.  Therefore, companies may find greater congruence of PG originating from their 
home environment with the prevailing systems that dictate their business practices (e.g. PG’s 
enforcement and compliance mechanisms in complement to the legal system).  The structure and 
strategies of PG from the same national context may also mirror familiar ways of working (e.g. 
similar views on stakeholders).  However, the way PG efforts formulate the problem at hand and 
conduct their work varies, so companies should carefully evaluate their own motivations and 
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imperatives before selecting their PG engagements.  As the ‘political’ expectations of business 
change, companies must remain astute as to which PG efforts best fit both their environment and 
their imperatives.   
   
6.4.2 Policy Makers  
Public authorities – home and host governments, as well as intergovernmental organizations like 
the EU, UN, and ILO – play a role in shaping PG.  The regulatory environments set the parameters 
both for the design and function of PG, demonstrating the power and influence of the state in 
shaping companies’ CSR practices (Gond et al., 2011).  Host countries in large part can dictate 
what PG initiatives are allowed to do, for example, by controlling the business licenses necessary 
for operation within their country.  They may also elect to participate or otherwise coordinate with 
PG organizations; this seems to be burgeoning trend which holds great promise for furthering 
sustainability objectives via the ability to better coordinate and reinforce the policies and actions 
of each (Amengual, 2010).   
 
Home countries also play a role in shaping how their companies enact their political 
responsibilities abroad (Knudsen, 2017; Knudsen & Moon, 2017).  Governments themselves may 
choose to take part in or even establish their own collaborative governance arrangements; for 
example, the UK government played a major role in the creation and direction of its Ethical 
Trading Initiative (Knudsen & Moon, 2017).   They may use instruments like trade policies and 
preferences to set acceptable standards of production and behavior, as well as provide incentives 
or disincentives for particular business practices.  They could also create regulatory “safe havens” 
for companies to engage in good faith efforts to experiment with different types of standards and 
approaches for addressing sustainability issues, but without fear of regulatory liability.  Home 
governments can use their regulatory apparatus to incent constructive and innovative PG 
behaviors by business.   
 
Intergovernmental organizations are already highly involved in many PG efforts.  For example, 
the ILO’s BetterWork program seeks to consolidate audits and improve labor rights, and is 
currently operational in eight countries with a pilot underway in a ninth.  Organizations such as 
this serve as a bridge between home and host governments, and are uniquely positioned 
“transnationally” to preside authoritatively over sustainability issues.  They also tend to enjoy 
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high legitimacy and credibility, demonstrating their power and potential to help guide and shape 
companies’ “political” behaviors.   
 
6.4.3 PG Organizations: MSIs and BLIs  
One of the key findings from this PhD thesis is the role of context in shaping companies’ PG 
choices.  For example, regulatory (liability) environments can be hugely influential in shaping 
companies’ behaviors, so PG organizations should be attuned to how their structures and strategies 
may be interpreted differently by companies from different environments.  This was found to be 
particularly true regarding the compliance and enforcement mechanisms used, vis-à-vis the 
applicable legal system.  Understanding the nuances and differences in how companies are likely 
to react, interpret or engage can therefore inform how policies and processes are formulated, and 
the degree of latitude acceptable in operations.  Such design choices are likely to shape which 
companies are most likely to join or not.   
 
Further, the findings from the study demonstrate that PG originating from a locale tends to mirror 
or otherwise complement the systems and structures of it, which in turn makes it primarily 
attractive to companies also originating from that environment.  Therefore, given the above point, 
PG organizations could benefit from reflexively considering the best balance between 
complementarity with their environment and the means necessary to reach their goals.  By viewing 
this from a broader perspective, PG initiatives can more purposefully exercise their agency when 
designing their own structures and strategies.   
 
Finally, the very role of PG should be considered carefully.  As demonstrated in the findings and 
consistent with the literature, states are not absent from the governance debate (Knudsen & Moon, 
2017).  While in many circumstances PG may be implemented due to the inadequacy of 
government – as discussed previously – it also has the ability to help raise the standards and 
capacities of public authorities (Locke et al., 2009).  PG need not supplant public regulation; it 
can reinforce it (Amengual & Chirot, 2016).  Therefore, PG organizations should consider their 
own objectives and goals carefully with full view of the environment in which it operates to 
carefully consider and account for the interest of other ‘governors’.   
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6.4.4. Other Actors  
The findings also hold implications for other actors in practice.  For suppliers, the variations 
viewed and attributed can help explain the varying expectations of the international buyers, 
explaining why companies from the U.S. may have different perspective than those from, say, 
Sweden.  Organized labor and activist civil society organizations can also learn from the differing 
motivations and conceptions of responsibilities that companies have, which can inform how the 
approach or engage with them.  Given that businesses from different environment may understand 
their roles and responsibilities differently, this suggests that different avenues for targeting or 
engagement may be appropriate.  Different approaches will impact firms in various ways.  
Overall, this study provides practical information on the variation in the practice and potential of 
PG to address sustainability issues.   
 
6.5 Limitations  
Consistent with case study research, this PhD thesis provides a great deal of information and 
knowledge specific to the Accord, Alliance, and the PG of building safety in the Bangladesh RMG 
industry.  While every effort has been made to draw upon literature and theory to analyze, 
substantiate, and extrapolate findings in a more generalizable way, further research is needed to 
determine to what extent the findings observed and theorized here carry forward to other 
environments.  The appreciation of context is one of the key insights from the study, signaling 
that findings may not necessarily be directly transferable elsewhere.  However, the research has 
grappled with this through the development of various models, frameworks and ideal types, 
hypothesized to be applicable in other environments.  Therefore, future research building upon 
the insights and frameworks offered here will be the ultimate judge of their portability elsewhere.   
 
Next, the study doesn’t seek to make a normative assessment of either the Accord and Alliance, 
or MSIs and BLIs generally.  Rather, it views this “which is better?” question so often posed to 
the author as a question that itself is in search of context.  To answer, we must understand where, 
how and why PG would be deployed before being able to answer such a query.  Therefore, the 
research was designed in such a way as to tease out and understand the differences between PG 
approaches so that we might be better able to answer such question within a given context.  Paper 
2, in particular, aims to tackle this issue.   
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Finally, the research also has various scope and methodological limitations – outline previously – 
which necessarily limit the study.  While a breadth of actors were included in the research, it did 
focus on a business perspective, and specifically, on Western, buying companies.  Even within 
this scope, it focused predominately on large companies, which may not necessarily reflect the 
same views and issues as small- and medium-sized businesses (Morsing & Perrini, 2009; Spence, 
1999).  Further research on smaller businesses, as well as on other actors like labor, NGOs and 
government, could help provide additional breadth and depth to our understanding of PG.   
Various other limitations of the research have been outlined within each of the papers as 
applicable.   
 
6.6 Future Research  
The findings from the PhD thesis open up many avenues for future research.  Following several 
of the points outlined under limitations, additional perspectives on the same case could potentially 
identify differences and similarities in companies of different sizes and how they engage with the 
Accord or other PG efforts.  Further, over its tenure the Accord garnered a smattering of brand 
members from outside of Europe and the U.S., such as Turkey, Hong Kong, and Malaysia.  While 
small in number, their inclusion suggests that countries once considered outside of the ‘Global 
North’ are becoming involved in the provision of PG, signaling an interesting development in 
which types of actors are engaging in “political” activities (Gereffi & Lee, 2016; Gregson & 
Ferdous, 2015).   
 
Next, the theme of context could be further explore.  For example, the increasing numbers and 
sizes of Export Processing Zones (EPZs) within producing countries like Bangladesh come with 
their own set of rules and governance, often well outside the normal systems, structures and 
institutions which govern other business in the country.  These have been under-explored in 
research, both from a comparative perspective (e.g. how do factories within EPZs compare with 
those outside?) as well as from a regulatory one (e.g. how do regulations affect and interact within 
EPZs to raise sustainability standards?) (Milberg & Amengual, 2008).  Findings from this study 
suggest that given the role of institutions – of which NBSs are only a part – that sourcing may be 
better understood as originating from production markets than production countries.  EPZs thus 
stand as a fruitful avenue for further research.  As well, further specification of the differences 
between NBS and VoCs could be of value, given the vast differences between the systems and 
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institutions otherwise grouped together, such as Germany and the Netherlands or the U.S. a dn 
Canada.  Further, the findings revealed that while political economy divisions can largely explain 
how and why companies conceptualize and act on their political roles and responsibilities 
differently, other institutional factors also come into play.  Other research could further investigate 
these differences, and help to further identify what these are and why they are so powerful in 
shaping actors’ behaviors.  As well, studying variations through a different phenomenon could 
help too, for example, by exploring differences in CSR communications (Høvring, 2017; Maignan 
& Ralston, 2002a; Morsing & Spence, 2019).  Further exploring and analyzing context though 
any number of avenues can help advance our knowledge and understanding of how it shapes and 
is shaped by the increasingly ‘political’ role of business.   
 
There is also an opportunity to further investigate the confluence of PG with traditional 
governance provided by public authorities.  While the political CSR perspective largely treats 
governments absent (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011), this is simply not reflective of the many ways that 
governments – home and host – influence PG and other political activities by companies (Gond 
et al., 2011).  Indeed, a growing body of research has explored the role of government in shaping 
CSR – and to a lesser extent, PG – practices (Amengual, 2010; Amengual & Chirot, 2016; 
Knudsen & Moon, 2017; Knudsen et al., 2015; Torfing, 2012), but further research could continue 
to develop this line of inquiry, particularly within a PG context.  Research in this vein could 
explore the relationships between the government in Bangladesh and their implicit endorsement 
of the continuation of the BLI Alliance (albeit by a new name), as well as their visceral opposition 
to the Accord.  As this research project needed to draw to a close during the heat of these debates, 
they present a ripe opportunity for further exploring the relationship between government and PG.   
Further from this particular case follows the inquiry about the purpose and function of 
government.  While the Bangladesh government may have been very effective at growing the 
industry – due in no small part due to the fact that a third of the country’s politicians have a 
familial stake in the RMG business – it has been ineffective at ensuring even the most basic safety 
conditions of its workers.  Further research using this case could explore the differences between 
governmental capacity, adequacy and competency, and its implications for PG.   
 
Finally, additional work should further seek to understand and conceptualize the differences 
between different ways of approaching PG.  MSIs and BLIs are two such models, and exploring 
their variations in other contexts would be useful (Marques, 2016).  Similar work has looked at 
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the forestry sector – and in particular, the competing FSC and SFI standards – which didn’t arise 
out of a crisis situation like the Accord and Alliance did, thereby representing an interesting case 
from which to further explore the durability of differences in the PG organizations arising in each 
(Cashore et al., 2004).  Other industries and sectors hold similar promise, for example, comparing 
the BSCI with the FLA.  Additionally, differences of PG in dealing with other matters would also 
be investigated; for example, given that 80% of Bangladesh’s garment workers are women, 
exploring gender implications could also be a fruitful avenue.  Additional research would be 
helpful in furthering our understanding of PG and its variations.   
 
7. CONCLUSION  
This PhD project set out to answer the RQ: Why do companies understand their political roles 
differently, and how does this shape their private governance choices?  In doing so, it found that 
context is a crucial aspect shaping actors’ understandings and motivations in their political 
behaviors.  When divergent approaches to the PG of building safety emerged post-Rana Plaza, 
the shared context of Bangladesh and crisis could not explain the phenomenon; rather, one of the 
principle findings of the study is that firms’ dominant institutional contexts served as the decisive 
reference point in actors’ sensemaking and choices in PG.  This shaped both their 
conceptualization of their responsibilities, as well as the choices they made in the design and scope 
of their PG agreements.  This contributes to our understanding of how political economies – 
particularly those of companies’ home environments – and other prevailing institutions shape how 
actors’ understanding of themselves as political actors in a global world, and set out to enact their 
responsibilities thusly.  Another principle contribution of the thesis is affording a greater 
appreciation for the role of agency within private governance.  While constrained by dominant 
institutional structures, actors still retail significant power to choose between a variety of options 
in PG.  Actors’ navigation within and between institutions is not path dependent.   
 
The work also addressed some of the deficiencies of the political CSR perspective and offered 
some additional refinements.  Companies’ assumption of political roles is not necessarily due to 
an absence of government, but rather, lack of agreement about the adequacy of government.  The 
Accord and Alliance emerged due to the inadequacies of the Bangladesh government to 
sufficiently enforce its otherwise decent regulations for factory safety, which was at odds with the 
norms of brands’ home institutional environment where compliance is the norm.  Next, the thesis 
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also questioned the use-value of the concept of “global” supply chains, and instead recommended 
that an “international” conceptualization would better reflect and appreciate the layers of 
regulations and norms which brands must navigate when sourcing from abroad.  This is also 
reflective of the empirical findings which demonstrate the significant role of institutions in actors’ 
environments, and provides pathways to additional theoretical development.  Third, the thesis 
investigated different models of organizing private governance (MSI and BLI), thereby providing 
much-needed evidence and insight into the underpinnings, dimensions and priorities of difference 
approaches.  Finally, it contested the evolution of political CSR from a 1.0 to a 2.0 conception, 
concluding that these varying models may be equally valid and reflective of different institutional 
environments themselves, and thus may be more accurately considered as orientations than 
temporal concepts.  Overall, this PhD thesis has contributed to our understanding of why 
companies understand their political roles differently.  In doing so it has provided a thorough 
explanation of what these differences mean for the organization and implications of private 
governance for sustainability issues.   
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9. APPENDIXES  
 
Appendix 1: PCSR 1.0 to 2.0  
 
Changing contexts – enlarged responses: From PCSR 1.0 to PCSR 2.0 (Scherer et al., 2016, pp. 280–281) 
  PCSR 1.0 PSCR 2.0 
Social-
political 
context 
Postnational constellation 1.0 
• End of bi-polar world order 
(capitalism vs communism)  
• Reduced barriers for trade and 
investment 
• Strengthening of economic actors  
• Eroding state power 
• Focus of ethical debate on principles 
and discourse  
Postnational constellation 2.0  
• Hardening of identities: new nationalism and 
religious fundamentalism  
• Repressive tendencies on local, national and 
global levels  
• Weakening of democratic institutions and civic 
liberties (even in developed countries)  
• Focus of ethical debate on values  
Focal types of 
responsible 
business 
organizations  
Selective set of business firms  
• Focus on large MNCs 
• Static/a-historic view on division of 
labor between private and public 
actors  
Enlarged set of business firms  
• E.g., MNCs, SMEs, state owned enterprises, 
social enterprises  
• Dynamic/historic view on division of labor 
between private and public actors  
Role of 
government 
regulation  
Erosion of public authorities  
• Private regulation as a substitute for 
public authority  
• Focus on soft-law  
• Significance of business-NGO 
collaborations, MSI, etc.  
Strengthening of public authorities  
• Extra-territorial enforcement of national laws 
vis-à-vis private actors  
• Intergovernmental initiatives on regional and 
international levels (e.g., EU, OECD, UN) 
facilitate CSR  
• Complementarity of hard and soft-law elements  
Institutional 
complexity  
Standard case (lower complexity)  
• MNCs from western countries 
operating in fragile states  
Variations that deviate from standard case (higher 
complexity)  
• Delegation of governance responsibilities in 
western countries  
• Institutional heterogeneity between host 
countries of MNCs  
• MNCs with home base in transition or 
emerging economies  
• South-south trade and investments  
Efficiency of 
private 
governance 
Simple supply chain governance  
• Focus on auditing of structures and 
procedures along supply chains  
• Development of compliance models  
Complex supply chain governance  
• Focus on input, procedure, and output side  
• Combination of compliance, collaboration, and 
integrity models  
Relevant 
industry 
sectors 
Focus on primary and secondary sectors 
(esp. extracting, industrial, and consumer 
goods)  
Analysis of all sectors  
• Financialization and digitalization of society as 
new challenges for PCSR  
Sensemaking 
of PCSR 
Selective analysis of management issues  
• Economic and social rationalities as 
antagonisms (efficiency vs ethics)  
• Single level analysis restricted on 
macro and – to a lesser extent – meso 
levels  
• Limited analysis of organizational 
structures and procedures (focused 
on compliance management or value 
based approaches)  
• Individual level and behavioural 
aspects largely neglected  
Extended analysis of management issues  
• Economic and social rationalities as results of 
discursive sense-making within business firms  
• Single and multi-level analyses (macro, meso, 
micro)  
• Enlarged analysis of structures and procedures 
(integration of various management systems – 
compliance, collaboration, integrity, role of 
corporate governance, HRM, etc.)  
• Analysis of individual and leadership behavior 
(‘responsible leadership’)  
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Appendix 2: Organizational Cases  
 
“Cases” used in the PhD Thesis for organizing the data.   
PhD Thesis Cases  
Accord 
Adidas 
Alliance  
Australia 
Bangladesh Government  
Bestseller 
Clean Clothes Campaign 
Coop DK 
Danida (Danish Development Agency)  
Danish Ethical Trading Initiative  
DK Company 
EU (Government)  
Expert Reports (NGO, academic reports)  
Gap 
Gina Tricot 
H&M 
Hema 
IC Group 
International Labour Organisation  
Inditex 
IndustriALL 
Labor  
NGOs  
News / Media  
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Primark 
PVH 
Other PG Organizations  
SOMO 
Sourcing Journal  
Stadium 
Target 
US Government 
VF Corporation  
Walmart 
Warehouse  
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Appendix 3: Interview Guides  
Example Interview Guides for: Bestseller, Gap, and Danish Fashion & Textile.   
Bestseller Interview Guide  
 
Signing  
You said before that it was unclear what the Accord even was back when you signed it.  So, why did you 
sign it?  Were you getting pressure from anyone?  Government, DIEH, etc.  
You said previously that not knowing what you were signing proved difficult afterwards.  How so?   
Has the Accord become what you expected it would, given the lack of initial clarity?  
 
Accord 
You said before that the Accord could have a little more influence of business.  What kind of influence?  
How could it be different?  
Does the legally binding clause change how you work with the Accord?  If it wasn’t legally binding, 
would you do things differently?   
You mentioned previously that the legal clause is a benefit.  How so?  What’s the difference between 
agreements with and without a legally-binding clause?  
Has the Accord increased or decreased your workload?   
Should the Accord continue beyond 2018?  In what capacity?  
Is there a need to build skills and competencies within Bangladesh?  Or should the focus be on bringing 
the factories up to code?  What is the Accord doing, and which should it do?    
 
Business Practices  
How many factories are you a lead on?  
Do you have any shared factories with the Alliance?  What’s it like working with the Alliance?   
Now that the 2-year sourcing agreement has passed, have you changed the factories that you work with 
in Bangladesh?  Or the volumes that your source from each?  
Has the Accord changed how buyers/merchandising do their work?  
Where in the hierarchy of things does CSR fall within Bestseller?   
You said before that Bestseller has financed 10 million dkk.  How much of this has gone directly for 
improvements?  Do you foresee investing even more?  
You mentioned previously how you work together with the other brands to share updates on remediation.  
Has the Accord changed how you interact or collaborate with competitors?   
 
Responsibility  
You said previously that it should be the government’s job, rather than the brands’, to address issues like 
safety and minimum wage.  In an ideal world, what would the division of responsibility be?  How is it 
actually?  Is there an intermediary solution?  
You shared before that you worked for an NGO and were surprised when you joined the company side of 
things.  What were some of the surprises?  
What’s the role of consumers?  Do you have any research on what your consumers think about sourcing 
issues?   
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Gap Interview Guide  
 
Alliance Formation  
• What was it about RP that spurred such movement in the industry?  
• What is Gap’s primary motivation for engagement?  (consumer demand, moral imperative, risk 
mitigation)  
• Why did Gap seek to form the Alliance instead of joining the Accord?  
• What are the pros and cons of the Alliance vs the Accord?   
 
Alliance Organization  
• In your capacity as an Alliance board member, what are your key tasks?   
• What differences might your board membership make to Gap, compared to companies who don’t 
have a representative on the board?   
• How does the Alliance board work with the advisory and labor committees?   
• What were some of the key challenges for the Alliance when it started? 
• What challenges does the Alliance face currently?   
• Have there been any unintended or spillover effects of the Alliance, either on the industry or on Gap 
specifically?   
• What’s the future for the Alliance?   
 
Legal 
• What are your thoughts on the legal provision of the Accord?  Why is it problematic?   
• Would you prefer to join a voluntary initiative – like the Alliance – or have clearly-laid out 
regulation to follow?   
 
Consumers  
• Consumers – different in US and Europe?  How did that affect your decision?  
• What role do consumers play in social sustainability?   
• Did you hear any feedback or concerns from your employees?  How interested are they in Gap’s 
sustainability commitments?   
 
Collaboration 
• Collaboration – has the Alliance changed how you work with your competitors?   
• Did you work with your competitors much in a pre-competitive environment before?  
 
Government  
• In an ideal world, who should be responsible for such tasks?   
• How has this impacted your relationship with the Bangladesh government?   
• What should the role of the Bangladesh government be?   
• Has the Alliance been impacted by the US government?  Changed the regulatory environment?   
 
Roles and Responsibilities  
• How have roles and responsibilities for public goods shifted in the past few years?   
• With this shift and companies like Gap doing more, does that change the expectations – and criticism 
– that you face?   
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• Is this just part of what it means to do business in an era of globalization?   Or has the pendulum 
swung too far?   
• Do you want to be political?   
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Danish Fashion & Textile Interview Guide  
 
Role of Danish Government   
What was the perspective of the Danish government on the Accord?   
What did the government do to encourage companies to sign up?  Why?   
Which ministry?  Who was involved?   
What were the sticks and carrots that the government used?   
What do you see as the primary reason (or reasons) that Danish companies ultimately joined the Accord?   
Was this approach something new?  Or reflective of a usual way of working with companies?    
Did this approach have any unintended effects?   
If and how has the government been involved since then?   
Did other governments take similar approaches?   
 
Current Efforts  
What is Danish Fashion & Textile currently doing in Bangladesh?  Why?   
Is the situation in Bangladesh unique?  Or do companies face similar issues in other countries they source 
from?   
Has the role of DF&T evolved or changed in the last few years?  How?   
What types of questions, concerns and/or requests do you hear from companies regarding Bangladesh 
and the Accord?   
How have the roles and responsibilities of companies in their supply chains evolved in the past 10 years?   
In an ideal world, who should be responsible for things like building construction and electrical safety?  
In the real world, who should be responsible?   
Do companies want to be political, that is, take on additional responsibilities?  Is this just part of what it 
means to have a global supply chain, or has the pendulum swung too far?   
As companies take on additional responsibilities, do you think this changes the expectations of them?  If 
so, just for the companies who step up to do more, or for the industry as a whole?   
Do you see any differences in the approach or practices of Scandinavian companies versus those from 
other countries?  
What’s the future for DF&T?   
 
Accord 
What do you see as the biggest differences between the Accord and Alliance?   
One of the biggest differences cited between the Alliance and Accord is the Accord’s legal liability 
clause.  How important do you think this clause is?   
Do you think or see companies behave differently because of the legal clause?   
If the legal clause didn’t exist, how do you think things might be different?   
Are you aware of any exercise of the legal clause, that is, have any companies been brought to suit?   
What are the greatest strengths of the Accord?  Biggest shortcomings?   
Does the Accord represent a new way for companies to operate and do business in a global world?  Why 
or why not?   
Even with the Accord, ILO Better Work program, and the work that DF&T is doing, are there still any 
gaps?   
What’s the future for the Accord?   
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Appendix 4: First Order Codes 
First order codes  
Name 
Accord 
Accord as political 
Accord future 
Accord vs Alliance 
Agents - Buying Houses 
Alliance 
Alliance as nimble 
Alliance Future 
Anecdote 
Answers not readily available 
Audit Fatigue 
Audit model, history 
Autonomy, Freedom 
BD as unique environment-challenges 
BD Government Ineffective 
BD Government opposition 
BD Government Relationship 
BD important sourcing market 
Benefits of Accord 
Boots on the Ground 
Brand differences 
Brand management of factories 
Brands as powerful 
Business Model 
Capacity Building 
Child Labor 
CoCs (Codes of Conduct)  
Collaboration 
Collective Power 
Competitive vs Pre-Competitive 
Compliance 
Consumers 
Convergence, Common Standards 
Corruption 
Credibility 
CSR 
CSR as talent recruitment-retention 
Dependence on Foreign Brands 
Differing Values-Cultures-Expectations-
Norms 
Drop factories 
Dynamics between actors 
Employees 
Ethical Responsibility 
Ethiopia 
Existing Agreement 
Expectations 
External factors (e.g. political instability 
compromise safety) 
Fast Fashion 
Follow Lead Brands 
Go it alone strategy 
Goal of Commitments 
Good for BD Industry 
Governance of A-A 
Government Function 
Government Relationship - Home 
Greenwashing 
Hypocrisy 
Impact of Accord on company 
Industry (Western) Solution 
Inspections 
Investment - Accord-Alliance 
Lack of skills, infrastructure 
Lack of transparency 
Leadership Status 
Legal 
Accord as a model, leader 
Accord as breakthrough 
Arbitration 
Binding Nature 
Dictates Actions 
Enforcement 
Explicit responsibilities under the 
Accord 
Facilitates new norms 
Finances, Costs 
Free riders 
Intent of the Accord 
Legally binding as obstacle 
Necessary to be legally binding 
Regulation VS Voluntary 
Regulatory strengthening 
Replication 
Skepticism 
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Sourcing Volumes 
Threat of legally bindingness 
Lessons applied elsewhere 
Leverage with Suppliers 
Limited Scope 
Local attitudes 
Local resources and capacities 
Long-Term Solutions 
Lots of Factories 
Market differences 
Media 
Motivation 
Need for the Accord - Justify 
Need systems, operations to support new 
ways of working 
New Normal 
New Processes 
NGOs 
NTPA 
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Paper 1 
How domestic contexts shape the organization of  
international private governance: the case of  
the European Accord and American Alliance in Bangladesh  
 
 
Erin Leitheiser 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Numerous studies have explored the impact of national business systems on companies’ domestic 
CSR practices, yet little is known about what factors shape CSR practices like private governance 
(PG) internationally.  Despite the claim of PG to establish ‘global’ rules, private governance has 
national origins, and multiple efforts to address the same issue frequently co-exist.   Therefore, 
this study seeks to understand how differing home institutional environments shape firms’ 
approaches to private governance engagement in host contexts, which it explores empirically 
through the comparative case study of competing PG in the post-Rana Plaza Bangladesh garment 
industry.  In doing so, it builds a framework of the structural and strategic dimensions of PG, one 
of the study’s principle contributions.  It also combines empirical findings with the comparative 
CSR literature to hypothesize about ideal types of PG organizing in U.S. and European contexts.  
Finally, by explicating linkages between the dimensions of PG with prevailing institutional 
environments, this study also extends our understanding of how and why the PG practices of 
companies varies for firms in different environments.   
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INTRODUCTION 
Despite similar pressures and expectations thrust upon business operating in similar host 
environments, companies respond to and engage with corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
internationally in very different ways.  One approach for understanding these differences has been 
the exploration of how CSR practices reflect, are shaped by, or align with the national contexts, 
business systems, and institutions in which companies operate (Campbell, 2007; Hall & Soskice, 
2001).  The overarching findings from this literature – explored in further detail below – 
demonstrate significant differences in the domestic practices of CSR between European and 
American companies (Blindheim, 2015; Ioannou & Serafeim, 2012; D. Matten & Moon, 2008; 
Rasche, 2015).  However, the primary focus of this literature has been on CSR practices in 
companies’ home  environments; less attention has been focused on understanding CSR behavior 
abroad (e.g. D. Brown & Knudsen, 2012; Jackson & Bartosch, 2016; Witt & Jackson, 2016).     
 
Companies utilize a range of CSR activities, which increasingly include engagement in 
collaborative arrangements of various types, such as partnerships, multi-stakeholder initiatives 
(MSIs), or private governance (Cashore, 2002; de Bakker et al., 2015; Quélin, Kivleniece, & 
Lazzarini, 2017).  Collective approaches vary in any number of dimensions, be it by sector, 
membership composition, purpose and goals, perceived legitimacy, scope and more (J. P. Doh & 
Guay, 2006; Fernholz, Bowyer, Stai, Bratkovich, & Howe, 2011; Mena & Palazzo, 2012; Rasche, 
2010).  While the purposes of collaborative efforts may vary (Palazzo & Scherer, 2010), an 
increasing trend is on the provision of governance by corporations (Frynas & Stephens, 2015; 
Scherer et al., 2014), turning them into “governance makers” (Rasche, Morsing, & Moon, 2017, 
p. 21).  The term “private governance” (PG) is used here to reflect voluntary, non-market 
governance initiatives with which companies engage to fulfill their social and/or environmental 
obligations (Cashore, 2002).  Indeed, an exploration of companies’ governance efforts has given 
rise to a niche conversation in the literature dubbed “political CSR” which contends that business 
is responsible for contributing to the public good, particularly when public authorities are 
unwilling or unable to do so (Scherer et al., 2016).  PG is a dominant mode through which 
companies address their social and environmental responsibilities in their supply chains.   
 
It is often overlooked that PG has national origins, despite its claim to set global rules.  For 
example, the original standard in forestry – the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) – was 
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popularized in Europe, but soon was rivaled by a competing American standard, the Sustainable 
Forestry Initiative (SFI) (Sasser, Prakash, Cashore, & Auld, 2006).  Yet, despite their national 
roots, these governance bodies  are utilized internationally, invoking calls in the field for further 
research on the internationalization of CSR (Pisani, Kourula, Kolk, & Meijer, 2017). The varying 
national roots of divergent or competing initiatives – with their accompanying rules, standards, 
and certifications – suggest important differences and preferences by firms in “governance 
making”.  PG can vary by any number of characteristics, be they structural factors such as internal 
rules and hierarchies, or more strategic ones such as how it defines the problem it seeks to address.  
Such differences give rise to questions about how PG approaches differ, and why firms from 
different environments tend to favor certain approaches over others.   
 
This paper takes on this inquiry empirically through the investigation of a comparative case study 
of competing European and North American PG in the post-Rana Plaza Bangladesh garment 
industry.  It explores how differing home contexts shaped companies’ preferences for different 
approaches to governance in the host country.  Specifically, the study aims to answer the question: 
how do different domestic institutional contexts shape firms’ approach to PG internationally?  
The answer to this question contributes to our understanding of why and how companies engage 
differently in CSR internationally.   
 
Overall, this paper makes three primary contributions in the areas of PG and comparative CSR.  
First, it sets out a framework which elucidates both the structural and strategic dimensions of PG 
for comparison.  While existing literature identifies some of the key structural dimensions of 
collaborative efforts (Rasche et al., 2013), there is currently a lack of understanding of agentic 
dimensions of PG.  Such distinctions and categories are crucial for comparative analysis, and offer 
a more comprehensive view of PG as constituted of structures which may be both reflective of as 
well as facilitate the (embedded) agency of actors.  Next, the comparative analysis between 
European and American PG approaches reveals how different institutions – manifest in different 
political economics, business systems and accompanying social norms – shape firm preferences 
for CSR not just at home, but also abroad.  These findings combine with the comparative CSR 
literature to inform the theorizing of ideal types of PG organizing for U.S. and European 
companies.  Finally, situating PG within its dominant institutional environment and resulting 
constraints can reveal the linkages, complementarities and causal mechanisms which can explain 
the differences in the chosen PG’s approach.  These findings extend our understanding of how 
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and why companies practice international CSR differently, an increasingly important body of 
knowledge given the growing provision of governance by private actors.   
 
The paper is structured as follows.  First, it provides an overview of what we know about the 
variation in CSR practices in different national contexts, business systems and institutional 
environments.  Next, it explores the varying features of different modes and approaches to PG, 
disaggregating PG’s structural and strategic dimensions into categorical elements for the 
empirical enquiry.  The presentation of the case and findings follow, leading to the discussion of 
what such variations tell us about PG approaches and the practice of international CSR between 
companies from different political economies.     
 
NATIONAL CONTEXTS AND CSR 
National context plays an important role in how companies view their responsibilities and practice 
CSR.  There are a variety of approaches and perspectives on how differences between countries 
manifest and affect firms.  One of the foundational perspectives which sought to explain the 
organization of economic activities is that of National Business Systems (NBSs), which are 
“distinctive patterns of economic organization that vary in their degree and mode of authoritative 
coordination of economic activities, and in the organization of, and interconnections between, 
owners, managers, experts and other employees” (Whitley, 1999, p. 33).  While numerous 
institutions exist at a national level, Whitley highlighted the political, financial, labor and cultural 
systems as those crucial to guiding and constraining behaviors as these prescribe the legal system, 
labor rights and relations, and financial rules, among others (1999).  These systems set the 
structures which firms must operative within, collectively constituting the country’s national 
business system.   
 
Similarly, a varieties of capitalism (VoCs) perspective puts firms at the center, contending that 
any political economy is comprised of institutions which set the parameters (“opportunities”) for 
firms, so firms will gravitate towards strategies which complement these structures (Hall & 
Soskice, 2001, p. 15).  The authors contend that economies broadly fall into either liberal market 
economies (LMEs) or coordinated market economies (CMEs) (though they do note some “mixed” 
economies), and that these types are characterized primarily by the degree to which firms 
coordinate their activities.  Therefore, there are systematic differences in corporate strategy 
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between LMEs and CMEs, reflective of the overarching institutional structures of the political 
economy in which they are embedded (Hall & Soskice, 2001).  The VoCs perspective has been 
noteworthy for its ability to explain “broad and persistent cross-national differences in institutions 
and policy outcomes” (Thelen, 2010, p. 48).  Whilst not path dependent, the varieties of capitalism 
perspective holds that institutional structures shape corporate strategies.   
 
Further work sought to also account for institutions outside of those comprising the traditional 
political economy.  Institutions – defined here broadly as the socially constructed “rules of the 
game” – do not exist together randomly, but rather form a set of complementary structures, with 
some institutions dominating others (Amable, 2005).  This view eschewed a largely structuralist 
view in favor of a socially embedded one where “strategic agents” adopt similar practices due to 
the dominance of the same or similar institutions surrounding them (Amable, 2005, p. 59).  For 
example, companies from the same country frequently adopt similar “stakeholder orientations” 
that align with prevailing social norms and expectations (Witt & Redding, 2012).  The 
heterogeneity of institutions which firms encounter should be better integrated into comparative 
analyses, as the breadth of these domains shape stakeholder interests and interactions (Aguilera 
& Jackson, 2003).  Herein we can see that while structures and institutions may set the parameters, 
there is a still a role for agency in navigating diverse institutional environments.   
 
Such a view is perhaps even more important when widening the lens from focusing solely on the 
organization of economic activity to also considering the wider roles of firms in society as 
manifest in CSR and PG.  Research on this point has found that NBSs in large part create the 
structure and constraints within which companies operate, and such national political-economic 
systems play a decisive role in how companies practice CSR (Gjølberg, 2009; Jackson & 
Apostolakou, 2010; Kang & Moon, 2012).  This is why companies’ CSR programs tend to reflect 
national public programs (Campbell, 2007).  Other work has even suggested that firm responses 
in PG should be path dependent so long as they experience the same changes in their external 
environments (Cashore & Vertinsky, 2000).  Governments also play a large role in shaping CSR 
practices through policies and/or practices which may facilitate, discourage, endorse, or otherwise 
establish the parameters and environment which influences companies’ CSR (Gond et al., 2011; 
Knudsen & Moon, 2017; Knudsen et al., 2015).   
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For comparative CSR purposes, distinctions are frequently made in the literature down VoC lines, 
differentiating between LMEs, such as the United States, and CMEs, which includes much of 
Western Europe (e.g. Blindheim, 2015; Jain, 2017; Kang & Moon, 2012; D. Matten & Moon, 
2008; Walker, Zhang, & Ni, 2018).   One of the dominant perspectives in the field is that of Matten 
and Moon (2008), who argue that CSR practices in LMEs – like the U.S. – are more “explicit” 
than the CSR practices of their CME (European) counterparts, which practice a more “implicit” 
approach to CSR.  Explicit CSR describes largely voluntary activities that promote a general 
interest of society – such as philanthropy – and which is often motivated by perceived stakeholder 
expectations, while implicit CSR constitutes practices that demonstrate corporate responsibility 
vis-à-vis fulfillment of the rules or expectations set by the structures and expectations of society, 
such as paying one’s full tax bill (D. Matten & Moon, 2008).  Blindheim builds upon this model, 
concluding that LME CSR practices embody individualism, discretionary agency, liberalism, 
network governance, isolated actors, and policies providing discretion, while CME CSR practices 
are characterized by collectivism, obligatory agency, solidarity, partnership governance, 
interlocking actors, and policies providing obligations (2015, pp. 64–65). Differences in the 
corporate social performance (CSP) of firms has been observed between countries, with the 
financial and labor systems found to be the most influential (Ioannou & Serafeim, 2012; Jackson 
& Apostolakou, 2010).  Differences based on culture have also been observed (Halkos & 
Skouloudis, 2017).  Taken together, these differences between CSR practices in different political 
economies suggest that companies from each may also approach PG differently; for example, 
European companies may be more predisposed to form partnerships across sectors with 
prescriptive obligations and enforcement mechanisms while their American counterparts are more 
likely to govern via networks of business actors and preserve their individual discretion.  Indeed, 
the breadth of differences observed between the CSR practices of companies originating from 
different political economies demonstrates the qualitatively different nature of their CSR 
practices, and hence the need to understand how these differences affect companies’ fulfillment 
of their societal responsibilities.   
 
This is not to say that there is agreement about how to treat the distinctions between companies 
originating from different environments, much less about what they mean for companies’ CSR 
behaviors abroad.  Even while some studies questioned the ability of CSR variations to fit neatly 
into a LME/CME construct, there is acknowledgement that “both the state and institutionalized 
coordination play an important role in enabling corporate responsibility”, leading to CSR which 
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either mirrors institutionalized forms of business coordination or substitute for its absence 
(Jackson & Bartosch, 2016, p. 11).  Overall, there is a general consensus that – on the whole – 
CSR looks different in the U.S. than it does in Europe.  But, these findings largely represent only 
domestic CSR practices; international business brings its own dynamic elements to the practice 
of CSR through interaction with often differing institutions (D. Matten & Moon, 2008).  While 
appreciating that a neat-and-tidy distinction between LME and CME CSR practices is hardly 
absolute, the overarching differences in the NBSs and institutions which predominate in North 
America and Europe do give rise to some general distinctions between the two.  A summary of 
the differences between the various contexts and CSR practices can be found in Table 1.   
 
Table 1.  Summary of main findings of CSR differences between LMEs and CMEs.   
 North America Europe 
Matten & Moon, 2008  
US/European CSR differences 
• Ethic of philanthropy 
• Legal mandates  
• Explicit CSR  
• Investment in systems 
• Social value  
• Implicit CSR  
Blindheim, 2015 
Refinement of implicit/explicit 
framework 
• Individualism  
• Discretionary agency 
• Liberalism  
• Network governance  
• Isolated actors  
• Policies providing discretion  
• Collectivism  
• Obligatory agency  
• Solidarity  
• Partnership governance  
• Interlocking actors 
• Policies providing 
obligations  
Kang & Moon, 2012 
CSR as “institutional 
complementarities”  
• Market-based  
• CSR a competitive strategy  
• Conformity and 
reinforcement  
• Non-market, negotiated  
• Socially-cohesive CSR  
• Potential for layering of 
competitive CSR onto 
socially-cohesive CSR  
Jackson & Apostolakou, 2010 
Effect of institutions on 
corporate social performance 
• CSR substitutes 
institutionalized forms of 
stakeholder participation  
• Higher CSP  
• Weaker CSR practices due to 
strong stakeholder 
coordination  
• Lower CSP  
 
Other literature has explored other potential determinants of CSR beyond national business 
systems which could offer alternative explanations for such differences, but to little effect.  An 
exploration of whether national institutions or the forces of globalization play a bigger role in the 
practice of CSR concluded that, overall, context was key, nodding towards the importance of 
dominant institutions in shaping firm behavior (Gjølberg, 2009).  This view has been further 
reinforced by findings that CSR complements corporate governance systems in their respective 
business systems by a logic of similarity, suggesting a replication of dominant models (Kang & 
Moon, 2012).  A study of emerging economies sought to understand if CSR was indicative of 
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development or a reflection of business systems, concluding that variations were due to NBSs and 
therefore underscore the influence of national context on CSR (Chapple & Moon, 2005).  When 
exploring factors affecting corporate reputation across countries with varying degrees of 
development, authors stressed that “reputations are driven not just by firm characteristics but also 
by their firms’ optimal fit with their environment” (Deephouse, Newburry, & Soleimani, 2016, p. 
470).  In sum, dominant systems and institutions play a crucial role in shaping firms’ CSR 
behaviors.  
 
Yet, operating in an international environment exposes companies to a diverse array of 
institutions, introducing a dynamic institutional environment in which to navigate.  How do the 
institutions in companies’ home environments shape their approaches to PG internationally?   
 
THE ORGANIZATION OF PRIVATE GOVERNANCE  
PG initiatives, as with organizations, look different in both structure and strategy.  While 
businesses themselves are typically defined as organizational units, these organizations engage in 
yet further organizing for PG.  The typical concept of an organization is one that is formal and 
complete, with the ability and authority to control all of the organizing elements: membership, 
hierarchy, rules, monitoring and sanctions (Ahrne & Brunsson, 2011).  However, the new social 
demands thrust upon businesses often requires collaboration and/or participation in a supra-
organization, such as an industry trade group, voluntary standard, or PG initiative.  When 
businesses (as individual organizations) engage in such group efforts, it is considered “partial 
organization”, where access to all organizing elements is not possible (Ahrne & Brunsson, 2011).  
Indeed, CSR – particularly internationally – is increasingly done through partial organization, 
which results from deliberate decisions of individuals or other organizations, and is distinct from 
networks and institutions (Rasche et al., 2013).  Partial organizing prevails in the contemporary 
global order of international PG arrangements.   
 
The core concepts of organizing are utilized in the exploration of the structural aspects of PG, 
albeit sometimes by analogous names.  The term membership translates in a straightforward way, 
referring to which actors are included within the PG effort.  Similarly applicable, rules constitute 
the explicit directives which members are expected to follow, lest they face formal consequences 
(Ahrne & Brunsson, 2011).  The term hierarchy, used to denote the relative position of actors and 
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their power within organizations, is encapsulated by the more encompassing term internal 
governance – akin to corporate governance – which also reflects the policies and procedures 
which guide interactions between members internally (Aguilera, Florackis, & Kim, 2016).  
Finally, the terms monitoring and enforcement have been collapsed into the combined notion of 
compliance, reflective of how these related concepts are typically used in the PG literature (e.g. 
Alamgir & Banerjee, 2018; Distelhorst, Locke, Pal, & Samel, 2015; Frenkel & Scott, 2002; 
Moazzem & Basak, 2015; Verbruggen, 2013).  The terms membership, internal governance, rules 
and compliance therefore stand as the disaggregated structural dimensions of PG which will be 
used in the analysis.   
 
Yet, organizations cannot simply be reduced to their structures.  Take for example the issue of 
legitimacy which differentiates between the “input” legitimacy  of PG – that is, which 
stakeholders are involved and how – as well as their “output” legitimacy, which refers to the 
effectiveness of the initiative (Mena & Palazzo, 2012).  Multiple dimensions appear therein, 
addressing aspects such as inclusion and transparency on the input side, as well as coverage, 
efficacy and enforcement on the output side, which collectively affect an initiative’s perceived 
legitimacy (Mena & Palazzo, 2012).  While some of these aspects relate to structure, legitimacy 
is just as much about perception, purpose and process.  The different principles and approaches 
to private governance demonstrate key variations in the practice of private governance which 
cannot be explained by their structural elements alone. 
 
Like firms and other organizations, PG is also infused with purposes, visions, processes and goals 
which collectively contribute to their overall strategies. Distinguishing between structure and 
strategy represents a classic distinction in understanding “the way different enterprises carried out 
the same activity”, with strategy representing the agentic elements and structure as the 
organizational design (Chandler, 1962, pp. 1, 13–14, emphasis in original).  Similarly, governance 
has been conceived of as a structure (the organizational architecture), process (the doing), 
mechanism (internal procedures specifying processes and compliance), and strategy (actors’ 
efforts in designing the structure, processes and mechanisms) (Levi-Faur, 2012, p. 8).  In this way, 
strategy can be conceived us as the agentic elements of PG through its ability to shape processes 
and mechanisms, complementing the structural dimensions presented above.   
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One key dimension of strategy differentiation is companies’ approach to stakeholders, which itself 
is shaped by the NBSs and institutions dominant in the environment (Cashore & Vertinsky, 2000).  
PG may take a “broad inclusiveness” perspective, meaningfully involving stakeholders 
throughout private governance, or conversely, it may adopt a more “narrow” perspective by 
simply consulting stakeholders (Fransen & Kolk, 2007).  Differing methods for stakeholder 
involvement highlight how strategic differences bear out in the structure of PG, with key 
distinctions to be made in stakeholders varying inclusion in the membership (are they directly 
involved or represented by a proxy, if at all?), internal governance (are stakeholders afforded a 
role in determining decisions, or do they serve an advisory function?), and implementation (do 
stakeholders carry out the operationalization of activities, or are the actions just for companies?) 
(Fransen & Kolk, 2007).  Whilst the membership and internal governance aspects are reflected in 
the structural elements of PG, the varying approaches to the implementation of PG activities 
reflect a more strategic one.  Activities may be implemented in a variety of ways; for example, 
some companies opt to manage their supply chains via collaborative approaches while some 
choose compliance-based approaches (Locke, Amengual, & Mangla, 2009; Locke, 2013).  While 
both may have the same goal in mind – sustainable supply chain management – they differ in their 
implementation of their activities, which serves as another point in the forthcoming analysis.      
 
The approach to stakeholders further explicates different types among them, and in particular, the 
distinction between stakeholder representatives and stakeholder targets of PG.  For example, a 
PG initiative seeking to address the negative environmental impacts of palm oil may include an 
official from the World Wildlife Federation in its governance process as a representative of the 
interests of chimpanzees, which are the “target” of such an initiative.  From a regulatory 
perspective, these are often referred to a “beneficiaries” (Koenig-Archibugi & Macdonald, 2017), 
but because PG may seek to change the behavior of some actors in ways that may not be beneficial 
to their self-interests (e.g. requiring factory owners to pay for expensive wastewater treatment 
devices), the analysis adopts the term targets to better account for the breadth of influence PG 
may seek (e.g. both factory owners and water quality).   
 
Collectively, differences in stakeholder orientation, implementation and the role afforded to 
targets underpin how different private governance tactics define and understand the problem in 
the first place.  This has been referred to as ”policy scope” in relation to PG instruments, which 
differentiates between “broad” and “narrower” conceptions of the problem; for example, in 
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sustainable forestry a narrower conception would focus solely on forestry management while a 
broad notion would also include aspects such as rules on labor rights and wider-ranging 
environmental impacts (Cashore et al., 2004, p. 13).  A key strategic element is therefore how the 
problem at hand is defined in the first place.  Accordingly, the analysis adopts the dimension 
problem definition as one of the strategic elements of PG.   
 
Different strategies to implement private governance are guided by different problem orientation 
logics, which in turn, lead to different consequences or outcomes.  Distinctions have been made 
between the “logic of control” and the “logic of empowerment”, which represent different 
perspectives on how to solve the problem at hand (Auld, Renckens, & Cashore, 2015).  The logic 
of control holds that prescriptive rules and enforcement mechanisms are required to ensure that 
companies don’t simply sign up to PG for its reputational benefits but then do nothing to actually 
further its imperatives.  The logic of empowerment, in contrast, embodies a pragmatic perspective 
that outputs are more highly valued than the processes used to achieve them (Auld et al., 2015).  
These different logics align with the differences between PG’s differing points of legitimacy; a 
logic of control – with its specific rules and compliance mechanisms – may enjoy a higher 
perceived input legitimacy than PG guided by a logic of empowerment, which represents a 
pragmatic approach to goal achievement, a decidedly output-oriented perspective on legitimacy.  
These varying aspects highlight key differences in the design – both structural and strategic – of 
PG.   
 
Herein we can see how differences in strategy affect the design of the structure, and vice versa.  
Accounting for both structural and strategic dimensions is necessary to capture a full view of PG.  
When viewed collectively, understanding both can better inform our understanding and evaluation 
of why such PG differences bear out.   Taken together, structural and strategic aspects can be 
explored to understand differences in PG, summarized in Table 2.   
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Table 2.  Structural and strategic dimension of private governance.  
Dimension Criterion Key Questions 
Structure   Membership Who is allowed to join?   
Who is excluded?   
Internal 
Governance  
What’s the hierarchy between different actors?   
What’s the decision-making process?   
Who has ultimately decision-making authority?    
Rules What are the rules that members are expected to follow?   
What are the incentives/disincentives for members?  Targets?   
Compliance What are the mechanisms to ensure compliance by members? Targets? 
How is compliance monitored and enforced?   
Strategy 
  
  
Problem 
Definition  
How is the problem understood?  Broad or narrow?   
What is the appropriate scope for private governance to address?   
Implementation How are efforts operationalized and implemented?   
Role of Targets  How are targets addressed?  
How are targets expected to engage?   
Problem-
orientation logic  
How are differing logics prioritized (e.g. control or empowerment)?  
How is “success” for the initiative understood?   
 
 
METHODOLOGY  
The phenomenon of two divergent PG initiatives which appeared at virtually the same time, in 
the same place, in response to the same pressures, and which shared the same broad goals serve 
as the locus of the study.  The membership of the different PG initiatives divided starkly down 
country lines, with one being exclusively North American and the other overwhelmingly 
European.  It is important to note how these empirical differences led to the formulation of this 
abductive, qualitative study which seeks to understand the confluence of home institutions and 
systems with the provision of PG internationally.  Here, the case, data collection, and analysis are 
detailed. 
 
Case Presentation: the European Accord & American Alliance  
The Accord and Alliance were PG initiatives created in the aftermath of a crisis to address the 
physical safety of the factories producing for the ready-made garment (RMG) sector.   In the 
morning of 24 April 2013 disaster struck: the collapse of the Rana Plaza complex.  Just the day 
before, large cracks had appeared in the building’s structural columns and the complex was 
evacuated.  On the morning of 24 April, factory workers were forced back in, falsely told that  
necessary repairs had been made, and that they would lose their entire month’s wages if they did 
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not return to work (Foxvog et al., 2013).  Just hours later, the building collapsed, killing 1,100+ 
workers and leaving at least twice as many more injured.   
 
After the disaster, it was found that the factories within the complex produced nearly exclusively 
for western brands.  Among the tens of companies who sourced from Rana Plaza at the time of 
the collapse included Walmart (US), Primark (UK), Loblaw (Canada), and PWT (Denmark).  
While brands largely protested against accusations of their culpability by pointing to their codes 
of conduct and social auditing practices, they were ultimately held responsible for ensuring such 
a disaster would not happen again.  A prior agreement to address factory safety in Bangladesh had 
been underway for some time – being negotiated by Gap (US), PVH (US), H&M (Sweden) and 
Tchibo (Germany) – which sought to establish a new model of governance by affording equal 
power to brands and trade unions in an agreement to take on the task of ensuring factory safety.  
However, it could only secure two of the needed four signatures to come into force (PVH and 
Tchibo) so had been sitting idle for some time (Bair, Anner, & Blasi, 2017).   This agreement 
served as the basis for negotiations with brands post-Rana Plaza, which trade unions effectively 
utilized to create the Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh (hereafter: “the Accord”) 
(Reinecke & Donaghey, 2015b).  While European brands signed on, most North American brands 
walked away, citing the legal enforcement mechanism as problematic in their legal systems.    
 
The Accord was established as a five year agreement unprecedented not only in scope by putting 
brands in charge of structural, fire and electrical safety in the factories that they sourced from, but 
also in governance and enforceability.  Governed in equal proportion by business and labor, the 
Accord agreement stated that signatories must continue as active members for the full 5-year 
lifecycle of the agreement, maintain sourcing volumes from Bangladesh, and ensure necessary 
remediation was completed in the factories they sourced from, including by providing funding.  
Uniquely, it created a legal enforcement clause where, for the first time, brands could be held 
responsible – ultimately via binding arbitration – to make good on their commitments.  The 
Accord created a PG arrangement distinctive in its cooperative governance approach with labor, 
specific rules which often defied traditional business logics, and legal enforceability.  By the end 
of its five-year tenure, the Accord had more than 220 signatories, including all of the European 
brands and a handful of North American ones, among others.   
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While the Accord was being formed, several North American companies protested its terms, and, 
needing to respond to the disaster, elected to form their own organization: the Alliance for 
Bangladesh Worker Safety (hereafter: “the Alliance”).  The Alliance set out the same safety 
standards and five year commitment as the Accord but was governed solely by the brands 
themselves and didn’t require long-term commitments to suppliers or order volumes.  The lack of 
individual brand liability for the costs of remediating factories, coupled with its shallow legal 
enforceability, became key points of criticism in the media.  Membership was comprised of 
around two dozen companies which included some of the biggest North American brands, like 
Walmart, Gap, Target and VF Corporation (parent company of Timberland, Vans, The North 
Face, and Jansport, among others), and collectively represented the vast majority of North 
America’s apparel imports from Bangladesh.   
 
The Accord and Alliance provide a unique, self-styled case where two PG initiatives were created 
at the same time, in response to the same incident, and with the same broad goals, but with 
different actors, approaches, and arrangements, and membership split starkly down country lines.  
Of the Accord’s 24 original signatories, 23 were European and one was the U.S. company PVH, 
which had previously signed on to the agreement that preceded the Accord.  All 17 original 
signatories of the Alliance were from North America, and no European brands joined over the 
course of its tenure.  The Accord’s signatory list published on its website in mid-2016, reveals 
that only 24 of its 218 members were from North America, accounting for about 11% of the 
Accord’s signatories, despite their making up approximately 40% of the Bangladesh garment 
export market.  With the exception of PVH and Fruit of the Loom, the remaining were very small 
brands and retailers.  Fruit of the Loom is a particularly interesting case as it initially signed the 
Alliance, but then due to pressure from student organizations affecting its university business, 
reluctantly signed the Accord as well3.  But, by and large, the two agreements originated 
separately along the boundaries of different political economies.  Given this, the case provides an 
opportunity to investigate systems of PG where national context can function as the independent 
variable in the investigation of design and practices of private governance arrangements.   
 
                                                          
3 According to multiple interview data.  
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Data Collection  
This study draws upon multiple data sources to explore the influence of NBSs and institutions on 
PG organizing.  First, it used membership agreements and other documents governing the 
organizations (e.g. by-laws and amendments) along with relevant information from their 
respective websites, public documents, and press releases.  These documents typically provided 
insight into the structural elements of each PG through their detailed descriptions of governance 
structures, rules, membership eligibility, enforcement mechanisms and the like.   
 
Strategic elements served as the focus of many interviews with individuals involved in various 
ways with the PG initiatives.  PG members, leaders and staff were interviewed, along with labor 
unions, NGOs, and public officials.  Overall, 41 interviews with 36 individuals representing 30 
different organizations were conducted.  Interviews were conducted with members (brands) of the 
European Accord (n=23, 10% of members) and American Alliance (n=8, 29% of members).  
Leaders and staff at both PG organizations were interviewed, some multiple times over the course 
of the research (n=6).  NGOs and trade unions (n=13), as well as the public sector (n=1) accounted 
for the balance.  Due to the sensitivity of some of the subject matter discussed, respondents have 
been anonymized.  Interviews were conducted throughout 2016 and 2017 with some follow-up 
interviews in 2018, and relied upon a semi-structured interview format and abductive approach of 
adapting interview questions based upon learning from previous interviews.  All interviews were 
recorded and transcribed, resulting in more than 43 hours of audio recordings and approximately 
900 pages of single-spaced transcripts.   
 
In addition to interviews, the author also participated in several major related convenings and 
events related to sustainability issues in the Bangladesh garment industry.  The author also 
traveled to Bangladesh on fieldwork twice over the course of the study (2016 and 2018), which 
helped to ground and contextualize the research.  Informal conversations during and after these 
events and travels also contributed to the author’s learning, which was documented in field memos 
along the way and used to inform the findings and discuss their implications.    
 
Data Analysis  
The analysis of data employed a cross-case analysis approach and three rounds of abductive 
coding (Miles & Huberman, 1994).  An abductive approach is theoretically inspired but data 
driven, seeking “the best explanation” by interpreting the data with a theoretical perspective in 
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mind (Mantere & Ketokivi, 2013).  Using NVivo software, the first round of coding identified 
“descriptive” codes for the data, labels which require little to no interpretation.  The study in its 
entirety yielded 158 unique first-order codes, with 44 of those directly related to this inquiry.  
Some of these included “Role of Trade Unions - Labor”, “Threat of legal binding-ness”, and 
“Time-limited commitment”.  In keeping with its abductive approach, the second round of coding 
moved into “interpretive” codes which sought to help group common themes found in the data, 
with a particular eye towards how the data might fit into constructs found within the literature of 
the political economy of CSR  and the organization of PG.  An example here would be the first-
order, descriptive code of “Time-limited commitment” becoming part of the second-order, 
interpretive code of “Implementation”, which serves as the criteria in the provided PG framework.  
Other examples include the first order code “Alliance as nimble” being grouped under the second 
order code “Implementation”, and “Legally-binding as obstacle” becoming part of “Compliance”.  
The final round of coding aimed to explain the data in light of the applicable theory and framework 
(abduction) by creating “pattern” codes, which in this analysis were “structure” and “strategy”.  
The full analysis that follows organizes and presents the data according to the pattern codes 
identified during the analysis process.   
 
FINDINGS 
The Accord and Alliance share similar ends – factory safety achieved through physical 
remediation and worker training – they diverged in the means used to reach them.  Structural and 
strategic dimensions differed significantly, so, the analysis focuses on those points of divergence 
which reflect their American/European alignment.  For example, interviews revealed that internal 
dynamics between actors in each initiative varied, but those findings are only raised to the degree 
that they relate to either the structure or strategy of the private governance organization itself.  By 
drawing on the framework presented previously, the two organizations are compared and 
contrasted before discussing the implications of political economy variations for international PG.   
 
Structure  
Structural elements of each organization are among the more black-and-white dimensions of PG 
organizing.  Significant variations between the two reveal different alignments with their 
predominate NBS.   
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Membership  
The approaches to stakeholder involvement via membership of each of the respective agreements 
are stark.  Whereas the Alliance adopted a business-type approach that could be characterized 
most accurately as a business-led initiative (BLI), the Accord opted for a more collaborative 
process as evidenced by the roles of various stakeholders amongst its leadership, making it a 
multi-stakeholder initiative (MSI).   
 
As the Accord formed, there was a strong focus on collaboration with the breadth of stakeholders, 
namely companies, labor, and activists.  Therefore, oversight took the form of a steering 
committee and was constructed to have equal representation from labor (in the form of trade union 
organizations) and brands.  The International Labour Organization (ILO) – seen as neutral 
intergovernmental body – was selected to serve as the chair.  Also, in effort to involve other 
passionate stakeholders, major advocacy organizations like the Clean Clothes Campaign were 
invited to participate as “witness signatories”.  While they lacked voting privileges, they were 
afforded great transparency into processes and decisions, as well as consulted on many matters.  
This inclusive governance structure demonstrates the Accord’s inclusion of a breadth of actors, 
which also in part signaled its understanding of the problem as requiring multiple perspectives to 
solve.   
 
The Alliance, in contrast, was governed via a business-like structure with a Board of Directors 
comprised primarily of business representatives.  It was originally chaired by a former U.S. 
Senator with a pro-business track record, and subsequently by a former U.S. Ambassador.  Senior 
officials in the Alliance reported directly to the chair of the board.  In the U.S., strong anti-
competition laws caused Alliance members to question initially whether or not they were even 
allowed to work together on a collective plan to address common supply chain problems, which 
later bore out in Alliance stakeholders taking pains to note that the Alliance was operating in a 
“pre-competitive environment”.   
 
When pressed on the differences between the initiatives, respondents frequently identified labor 
inclusion (or exclusion) as a key differentiator.  As told by one respondent, “the main difference 
is that the Alliance is put together by the industry and the Accord is put together by trade unions.”  
Other research has similarly concluded that the inclusion (or exclusion) of labor was the key 
difference between the Accord and Alliance (Donaghey & Reinecke, 2017).   
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Internal Governance 
It’s not just who’s at the table that matters, but also who has the authority to make decisions.  For 
the Accord, the hierarchy of its internal governance structure was one of its defining features, 
which afforded equal representation of and power between labor and business, something 
heralded by activists as a “breakthrough” (Clean Clothes Campaign, 2013b; Hensler & Blasi, 
2013; Khan & Wichterich, 2015).  The internal governance of the steering committee prescribed 
that the preference was for decisions by consensus, but in its absence, decisions would be made 
by majority rule.  As one respondent close to the Accord reported, “Does it become adversarial 
between the brands and trade unions?  Absolutely.  Yeah, all the time.”  While presenting 
challenges for the Accord operationally, perhaps, adversarial relations between its governors 
signaled its equality in power distribution as each advocated for their perspective.  The Accord 
was explicitly organized to create a power balance between business and labor.   
 
The role of labor proved a key factor in the creation of the Alliance as a BLI in the first place.  A 
candid account by one respondent associated with the Accord summed up a common theme about 
why Alliance members chose to create a separate organization.   
“The brands that signed the Alliance don’t want to be bound to an agreement that was 
negotiated with the unions, whom have equal say in how it’s implemented, and have the 
right to file complaints that culminate in binding arbitration.  They didn’t want to be bound 
to…a binding agreement that labor could enforce.”   
A prominent figure from the Alliance reinforced this message, albeit in a more politically correct 
way.  “A lot of the brands didn’t feel comfortable with the set-up of the board, and the imbalance 
of labor on the board…North American brands were not comfortable with that sort of set up.”  
Labor-management relations are altogether a different dynamic in a North American context than 
they a European one, which was mirrored in the PG approaches.   
 
For both membership and internal governance, prevailing labor and employment systems on both 
sides of the Atlantic played a key role in shaping the choices and behaviors of companies.  Formal 
labor organization and trade unions are common, established, and ascribed important roles in the 
governance of industrial relations domestically in Europe.  Post-war Germany, for example, 
instituted codetermination legislation which requires managers to work with employees and trade 
unions.  Denmark does not have a legal minimum wage because wages are negotiated through 
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collective bargaining agreements.  In the Netherlands, the vast majority of workers there are also 
covered by collective bargaining agreements.  Such rules, structures and norms are translated into 
companies’ CSR.  Negotiations between labor and management are not just common, they’re 
often required.  So, instituting a similar structure in PG simply replicates domestic approaches.  
Further, replication also signals an important distinction in the processes used for governance; 
partnerships, multi-stakeholder agreements, and deliberation are all part of the normal way of 
doing business in much of Europe.  It is hardly surprising then that all of the European companies 
that signed up to a PG initiative chose the Accord, a MSI.   
 
Labor relations and structures are wholly different in North America, and in particular, in the U.S.  
Labor unions have been on the decline for decades, and relations between labor and management 
are virtually always adversarial.  Walmart in particular is famous for preventing and squelching 
any attempts at organizing labor within its stores, distribution facilities or headquarters, going so 
far as to close down stores rather than let a unionization vote go ahead (Picchi, 2015).  Target has 
taken similar actions, and shows an effective anti-union video in the first hours of training that is 
required of all headquarters employees on their first day (U. Wang, 2014).  Trade union power in 
the U.S. has been waning for some time, which culminated in 2018 when the Supreme Court ruled 
that public employees could no longer be required to pay union dues.  Ergo, it is unsurprising that 
the North American companies shunned the idea of working collaboratively with organized labor, 
much less allow them to monitor and enforce compliance actions upon them.   
 
Rules  
The Accord was groundbreaking in its inclusion of multiple substantive provisions that required 
atypical activities amongst its company signatories.  First, it required company signatories to 
ensure the financial feasibility of factory remediation, which represented the first time that 
Western buyers were bound to providing financial assistance for compliance with their terms 
(Accord, 2013, p. 6).  While it allowed buyers the freedom to determine how to make financing 
available – and on commercial terms – it clearly stipulated that ultimate responsibility for adequate 
financial resourcing come from buyers.  This requirement demonstrated the Accord’s approach to 
rules as specific and obligatory, decidedly European approaches.   
 
The Accord’s other substantive requirements similarly required buyers to diverge from their 
business-as-usual approach and practices.  Article 23 of the agreement called for companies to 
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maintain business with current suppliers and current volumes, a procedure at odds with the 
traditional business practice of continuous shopping around for the best product and price.  The 
Accord also required that signatory companies cease sourcing relationships with non-compliant 
suppliers, the ultimate “stick” for buyers and suppliers alike  (Accord, 2013, p. 6). Buyers could 
no longer shop around amongst suppliers, adjust order volumes according to retail forecasts, and 
use any supplier they wished; instead, buyers had to continue long-term relationships and volumes 
and could only source from approved factories.  These business-altering provisions, in tandem 
with buyer’s duty to help pay for remediation, demonstrate the Accord’s clear and substantive 
rules.  Such an arrangement mirrors the strong regulatory approach found in CMEs like Europe.   
 
The Alliance, in contrast, was more principle-based than the Accord.  Rather than opting for 
specific provisions and requirements, it sought to ensure discretion in members’ implementation 
of the Alliance agreement.  For example, rather than hold individual brands ultimately liable for 
funding factory remediation or paying out worker compensation in cases of factory closure, it 
instead created common funding pools covering all Alliance members and factories (Alliance, 
2013, pp. 3–5).  Further, contributions by members – beyond annual membership fees – to these 
pools were voluntary.  Rather than specify particular obligations, the Alliance opted to include 
softer language that encouraged its members to provide favorable financing terms, grants, and 
higher production prices to help factories make the necessary improvements (Alliance, 2013).  
Such structural choices demonstrate the Alliance’s discretion-based approach, as well as its efforts 
to stem individual brand liability in preference for collective liability.  Such attributes mirror their 
LME roots and the hypotheses suggested by domestic CSR differences.   
 
Compliance  
One of the most noted differences between the Accord and Alliance has been their divergent 
approaches on legal liability.  The Accord included a unique enforcement clause allowing for 
internal disputes to ultimately be adjudicated in the International Court of Arbitration in the 
Hague, and any awards resulting thereof enforceable in brands’ home courts (Accord, 2013, see 
Article 5).  As told by one labor representative, this stipulation was included “to enforce the 
agreement.  You wouldn’t have any negotiated agreement between labor and management in any 
country that did not have an arbitration clause…there has to be some mechanism to hold each 
side accountable.”  This effectively made the “soft” law of the Accord enforceable in “hard” law.  
As European CSR practices have been found to complement their highly regulated environments 
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– implicit CSR – the enforcement structure of the Accord mirrored a European regulatory 
atmosphere.  Labor members of the Accord were its designated enforcers to hold brands 
accountable.  This arrangement also mirrors the labor system in many European countries where 
negotiation and contracts between labor and management are typical.  As discussed previously, 
such arrangements bear out in the collective bargaining agreements between labor and 
management which dictate wage levels throughout much of Europe.   
 
The Alliance did not have such a legal provision.  Indeed, it was that very provision which 
Alliance members stated at their reason for not joining the Accord, citing the differences in legal 
systems between Europe and North America.  As stated by Walmart’s representative at the press 
conference announcing the Alliance in 2013:  
“The reason we couldn’t sign the Accord is Europe has a different legal environment than 
we do in the United States and Canada, and the Accord had some provisions that, in the 
way the U.S. and Canadian legal system work, would subject us to potential unlimited 
legal liability and litigation.”   
This point was reinforced throughout interviews; Alliance representatives frequently pointed to 
differences in how the Accord may be interpreted differently in the in the European and North 
American legal systems, with the former emphasizing the spirit of the law and the latter on the 
letter of the law.  Therefore, enforcement provisions within the Alliance structured monitoring 
and enforcement as a self-policing effort of members monitoring other members.  Informal 
conversations also revealed that any instances of non-compliance were dealt with in a congenial 
and laid-back manner.  This differential between the Accord and Alliance stands as perhaps the 
most clear and prominent example of home NBSs shaping how companies designed and engaged 
with private governance.   
 
While the Accord and Alliance both represent soft law, voluntary agreements, the Accord 
included a strict enforcement mechanism while the Alliance did not, reflective of the home 
environments of each initiative.  From a sheer legal setting perspective, North American and 
particularly U.S. companies seek to minimize legal liabilities and hard regulation, consistent with 
the base principles of a LME.  This has bearing in at least two ways; it mirrors the legal 
enforceability approach – or lack thereof – adopted by the Alliance, as well as the approach to 
encourage rather than stipulate members’ investments in factories.  In contrast, most European 
nations have a strong role for the state as part of their CMEs, which creates an environment where 
114 
 
the norm is for companies to support and operate within hard regulation.  This is reflective of both 
the Accord’s legal enforceability provision, as well as its mandate that brands themselves are 
ultimately responsible for the financial investments necessary to make factories safer.  In these 
ways, the structure of the rules of the Accord and the Alliance are reflective of the national 
contexts in which their founding members operate.   
 
Strategy  
Strategic dimensions explicate the intentions, motivations and understandings which guided the 
(structural) design of the initiatives, as well as their operation.   
 
Problem Definition  
The scope of the agreements signaled their definition of the problem at hand.  The Accord – 
through its broad stakeholder inclusion, and in particular, labor – seemingly defined the problem 
of safe factories as more than physical construction and fire hazards.  The problem was seen as, 
in part, the result of the (failed) social auditing model by individual brands.  As explained by one 
labor representative.  
“Unfortunately Rana Plaza was a wake-up call.  All along, we as trade unions were 
saying, ‘Audits don’t do the trick.  They’re voluntary.  You’re doing this on your own 
directly with your suppliers and ignoring the systemic problems in the industry that can’t 
be solved on your own.’ [A code of conduct] really makes no dent…no, it didn’t have an 
effect in the industry. So I think that was a really important change and a reason for brands 
working together on this.  Because it’s collective action that they’re doing to leverage 
change.” 
Later, the representative went on talk more specifically about the underlying issues that the 
Accord and other labor agreements sought to tackle, stating that now there is “recognition 
globally that there needs to be supply chain labor relations” which the Accord was the leading 
model in addressing.  This was further confirmed by a brand respondent.  “Some of the parties 
that were present in the Accord, [it was] their expressed interest that unionization was a critical 
factor to addressing safety.”  The scope of issues under the purview of the Accord were not just 
safety, but to also promote labor relations more broadly and systemically in the supply chain as 
these issues were seen as the root of the cause.   
 
The Alliance sought to keep its focus narrowly on safety.  As a representative from one of the 
Alliance member brands shared:  
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“We didn’t want to necessarily tie the issues of safety with unionization in factories.  If 
the workers in a particular factor within a lot decide that they want to unionize, we 
support the factory’s right to do what they can do legally to inform workers of the pros 
and cons.  But we also support the rights of the workers to unionize.  But we don’t 
necessarily feel like those two things, workers’ safety and unionization, has to be tied.” 
This theme reoccurred throughout multiple interviews.  Some more critical voices saw this as a 
downside of the Alliance.  For example, “anything that Walmart does is this kind of philanthropic 
contribution to development.  It’s not really about supply chain management and labor relations.”   
 
The differences in labor systems – as well as liability, legal and otherwise – also help explain why 
the problem definition and resulting scope of the private governance initiatives were conceived 
so differently.  The Accord saw the lack of labor involvement in management decisions as a key 
reason that safety issues occurred in the first place; by strengthening skills and knowledge around 
worker organization – in tandem with physically remediating factories – some of the systemic 
problems in the industry could be addressed.  Conversely, the Alliance remained laser-focused on 
safety issues and mechanisms like its worker helpline, which give workers a voice but didn’t build 
the foundation of formal worker organization as the safety committees utilized by the Accord did.  
Both of these views reflect the dominant perspective of their home environments.   
 
Implementation  
The Accord and Alliance also approached the implementation and operationalization of their 
efforts in different ways.  While both hired technical staff – like engineers and trainers – in 
Bangladesh, their administrative approaches to leadership and operations differed.  The Accord 
established a secretariat in Amsterdam, and along with it, permanent staff.  The Alliance, in 
contrast, declined to establish a secretariat, but legally-incorporated itself in the U.S. state of 
Delaware.  It hired only its leadership as staff, whom were all located in the U.S., and then 
contracted the rest of its human resources – which represented a substantial portion of the work, 
particular in its early days – with the global consultancy Elevate. The different staffing models 
demonstrate very different approaches of the initiatives to implementing their tasks, with one 
focused on building a permanent, long-term organization and the other on creating a short-term 
solution.   
 
In addition to staffing, the Accord and Alliance also diverged in the responsibilities they tasked 
to their brand members.  In the case of the Accord, brands had specific roles and duties that they 
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had to carry out.  In addition to complying with provisions surrounding the maintenance of 
sourcing volumes and ceasing business relationships with non-compliant suppliers, they also were 
assigned to serve as a “lead brand” in a number of factories proportionate to their relative 
production in Bangladesh.  Being a lead brand entailed working closely with the factories to 
ensure that they understood their remediation requirements, as well as ensuring that the costs of 
remediation were made ”financially feasible” for factories.  In turn, brands frequently reported 
taking on additional workload, sometime even hiring additional staff in Bangladesh.  The Accord 
was designed to create and delegate specific responsibilities to its signatories.  This is broadly 
reflective of an “implicit CSR” view; companies were expected to meet the specific obligations 
given to them (D. Matten & Moon, 2008).  It’s also consistent with the previously presented 
research that found that European companies tend to favor policies prescribing obligation rather 
than discretion (Blindheim, 2015).    
 
The Alliance took a different approach, at least once operations were established.  In its early days 
– reflective of the challenges of not having a secretariat – the founding brands established the 
Alliance largely by designing it and beginning its operations.  As one person involved with this 
task shared: “It was daunting, and it was challenging to set up – basically we were setting up a 
government institution to address worker’s safety overnight.  And that was really challenging. It 
was really tough and it required a lot of time.”  A respondent whom helped staff the Alliance as 
a consultant during this time reported that the founding brands:  
“…had a ton of people and everyone was running these working groups.  And so I started 
getting on these calls and everyone was like, ‘when can we go back to our day jobs?’  
They're like, ‘please help us!  Please tell us when you're going to take the reins!’” 
And take the reins they did.  Once the Alliance was established, the workload for brands decreased 
significantly.  The Alliance essentially only involved brand members if issues arose or updates on 
factories were available.  This is not to say that brands didn’t also have obligations and 
responsibilities, however.  Ultimately, they were used as the enforcement “stick” to oblige 
factories to remediate if they did not meet goals and targets.  The point here is that rather than 
regular, systematic workload obligations like their Accord counterparts, Alliance brands engaged 
on a more as-needed basis.  This difference is also consistent with our expectations vis-à-vis the 
business systems and structures within the political economy.  Policies providing for discretion, 
an underpinning tenet of “explicit CSR”, best align with American CSR practices (Blindheim, 
2015; D. Matten & Moon, 2008).   
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Role of Targets  
Both the Accord and Alliance targeted factories in order to ensure their physical remediation, as 
well as trained workers on safety matters.  However, they diverged in the mechanisms designed 
to facilitate the handling of workers’ safety complaints.  The Accord focused on Safety 
Committees in factories, comprised of worker representatives and management who would work 
collectively on safety issues.  For factories with a union, worker Safety Committee representatives 
would be elected from the union leaders.  In this process, workers who identified a safety issue 
(e.g. boxes stored in front of a fire exit) were to alert a Safety Committee member, who would 
bring the issue to management.  This structure and process is akin to that of labor unions, which 
some Accord affiliates saw as a potential “in” to help labor organization in factories.  The 
approach to labor-management relations in such processes were familiar to the Accord’s European 
members, as discussed previously.   
 
On the other hand, the Alliance sought a different mechanism for workers to raise issues: a 24/7 
toll-free hotline, called the Helpline.  Workers received training on the Helpline, and every worker 
in an Alliance factory was provided with a business card with the Alliance Helpline information 
that they had to keep with their ID badge.  Posters with the phone number were also plastered 
throughout factories.  One Alliance member spoke of the power and potential of the Helpline:    
“The Helpline is a way for there to be eyes on what’s happening out there.  Giving 
employees a voice so that after an earthquake, if they see something that’s scary in the 
factory where they work, they can call and then someone will come out and look at it.  They 
haven’t had that voice before.”   
Alliance saw workers’ voice empowered via the Helpline, bottom-up model, while the Accord 
believed in worker organization.  Each strategy aligns with common practices in their respective 
home countries.   
 
Problem-orientation logic  
Finally, the Accord and Alliance also differed in the underpinning logic which guided their 
strategies and practices.  As demonstrated hitherto, the Accord structured and operationalized its 
efforts largely by utilizing specific rules and obligations for its members.  Its strong monitoring 
and enforcement mechanism promoted conformance and punished non-compliance.  The hard-
and-fast structure and rules of the Accord  reflects a “logic of control”  (Auld et al., 2015).  Within 
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these bounds, it sought to empower workers, brands, and factory owners.  The Alliance, in 
contrast, opted for a more principle-based approach that left significant discretion for its members 
to interpret and implement as they saw fit.  Its focus on outcomes, rather than on the means to 
achieve them, aligns with a “logic of empowerment” (Auld et al., 2015).   
 
The Accord and Alliance also differed in how they defined success, which translated into, 
respectively, how long they saw their commitment lasting, and if and when to transition out.  There 
was broad recognition from respondents that remediating factories and training workers on safety 
would take longer than both organizations’ 5-year commitments, and ultimately, both 
organizations extended their tenure by approximately six months to the end of 2018.  But, the PG 
organizations approached this conundrum quite differently.  The Accord vowed to continue after 
its original closure date, initially calling the next phase the “Accord 2.0”.  Its labor and NGO 
witness signatories launched public campaigns to gain support for its continuation (e.g.  the Clean 
Clothes Campaign’s #ProtectProgress, #RanaPlazaNeverAgain).   This longer-term perspective is 
consistent with that of many European companies, which tend to be privately-owned or controlled 
and therefore less susceptible to the whims of investors seeking short-term gains.  However, the 
continuation of the Accord model was met with significant opposition by the Bangladesh 
government, so the Accord softened its rhetoric by changing itself to the “Transition Accord”, in 
an effort to signal that it would eventually complete its work and exit.   Even when facing 
expulsion from the country by the Bangladesh High Court, the Accord vowed to continue its 
efforts regardless, stating that it would work around the legal challenge by moving leadership staff 
to its secretariat in Amsterdam and staffing engineers by contract to be flown in from nearby 
countries.  The Accord had envisaged and implemented a new role for companies in their supply 
chains, a model which it sought to perpetuate long term.  Such a view demonstrates the propensity 
for both obligatory agency by members, as well as a logic of control by brands over their factories 
in the future.    
 
The Alliance, however, expressed its intent to finish its work within the agreed five years (plus 
extension) and to find another path if the work wasn’t yet completed.  As a member of the 
leadership team commented in 2016, “We are looking forward to completing our commitment.  
We won’t close shop, so are looking for a viable solution.”  By the end of 2018, it had not 
completed all remediation work, so sought to find a path forward where remediation could be 
completed without further extending the Alliance’s tenure and obligations.  Shorter-term goals 
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and projects are typical for publically-traded companies which are conventionally evaluated by 
their quarterly earnings.  A more nimble model with a specified timeframe is consistent with a 
typical American approach.  Therefore, it established what was originally called the “Safety 
Monitoring Organization”, later given the Bengali name Nirapon, meaning “our voice”.  The 
model changed, largely to shift greater responsibilities to factories themselves as well as to move 
former Alliance functions like engineering consulting and worker training to third-party providers.  
Such a setup would ensure continued benefits for the brands at minimal expense to them by 
pushing the onus and costs to manufacturers.  The Alliance viewed its work at time-limited, and 
made appropriate arrangements to transition its work and end its tenure.  For the Alliance, success 
was defined by “completing” its commitment, as well as establishing a different PG solution to 
ensure that the work could carry forward, which aligns well with a logic of empowerment. An 
overview of the findings is summarized in Table 3.   
 
DISCUSSION 
The differences in the Accord and Alliance were stark, varying across every dimension of PG 
organizing.  The central finding is that, much like domestic CSR, the practice of PG 
internationally was shaped by companies’ dominant home systems and institutions.  The 
findings from this case, combined with what we know from the literature, suggests that even 
when the pressures thrust upon companies remain the same, companies from different 
institutional environments – largely shaped by their political economies – are likely to respond 
differently.  This enables us to theorize about what home contexts might mean for how and why 
PG is organized differently in the US and in Europe.   
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When examining broad business systems and institutions which dominate each of their respective 
home environments, there are important differences in the structure and strategy of the Accord 
and Alliance.  First, the initial structures assigned to each initiative are broadly reflective of typical 
modes of corporate governance in those countries, which themselves are reflective of NBSs 
(Whitley, 1999).  In the United States, for instance, the vast majority of large companies – and in 
particular, those companies which were member to the Alliance – are publically-traded companies 
governed by Boards of Directors.  Strong hierarchies, limitation of liabilities, and preservation of 
individual discretion prevail, so these familiar modes of organizing were therefore replicated in 
the Alliance.  Europe, on the other hand, has a broader diversity of corporate governance structures 
and ownership, which beget different roles for stakeholders and internalized obligations by 
companies.  Family-owned businesses are common; examples of Accord members include Danish 
Bestseller, German giants Aldi, Lidl and Tchibo, and Dutch C&A, just to name a few.  Companies 
with these structures therefore can focus less on shareholders – whom often take a short-term view 
– and more on dynamics and relations between stakeholders.  Legal liabilities are less of a concern, 
companies regularly cooperate and coordinate with each other, and prescriptive obligations are 
the norm.  Indeed, prevailing systems in each country were replicated in their preferred PG.    
 
Using the learnings about how CSR practices differ between different political economies (Table 
1) and combining it with the findings from the case study (Table 3) can aid in our development of 
ideal types of PG organizing.  Ideal types of private governance organizing between North 
America and Europe is found in Table 4.  It uses the disaggregated PG dimensions (Table 2) as 
the categories used for comparison.  As these are ideal types of PG organizing, they do not take 
into account empirical variations, as seen with the handful of North American companies which 
were members of the Accord.   
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Table 4.  Ideal types of private governance organizing by NBSs.   
 Criteria North America Europe 
St
ru
ct
ur
e 
 
Membership Restrictive, preference for 
business-led 
Network governance 
Collaborative, open to multiple 
actors and/or stakeholders 
Partnership governance  
Governance  Top-down  
Hierarchical 
Deliberative, negotiated  
Coordinated  
Rules Policies providing discretion   Policies providing obligations  
Compliance Market-based  
“Letter of the law”  
Multi-stakeholder-based  
“Spirit of the law”  
St
ra
te
gy
  
Problem 
Definition   
Narrow Broad  
Implementation Short-term Long-term  
Role of Targets  Compliance-based  Cooperative-based, developmental  
Problem-
orientation logic  
Logic of empowerment Logic of control  
 
Overall, this paper makes three primary contributions.  First, this study unpacks differences in 
how companies from different political economies practice CSR abroad and hypothesizes ideal 
types of PG organizing.  It thereby advances understanding of the systemic drivers and constraints 
of international CSR practices.  While numerous studies have evaluated and theorized about the 
influence of NBSs on domestic CSR practices, little work has yet focused on what domestic NBSs 
mean for international CSR practices.  This study contributes to the literature on comparative CSR 
(Blindheim, 2015; Jackson & Apostolakou, 2010; Kang & Moon, 2012; D. Matten & Moon, 2008) 
by situating findings from literature and empirics within an international context.  Companies 
translate home country systems and approaches abroad, demonstrating the significance of home 
– rather than host – systems in shaping CSR practices.  Companies from different home 
environments have varying aptitudes towards PG arrangements, underscoring the complexity and 
difficulty in identifying and deploying solutions to address sustainability issues in supply chains.  
Understanding the preferences of companies originating from different countries is of paramount 
importance both for the study of international CSR, as well as for practitioners and policy makers 
whom craft and facilitate PG internationally.    
 
Second, this paper contributes to our understanding of how and why the practice of PG differs 
between companies from differing institutional environments, even if their host environment or 
industry is the same.  Situating PG within its dominant institutional environment and resulting 
constraints can reveal the linkages, complementarities and causal mechanisms which can explain 
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the differences in the chosen PG’s approach.  Connecting the PG ideal types to their institutional 
contexts – political economies or otherwise – can help identify linkages between the two.  For 
example, when prevailing institutions facilitate regular and functional relationships between 
management and labor – as they do in much of Europe – we can expect PG organizing to 
complement or mirror that dynamic.  Better identifying the connections between institutions with 
the elements of PG organizing furthers our understanding of how and why PG practices differs 
between companies from different contexts.  This similarly contributes to the comparative CSR 
literature.   
 
The paper’s third major contribution is its explication of the structural and strategic dimensions 
of PG (Table 2).  PG as a CSR instrument has thus far been under-theorized, exhibiting the gap 
in our ability to assess and analyze differences between various efforts (Cashore et al., 2004). The 
disaggregation of elements furthers understanding of PG not just as a structure or process, but also 
as a strategy (Rasche et al., 2013).  As the case demonstrated, even if two PG instruments are 
created at the same time, in response to the same pressures, and share the same goal and standards, 
the “work” can be organized very differently, and these differences demonstrate fundamental 
strategic variations between the two.  Understanding how problems are understood and addressed, 
the intended roles of stakeholders and targets, how the work is conducted, and the general logic 
used to guide the effort all tell us about the “governance making” of companies.  Indeed, the 
confluence of structure and strategy – as with firms – carries implications both for the governance 
provided, as well as for the roles and responsibilities of firms in society.  Disaggregating its 
requisite elements within each dimension helps us to better understand the complexity and 
dimensionality of PG while also opening up those components for use in other analyses.  The 
framework could be used for other comparative analyses of PG beyond political economy, for 
example, comparing differences between different sustainability certifications like Fairtrade and 
Rainforest Alliance.  The framework has broad use-value by facilitating the use of apples-to-
apples analytic categories.  It therefore aids in our ability to identify linkages between the 
categorical elements of PG within their situated context.    
 
Limitations & Future Research  
First, the comparative case study used broad brush strokes to delineate differences between North 
American and European differences.  While membership in the Accord and Alliance fell broadly 
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down these lines, the presence of some North American brands in the Accord make these 
distinctions far from absolute.  Indeed, differences were attributed to differing institutional 
environments, which extends more broadly.  There are differences even within North American 
and European contexts; California and Delaware are home to very different business 
environments, as are Germany, the U.K. and Greece.  Hence, it is more helpful to consider 
political economy differences as indicative of their dominant institutional environments rather 
than categorical opposites themselves.   
 
The PG framework developed – with its structural and strategic elements – has attempted to bring 
together key insights and knowledge from existing literature.  Yet, these concepts and categories 
could continue to sharpen.  Additional elements may warrant inclusion, and current categories 
could also be further developed and adapted.  Future research could continue to test and iterate 
this framework.  Future work could also test the usefulness of the framework when applied to 
contexts beyond political economy.   
 
Finally, the research question here relates to the observed phenomenon – the different approaches 
to PG in a host country by companies originating from different homes – but does not take on the 
home/host dilemma directly.  Rather, the study operates from the basic premise of political CSR 
that companies are compelled to provide governance in areas where it is either weak or absent, 
therefore suggesting a dearth of systems and structures to shape governance making.  But, this is 
an assumption in need of further testing.  Future work could therefore explore the role of host 
country systems and institutions on the chosen PG. 
     
CONCLUSION 
Companies are increasingly tasked with contributing to the common good, particularly as it relates 
to their operations abroad.  PG has proliferated as a way to address transnational issues that 
otherwise span the boundaries of traditional state sovereignty.  Yet, even as companies 
increasingly participate in such private governance arrangements, there is hardly homogeneity or 
convergence in how or why companies engage.  This study drew upon past works of how NBSs 
shape CSR practices by extrapolating key theories and principles to how companies practice CSR 
abroad.  It then connected what we know about CSR national differences to PG arrangements by 
juxtaposing these with the various elements of structure and strategy.  The disaggregation and 
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identification of PG dimensions by its elemental categories into an analytical framework 
constitutes one of this study’s primary contributions.   
 
The findings demonstrated that in the case of the Accord and Alliance companies translated their 
home country systems and policies into PG for the host context.  The alignment of PG with the 
NBSs and institutions of the companies’ home environment is significant and pertinent to better 
understanding how domestic institutions and business systems shape and are translated when 
companies practice CSR internationally.  Combining these findings with the literature on 
comparative CSR lead to hypothesized ideal types of PG organizing for American and European 
companies.  Finally, the findings overall help us to better connect institutions with the elements 
of PG organizing, thereby further our understanding of how and why PG practices differ between 
companies originating from different contexts.   
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Comparison of Multi-Stakeholder and Business-Led Initiatives 
as Private Governance Models 
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ABSTRACT 
 
Multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs) and business-led initiatives (BLIs) constitute major models 
for the provision of private governance, yet little is known about how the models differ or the 
implications thereof.  Adopting an institutional logics perspective, this paper compares MSIs and 
BLIs as private governance models by examining their underpinning logics and theorizes about 
what these differences mean for their potential to address different types of sustainability 
challenges.  Is it better to give a hungry person a fish or a fishing rod, and under what 
circumstances?  It draws on the comparative case of a MSI and BLI in the Bangladesh apparel 
industry which were created at the same time and which shared the same broad goals, yet deployed 
very different means to achieve them.  It develops a framework of differing logics of private 
governance, with MSIs embodying a collective logic and BLIs a benevolent one.  It proposes, 
therefore, that MSIs are best suited for addressing systemic issues, while BLIs are most effective 
at addressing narrowly-defined, outcome-oriented problems.  Overall, this study contributes to 
our understanding of the logic, potential and implications of different models of private 
governance.   
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INTRODUCTION 
Collaboration has been purported to be the silver bullet to address society’s great sustainability 
challenges, and business is expected to play a major role, as affirmed in the United Nations’ 
Sustainable Development Goal 17: Partnerships (United Nations General Assembly, 2015).  
Business operations in areas where governance provision by state actors is weak or ineffective – 
common in many of the countries where companies source their products – have resulted in rising 
expectations for the buying companies themselves to provide governance (Moon, 2002; Moon et 
al., 2005; Scherer et al., 2006).  To fulfill these expectations, firms increasingly engage in private 
governance (PG), used here to refer to voluntary, non-market governance efforts utilized by 
companies to fulfill their sustainability imperatives, particularly in their supply chains (Cashore, 
2002).  PG has proliferated, illustrated by few well-known examples: the Forest Stewardship 
Council (FSC), Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO), Business Social Compliance 
Initiative (BSCI) and Worldwide Responsible Accredited Production (WRAP).   
 
There are many different ways in which PG can be done.  Business may partner with each other, 
as they do in business associations, or they may form alliances with outside groups in a cross-
sector model (Gutiérrez, Márquez, & Reficco, 2016).  Innumerable avenues, assemblages, and 
aims in PG exist – often to tackle the same problem – and frequently arise to create competition 
in sustainability governance (Smith & Fischlein, 2010).  Two principle models prevail: business-
led initiatives (BLIs) and multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs).  The growth of collaborative PG 
arrangements represent the emergence of a new empirical phenomenon underexplored in the 
research: the varying models and modes of PG itself.  PG can be understood both as a model – 
referring to what constellation of actors work together – or as a mode, which reflects how PG is 
done.   
 
After the horrific collapse of Rana Plaza in Bangladesh which claimed the lives of well over 1,100 
people, companies were pressured to lead the reformation of factory safety in the ready-made 
garment (RMG) industry, which led to the creation of two PG arrangements: the MSI Accord and 
the BLI Alliance.  The emergence of these initiatives seems to be a classic example of neo-
institutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983); the Accord was created under coercive 
isomorphic pressure in the immediate aftermath (Reinecke & Donaghey, 2015b), and after 
individual brand efforts failed, the Alliance formed, exemplifying mimetic isomorphism.  
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Although the two initiatives shared the same end goal – safer factories – their means to get there 
varied greatly.  While neo-institutional theory can tell us what companies did (i.e. create the 
Accord and Alliance), it falls short of being able to explain the heterogeneity within, which 
encompasses the how and why companies opted for different means in the first place.   
 
Institutional logics represent the underlying frames of reference which guide cognition and inform 
action, thereby providing a bridge between the (macro) structural isomorphic forces of institutions 
with the (micro) embedded agency of actors in navigating within and between them (Thornton & 
Osasio, 2008).  In this way, classic neo-institutional theory can explain the ends, and institutional 
logics can help tell us about the means.  And the means matters a great deal.  For example, 
addressing hunger could be accomplished by giving a person a fish or a fishing rod; while both 
may be capable of eliminating hunger (the ends), the means to get there represent very different 
logics deployed to understand and address the problem at hand.  One may be more effective in 
the short-term, while the other may represent a more systemic solution for the long-term, reflective 
of the differing capabilities of different collaborative models (Y. Wang & Rajagopalan, 2015).  
Likewise, different modes of PG are underpinned by different logics which similarly shape the 
activities, approaches and outcomes which the model is able to achieve.   
 
This study seeks to understand how the logics of MSIs and BLIs differ and what this means for 
their ability to address sustainability challenges.  Drawing on a rich dataset of more than 40 
interviews and 150 documents, it uses the case of the Bangladesh RMG industry to investigate 
the different underpinning logics of the MSI Accord and BLI Alliance and theorize about their 
implications.  It specifically poses the question: how do the logics between MSIs and BLIs for PG 
differ, and what does this mean for their potential to address different types of sustainability 
challenges?  In answering this question the paper makes two primary contributions.  First, it 
develops a framework of the underlying logics which guide MSIs and BLIs, which can aid in the 
analysis and theorization of PG.  Second, it discusses how these differing logics hold different 
potential for addressing sustainability issues.  Overall, it advances our understanding of the logics 
and implications of different models and modes of PG.  As PG proliferates as a solution to the 
grand sustainability challenges which face our world, it is of critical importance to understand 
which logics, modes and constellations are likely to be most effective in addressing which types 
of sustainability challenges.   
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PRIVATE GOVERNANCE & INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS  
Just as traditional business models vary to reflect different ways of generating profit, divergent 
PG models also represent different approaches to governing sustainability.  Businesses may 
decide to partner with each other in business-led initiatives (BLIs); with governments in public-
private partnerships; with NGOs, labor or other civil society organizations; or with any 
combination thereof, resulting in what has been referred to as cross-sector social partnerships or 
MSIs (Selsky & Parker, 2005).  This variations bring to the fore important distinctions to be made 
between their organizational design models and the means deployed to carry out the work, the 
mode.  Modes explicate how work is done – for example, primary governance modes in research 
and development include partnering and contracting (Fey & Birkinshaw, 2005) – and models 
specific the configuration of the organizational unit, the design of which is guided by logics 
(Schneckenberg, Velamuri, & Comberg, 2018).  Better understanding the nuances between the 
model of organizing and the mode applied to reach its goals can help to further our understanding 
of how different PG configurations (models) deploy different means (modes) of governance, 
which are reflective of their capabilities and potential.   
 
In addition to increasing in number, collaborative approaches also are increasing in scope, 
authority and legitimacy (Crane, 2010), underscoring the need to better understand the differences 
between them.   A large stream of literature has arisen to explore various dimensions of 
partnerships and collaborations which has provided valuable insights about value creation (Austin 
& Seitanidi, 2012),  partnership dynamics (Herlin, 2015; Stadtler, 2018), and the ability of 
collaborative approaches to compensate for regulatory gaps (Pinkse & Kolk, 2012).    Comparative 
work has looked at differences in the “legitimation politics” of MSIs and BLIs, concluding that 
strategy and choice shaped both their institutional designs and external perceptions (Fransen, 
2012).  The legitimacy of MSIs has also been explored, with differentiations made between their 
“input” and “output” legitimacy, showing how differences in actor composition and the results 
achieved lend themselves to different types of legitimacy (Mena & Palazzo, 2012).  Yet, the 
differences in modes of organizing and their implications  has remained relatively unexplored, 
meaning that we still  know little about how MSIs and BLIs differ as models of PG.  A logics 
perspective has been used to explore the implications of different logics in hybrid organizations 
(Pache & Santos, 2013), cross sector partnerships (Vurro, Dacin, & Perrini, 2010), and business 
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model development (Vaskelainen & Münzel, 2017), thereby representing a promising avenue for 
the exploration of different PG approaches.   
 
Logics seek to explain how and why differences emerge beyond what a neo-institutional theory 
perspective cannot account for.  The institutional logics perspective holds that actors seek to 
understand how underlying reference points within institutional environments shape individual 
and organizational rationality and agency, thus providing a bridge between macro and micro 
perspectives (Thornton & Osasio, 2008).  Institutional logics are defined as “the socially 
constructed, historical patterns of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by 
which individuals produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and space, and 
provide meaning to their social reality” (Thornton & Ocasio 1999, p.804).  Each institution is 
guided by a central logic that constrains – but does not determine – individual and organizational 
behavior.   
 
A core premise of the institutional logics perspective is that organizations operate within an “inter-
institutional” system, that is, a that their worlds are comprised of various institutions that they 
must navigate (Thornton et al., 2012).  These are referred to as different “institutional orders” – 
some of which include market, profession, state and community – and in organizational life, one 
“cornerstone institution” with its prevailing logic dominates actors’ (organizations’) 
interpretations and actions.  “Each institutional order represents a governance system that provides 
a frame of reference that preconditions actors’ sensemaking choices.  The cornerstone institution 
connotes the root symbols and metaphors through which individuals and organizations perceive 
and categorize their activity and infuse it with meaning and value.” (Thornton et al., 2012, p. 54).  
Different actors may draw upon different reference points – institutional orders – when assessing 
changes in their environment.  Actors must navigate – sometimes simultaneously – through 
various institutions, each of which is rooted in its own material practices and symbolic systems 
(Friedland & Alford, 1991).  Institutional orders are differentiated from each other by variances 
across nine “elemental categories”: root metaphor, sources of legitimacy, sources of authority, 
sources of identity, basis of norms, basis of attention, basis of strategy, information control 
mechanisms, and economic system (Thornton et al., 2012, p. 53).  These categorical elements 
breakdown complex institutions into their requisite components, which shape actors’ 
interpretations, motives, and understandings.  Institutional logics can therefore aid in the 
theorization of institutional and organizational change by capturing the dynamic interactions 
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between embedded logics and the exercise of agency (Johansen & Waldorff, 2017).  The 
institutional logics perspective therefore provides a way in which we can understand actors’ 
dominant frames for interpreting and acting in their environments.   
 
Individuals and organizations are anchored in the cultural institutions of different institutional 
orders which serve as the frames of reference from which actors exercise their agency and 
organize their activities and interests (Friedland & Alford, 1991). Whereas a purely new 
institutional theory perspective would emphasize the role of rationality in inducing isomorphic 
effects, a logics perspective enables us to understand "the origin and definition of important value 
differences or sources of compromise and conflict" (Thornton et al., 2012, p. 45). So, whilst a new 
institutional theory view might well explain what individuals or organizations do in reference to 
perceived isomorphic effects, the institutional logics perspective can help explain why there was 
an emergence and establishment of new norms or practices in the first place. Indeed, in later work, 
DiMaggio (1988) recognized that new institutional theory refers only to successfully 
institutionalized practices, but without a theory that also encompasses agency, it cannot explain 
the antecedents, creation or disappearance of institutions (Thornton et al., 2012). The institutional 
logics perspective therefore allows us to explore the precursors and rationality that accompanies 
institutional change. 
 
The institutional logics perspective allows us to evaluate and theorize about the implications of 
contradictory logics of varying institutional orders.  Such a perspective is particularly useful when 
investigating contradictory imperatives thrust upon actors, such as the private governance of 
sustainability.  Profit-seeking business (market logic) is compelled to provide governance for the 
promotion of sustainability and public goods (state logic) by engaging collaboratively with other 
actors (community logic).  Multiple logics may shape a field or sector through contradiction, 
reinforcement, and all manners in between, and therefore help explain heterogeneous agency and 
varying value creation.  For example, the post-Rana Plaza RMG industry in Bangladesh may be 
guided by concurrent logics on behalf of buyers such as partnerships (e.g. buyers should work 
together with suppliers to facilitate safer factors), philanthropy (e.g. buyers should generously 
donate resources for factory remediation), and transaction (e.g. buyers should pay more for 
products produced in safe factories).  The identification of the prevailing logic and aligned 
institutional order allows us to evaluate and understand both the why (e.g. why did both a MSI 
and BLI emerge in response to the same pressures?) and the how (e.g. how do the means deployed 
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by the MSI and BLI affect sustainability differently?).  The embeddedness of logics shapes the 
agency exercised by actors, and in this case, the PG in response to Rana Plaza.   
 
METHODOLOGY  
Case Selection: Simultaneous Emergence of a MSI and BLIs  
The Bangladesh ready-made garment (RMG) industry stands as an extraordinary example of how 
a catastrophe ultimately resulted in the emergence of two competing PG models created for the 
same purpose, but which embodied very different logics.  The horrific collapse of the Rana Plaza 
complex in Bangladesh in 2013 which killed more than 1,100 and injured twice as many more 
demonstrated the detrimental consequences of the governance gaps within apparel global supply 
chains.  In response to intense pressure from civil society and governmental groups (Reinecke & 
Donaghey, 2015b) Western brands and retailers succumbed to pressure to fill the governance gap 
by creating two rival agreements to address factory safety: the Accord on Fire and Building Safety 
in Bangladesh (hereafter, “Accord”) and the Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety (hereafter, 
“Alliance”).  The Accord was a substantive and binding multi-stakeholder agreement dominated 
by European companies, while the Alliance was an industry-led, principle-based agreement of 
exclusively North American brands and retailers. The creation of two distinct collaborations – one 
a multi-stakeholder initiative (MSI) and the other a business-led initiative (BLI) – in response to 
the same pressures and which ultimately shared the same goals and standards provides a valuable 
opportunity to directly compare and contrast divergent approaches to collaboration.   
 
Case Background: the Accord and Alliance  
The collapse of Rana Plaza served as a wake-up call for the apparel industry, and in particular, for 
the Western brands and retailers who had long been exploiting the country’s low costs for apparel 
production.  While virtually all sourcing companies had been deploying tools and tactics such as 
codes of conduct and regular social audits, such instruments were directed towards encouraging 
accordance with their prescribed standards on labor practices like working hours and conditions, 
rather than compliance with underlying safety issues – like building codes – which were presumed 
to be under the purview of the Bangladesh government.  Yet, as Rana Plaza and all too numerous 
preceding fatal incidents demonstrate, an individual company-by-company approach failed to 
ensure the most basic health and safety of workers (Hasan et al., 2017).   
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While a proposal to address building and fire safety issues in Bangladesh’s apparel industry had 
been on the table for some time, it failed to gain broad support from brands and retailers until after 
Rana Plaza, when political and public pressure vanquished companies’ reservations and inertia 
(Bair et al., 2017).  After a few updates, the voluntary agreement became the Accord.  The purpose 
of the Accord was to establish, monitor and ensure implementation of safety standards on 
construction, fire and electrical safety – as well as train workers on safety issues – in all of the 
factories producing products for the brands and retailers that signed on.  To do this, the Accord 
established a governance model utilizing equal representation from labor and brands with the ILO 
serving as a neutral chair, and also afforded an observatory role for advocacy organizations 
(NGOs).  The agreement itself was substantive in nature and included several unique provisions, 
namely publically disclosing a comprehensive list of all factories used by Accord members, 
exerting some control of business’ sourcing practices by requiring the continuation of sourcing 
volumes with current factories, specifying Accord brand members as ultimately liable for the costs 
of remediation in specified factories, and requiring brands to serve as lead on overseeing 
remediation in a number of factories proportional to their production in the country (Accord, 
2013).  Remarkably, it also included a legal enforceability clause specifying that violation of the 
agreement was subject to binding arbitration and any awards resulting thereof were enforceable 
in brands’ home courts.  While 31 brands signed on initially – a number that eventually grew to 
more than 220  – several major North American brands walked away at the eleventh hour – 
including Gap, which had helped negotiate the original voluntary agreement – stating that they 
could not agree to the terms and governance structure of the Accord (Bair et al., 2017).   
 
Upon leaving the Accord negotiations, North American retail giants Gap and Walmart led the 
formation of a rival agreement – the Alliance – and brought along other North American retail 
powerhouses like VF Corporation, Target, JCPenney, Sears and Canadian Tire which collectively 
represented the vast majority of Bangladesh RMG imports to North America.  The Alliance shared 
the Accord’s broad goal of safer factories – accomplished via construction, fire, and electrical 
upgrades and worker safety training – yet set out to carry out its work in very different ways.  
First, the Alliance adopted a business-centric approach in its organizational structure and 
representation by limiting membership to RMG brands and industry experts, and governing itself 
via a board of directors and chief executive (Alliance, 2013a).  Second, it opted for a principle-
based agreement rather than a substantive one – and included comprehensive policies for limiting 
liabilities for its members – underscoring its voluntary nature and affinity for traditional business 
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mechanisms.  Most controversially, however, was the absence of a financial liability clause to 
hold brands liable for remediation costs, which was instead surmounted by the creation of a 
funding pool, access to low-cost loans and capital, and a promise to leverage third party resources 
such as grants and donations from third-party sources, which it did, for example, by working with 
USAID.  The stark differences between the Accord and Alliance demonstrate key differences in 
the design of and engagement with different approaches to PG.  The following analysis seeks to 
understand the underpinning logics leading to these differences and what they can tell us about 
different models of PG for sustainability.   
 
Data Collection  
The case study adopted a qualitative approach, with data primarily drawn from documents and 
interviews.  Overall, 41 interviews with 36 unique individuals representing 30 different 
organizations were conducted.  Interviews were conducted with representatives of signatories 
(brands) of the Accord (n=23, approximately 10% of members) and Alliance (n=7, 25% of 
members), NGOs and trade unions (n=12), the public sector (n=1), and the Accord and Alliance 
organizations (n=6).  The study targeted those actors which played a key role in the design of 
either or both initiatives, such as those companies which were principle negotiators for the original 
MOU and subsequent Accord, as well as those who were central to the creation of the Alliance.  
From there, the author identified additional respondents via snowball sampling, via connections 
in her own network, as well as “cold calling”.  Data collection continued until saturation was 
reached, signified by the repetition of key themes, information and stories, with few to no new 
insights or unique data generated through additional interviews.  Respondents have been 
anonymized due to the sensitivity of some of the topics discussed.  The first round of interviews 
were conducted in 2016 and 2017, with follow-up and final interviews being conducted in 2018.  
Interviews utilized a semi-structured interview format which was abductively adapted in 
accordance with the insights ascertained through previous interviews.  All interviews were 
recorded and their substantive portions fully transcribed.  This resulted in more than 43 hours of 
audio recordings and 900+ pages of single-spaced transcripts.   
 
Relevant documents were also collected for this analysis.  These included membership agreements 
and other governing documents – such as by-laws and amendments – of the Accord and Alliance, 
which collectively totaled around 75 single-spaced pages.  Other sources were also included: 
140 
 
company CSR reports; press releases by companies, Accord, Alliance, labor and NGOs; related 
press conferences (transcribed); websites of the Accord and Alliance and relevant webpages of 
member brands, labor and NGOs; news stories; and relevant reports written by NGOs and research 
groups.  In all, these documents number around 150.   
 
Data Analysis  
The data analysis employed a cross-case analysis approach – comparing and contrasting the 
Accord and Alliance – and three rounds of abductive coding (Miles & Huberman, 1994).  NVivo 
qualitative data analysis software was used to collate and code the data.  The first round of coding 
was purely inductive, identifying “descriptive” codes for the data and assigning labels which 
require little to no interpretation.  Examples of descriptive codes include “Rana Plaza as 
instigating factor”, “operationalization of A/A responsibilities”, and “Pressure to sign”.  The 
second round of coding moved into “interpretive” codes which sought to help group common 
themes found in the data vis-à-vis the theoretical framework of institutional logics, an abductive 
approach.  Abduction was used to infer explanations from the data (Mantere & Ketokivi, 2013).  
These interpretive codes guide the presentation of the findings, serving as the section headers (e.g. 
“Stakeholder Orientation”).  The final round of coding aimed to explain the data in light of the 
applicable theory and framework – institutional logics and orders – creating “pattern” codes, 
which represent true qualitative data analysis (Miles & Huberman, 1994).  These patterns codes 
elucidate the overall findings of the data analysis, culminating the overarching logics embodied 
by the different collaborative approaches.   
 
FINDINGS: SHARED GOALS, DIFFERENT LOGICS 
As discussed previously, the Accord and Alliance shared the same broad goal of safe factories in 
Bangladesh’s RMG industry, and even worked together to identify and establish common 
standards and determine a feasible plan for oversight of factories that fell under the scope of both 
agreements.  However, as both organizations embarked on their work to inspect and oversee the 
remediation of factories, they each approached their work in very different ways which reflected 
different underpinning logics.  The analysis presents its findings first as inductively derived from 
the data, which generated second order, interpretive categories of “stakeholder roles”, “perceived 
legitimacy”, “agreement content”, and “processes”.  These have been adapted into the analysis 
headings of Stakeholder Orientations, Input & Output Legitimacy, Substantive vs. Principle-based 
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Responsibilities, and Liability & Enforcement.  After the analysis is presented, the findings are 
then abductively “translated” into the institutional logics framework (“elemental categories”) and 
discussed in order to answer the study’s research question: how do the logics between MSIs and 
BLIs for PG differ, and what does this mean for their potential to address different types of 
sustainability challenges?     
 
Stakeholder Orientation  
Perhaps the clearest point of differentiation between the Accord and Alliance was their varying 
views on and approaches to stakeholders.  As the former agreement was updated in the aftermath 
of Rana Plaza into what would become the Accord, one of its foundational premises was its 
inclusion of a broad range of stakeholders – brands, labor, activists and the ILO.  The Accord 
established its governance structure via a Steering Committee comprised of “equal representation 
chosen by the trade union signatories and company signatories (maximum 3 seats each) and a 
representative from and chosen by the International Labour Organization (ILO) as a neutral 
chair” (Accord, 2013, p. 2).  Brands and labor were represented equally on the steering team, and 
the ILO provided an unbiased representative to chair.  Further, the Accord included advocacy 
organizations in a curtailed capacity in its governance by offering them the role of “witness 
signatories”.  The designation provided them great insight and access to the Accord as well as the 
opportunity to continue to engage with in some decision making.  Their inclusion afforded the 
Accord and the witness signatories both further legitimacy in the public eye, underscoring 
importance of inclusion and input legitimacy (Mena & Palazzo, 2012).   For Accord members, 
the diversity of stakeholders represented was an attribute.  As one brand representative put it,  
“… in terms of our sustainability work, the more we can collaborate with other brands, 
trade unions, NGOs, politicians, the better results we can achieve.  In that sense, [the 
Accord] is a really good collaboration because we are learning a lot and we are making 
contact with some new brands and organizations that we have not been in touch with 
before.”  
Here we can see that diverse stakeholders and perspectives were believed to add value to the work 
of the Accord and the individual brand.     
 
A clear difference between the two organizations is that the Alliance was comprised exclusively 
of business members, which earned it the description of the “industry-led Alliance” by media and 
advocacy organizations.  Indeed, it even referred to itself as “the Corporation” in its bylaws.  The 
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Alliance member agreement stipulated that “membership is open to all business organizations 
which are involved in the sale or marketing of ready-made garments (“RMG”) and wish to 
support the principles set forth below” (Alliance, 2013, p. 1).  It elaborated on this point in its 
bylaws, where it specified that “membership in the Corporation is open to all corporations, 
associations, and other business organizations…that are involved in the sale or marketing of 
RMG” (Alliance, 2013b, p. 2).  Further, the Alliance sought to retain tight control of its 
membership, even within their specific parameters.  Membership in the Alliance could happen in 
one of two ways: first, those corporations that were founding members and signed on to the 
agreement prior to 2 July 2013, before its inception, and second, by applying for membership, 
with acceptance conditional upon a majority vote amongst all Alliance members.  Clearly, the 
Alliance sought to retain tight control on who was allowed in (and not).   
 
The Alliance’s strict parameters on membership was due in part to existing dynamics between 
stakeholder groups; in contrast to the Accord, members of the Alliance didn’t necessarily view 
labor or NGOs as an asset to its work.  The Alliance (North American) brands had a different, 
often antagonistic relationship with and view of such civil society organizations prior to Rana 
Plaza.  One Alliance brand spoke to the current dynamics between these actors.   
“I think the role that governments and NGOs play is to nudge us in the right direction. … 
You know, screaming at the door with pitchforks is one approach, but it probably doesn’t 
get a lot of work done…For us to let a NGO into this building is a big deal.”   
 Existing adversarial dynamics between actor groups shaped not just the Alliance’s governance 
structure, but its entire approach to stakeholders generally, which was reflected in its governance 
solely by industry.  Similarly, Alliance members were skeptical about the intent of labor 
representatives from the Accord, stating that,  
“They’re global worker unionization organizations…[whose] primary focus is unionization 
and collective bargaining. Their expressed interest was that unionization was a critical 
factor to addressing safety.  We didn’t want to necessarily tie the issues of safety with 
unionization.”   
North American companies have a long track record of eschewing organized labor, as put by one 
respondent on the Accord side, “A company like Walmart doesn’t necessarily have a particularly 
good track record when it comes to working with trade unions.  Just to put it mildly.”  Therefore, 
it’s clear that labor and NGOs were not seen as a value-add to the Alliance.   
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The governance structure of the Alliance was modeled on that of business.  It was governed by a 
Board of Directors comprised of: an “Elected Independent Director” to serve as the chair, a 
guaranteed seat for a specific founding member (Gap), referred to as “Appointed Director”, three 
“Elected Member Directors” (all companies), and four “Elected Stakeholder Directors” for a total 
of nine seats.  Stakeholder directors were defined as a “qualifying” organization or individual.   
A Qualifying Organization is defined as an organization representing worker safety, human 
rights, anti-corruption, labour, development, international diplomacy, governance, or 
supplier interests in the Bangladesh RMG industry. A Qualifying Individual is one who 
possesses expertise in factory safety or Bangladesh economic or factory safety conditions, 
human rights, anti-corruption, development, international diplomacy, governance, or other 
similar areas of expertise that would be helpful in the governance of the Corporation. 
(Alliance, 2013a, p. 9)   
While this suggests the possibility for a split between brands and advocacy organizations or labor, 
in reality all but one of the Stakeholder Directors represented industry, and none represented 
workers. The final clause “…that would be helpful in the governance of the Corporation” also 
signals that competing interests were not welcome.  But, for the Alliance, this helped them find a 
comfort zone to get work done.  As one member explained,  
“We did look at both and we did find that we had more in common with the members of the 
Alliance that we did with members of the Accord. … You recognize the people and you know 
what their opinions are and what their backgrounds are.  It makes it a lot easier to work 
with people that you know because you get a certain level of trust…so there aren’t the 
surprises or political play.”   
Herein we see that for Alliance members, it was important to collaborate with people and 
organizations they already knew and trusted, which most certainly did not include organized labor, 
NGOs or other activists.   
 
In addition to the obvious disparities regarding membership and inclusion in the work, these points 
collectively illustrate important differences in the problem definition and subsequent solution-
seeking approaches between the Accord and Alliance.  Tying worker organization to safety 
illustrates how the Accord and its founding members viewed the problem of safety as an 
underlying, systemic issue which could best be addressed in the long term by organizing and 
empowering workers rather than solving it through remediation.  The Alliance, in contrast, viewed 
the scope of the problem narrowly as safety which could be best addressed through remediation 
and training.  The differences in stakeholder orientation provide insight into differences in each 
initiatives’ problem conceptualization and subsequent scope.   
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Input & Output Legitimacy  
PG arrangements have different kinds of legitimacy, theoretically categorized into input and 
output legitimacy.  Input legitimacy refers to the breadth of stakeholders and perspectives 
represented within an initiative, and output legitimacy embodies what the initiative itself is able 
to achieve (Mena & Palazzo, 2012).  The Accord, with its substantive inclusion of diverse 
stakeholders, enjoyed a high input legitimacy in the eyes of civil society.  Media articles from 
reputable sources such as Reuters and The New York Times heralded the Accord;  for example, 
one headline read “Doing the right thing: when ethics beat compliance” (Biraj, 2013).  Some of 
the industry’s most critical voices – such as the Clean Clothes Campaign – marveled in the 
Accord’s approach as well, issuing a statement:  “We made it! Global Breakthrough as Retail 
Brands sign up to Bangladesh Factory Safety Deal” (Clean Clothes Campaign, 2013b).  The 
inclusion of labor as equal governors of the Accord, along with the transparency afforded to its 
NGO witness signatories, were among the praised attributes.  Further, the number of brand 
signatories was also seen as a source of legitimacy, some 220+ by the end.  “The power for the 
Accord is we have 220 brands behind it.  Factory owners can’t deny us entry or negotiate with us 
on what they need to do.”  Their sheer numbers provided them great power because “the 220 
brands collectively have the best ability to drive change in the industry.”  The Accord focused on 
its inclusive and substantive structure as its sources of power and legitimacy to drive change in 
the industry.   
 
However, the Alliance, with its BLI structure, suffered major reputational and legitimacy 
problems initially.  As headlines like “American retailers’ plan for Bangladesh factory safety 
branded a sham” (Butler, 2013) appeared in mainstream media, the Alliance chose to focus on 
two key differentiating aspects regarding their legitimacy.  First, they made clear that they had 
economic might, stating at the launch that “…seventeen North American retailers and brands 
responsible for the overwhelming majority of North American apparel imports from Bangladesh 
have come together to form this historic Alliance.”  The Alliance identified its input legitimacy 
as the power of the purse strings in the North American market.  Second, it sought to re-orient 
criticisms about its single-sector model by re-framing itself in terms of output legitimacy by 
focusing on goals, results and indicators.  At its announcement press conference Alliance 
representatives stated clear goals and results which they would focus on.   
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“Within one year we will inspect 100% of the Alliance factories focusing on fire and 
structure safety.  By this time next year we’re committing to training workers in 100% of 
the Alliance factories. … By September, we will implement an anonymous worker hotline 
that will use mobile technology and administered by a 3rd party organization.”   
This sentiment was echoed in interviews with members of the Alliance.  “We wanted a nimble 
organization that addressed the exact risks that we’re seeing related to fire, electrical and 
structural safety.”  The Alliance thereby adopted a traditional business logic by illustrating its 
affinity for speed and results-orientation.  Indeed, its results reflect this emphasis.  The Alliance 
remediated factories and trained workers much more quickly than did the Alliance.   
 
Substantive vs. Principle-based Responsibilities  
The Accord was groundbreaking in its inclusion of multiple substantive provisions that required 
atypical activities amongst its company signatories.  First, it required company signatories to 
ensure the financial feasibility of factory remediation, which represented the first time that 
Western buyers were bound to providing financial assistance to the factories which made their 
products.  It stated:  
In order to induce Tier 1 and Tier 2 factories to comply with upgrade and remediation 
requirements of the program, participating brands and retailers will negotiate commercial 
terms with their suppliers which ensure that it is financially feasible for the factories to 
maintain safe workplaces and comply with upgrade and remediation requirements instituted 
by the Safety Inspector. Each signatory company may, at its option, use alternative means 
to ensure factories have the financial capacity to comply with remediation requirements. 
(Accord, 2013, p. 6)  
While it allowed buyers the freedom to determine how to make financing available, it clearly 
stipulated that ultimate responsibility was vested with buyers.  This is notable for at least two 
reasons.  First, it demonstrates a shift in who should be responsible for paying for remediation 
(ultimately, the brands), and second, it also ensured that each and every brand had an individual 
responsibility.  Proportional liability was an innovative and distinguishing feature of the Accord, 
designed to help address the problem of firms signing up for collaborative efforts but then doing 
little to actually further its imperatives (Auld et al., 2015).    
 
Some of the Accord’s other substantive requirements required buyers to diverge from their 
business-as-usual approach and practices.  Article 23 of the agreement called for companies to 
maintain business with current suppliers, and at current volumes, a procedure at odds with the 
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traditional business practice of continual shopping around for the best product and price.  As one 
person familiar with the Accord reported,  
“To my surprise, brands were more concerned about this Article than the financing 
obligation article because this one they often said, ‘But now you are really touching on our 
business model!  We – and only we – can decide which factories we will work with.  
[Shopping around between suppliers] is part of the negotiations, and that’s our business 
model.  So we cannot comply with this.’”   
Buyers could no longer shop around amongst suppliers, adjust order volumes according to retail 
forecasts, and use any supplier they wished; buyers had to continue long-term relationships and 
volumes and could only source from approved factories.  These business-altering provisions, in 
tandem with buyer’s duty to help pay for remediation, signal the notion that buyers have a duty 
and obligation to the suppliers and workers supplying their products beyond a typical contractual 
relationship.  These changes stand in contrast to the norm where buyers sever contracts with non-
compliant suppliers yet do not necessarily increase their prices or volumes for those suppliers that 
complied (Amengual, Distelhorst, & Tobin, forthcoming)  The Accord specified explicit 
responsibilities which stood at odds with brands’ traditional business models.  This orientation 
demonstrates the Accord’s fundamental premise that the problem wasn’t simply that Rana Plaza 
collapsed, but that it was also symptomatic the nature of the business practices of the buyers.   
 
In contrast, the Alliance relied on a more principle-based agreement which sought to preserve the 
traditional business model, as well as brands’ agency to determine how to comply with the terms 
of the agreement.  When it came to financing necessary remediation, the Alliance reinforced its 
perspective as voluntary by pooling funds from brands to create the “Worker Safety Fund” and 
loans via the Affordable Capital for Building Safety (ACBS).   
ACBS funds will be administered solely by the Member who makes such funds available to 
Factories, on terms and conditions to be established solely by that Member and any lending 
institutions who are working with such Member on ACBS.  Participation in ACBS is not a 
condition of membership in the Alliance (Alliance, 2013a, p. 5).   
Brands retained their agency and individual discretion: they could pool resources or not, and they 
retained their agency over how to use and distribute pooled funds.  This preserved brands’ 
individual agency and traditional business model, unlike the Accord which specified individual 
brand liability for improvements to be conducted via the terms of the members’ agreement.  
 
147 
 
The governance structure and principle-based nature of the Alliance are indicative of its 
underlying rationale: benevolence.  It might have made economic sense to simply leave 
Bangladesh and move production elsewhere; however, companies felt they bore some 
responsibility given their history and investment in the country.   
“You know, there were a couple of companies that did [leave Bangladesh after Rana Plaza].  
I think if [my company] was completely soul-less, that would have been the move to make.  
If there are cost advantages to operating in Bangladesh, they don’t outweigh the risks.  And 
they don’t outweigh the costs that we’ve incurred over the past four years to improve factory 
conditions and the institutional capacity of the country.  I think it was really an ethical 
decision to stay and say that we came into this country without full knowledge of the risks 
and institutional capabilities of the country.  And in some ways that’s our fault.  Even though 
we weren’t involved in Rana Plaza – it’s very likely that we never would have had 
production at that facility because we would have seen some of the risks that existed there 
– we’re a part of the system.  We felt a responsibility to stay and improve conditions 
regardless of our business interest there, because ultimately for cost-benefit analysis it 
would have probably made more sense to leave.” 
The Alliance’s rationalization for engagement was based on a characteristically benevolent or 
philanthropic view common for North American business (Maignan & Ralston, 2002b; D. Matten 
& Moon, 2008).  Brands’ responsibilities after Rana Plaza were conceptualized as arising from 
their inability to adequately anticipate the existing risks in the country, rather than their role in 
contributing to them.  An instrumental cost-benefit analysis justified the departure of brands like 
Disney (Greenhouse, 2013), underscoring that there was not an obligation to stay.  Those brands 
that remained on and joined the Alliance did so voluntarily out of their own benevolence, hence 
the crafting of the Alliance as principle-based rather than substantive-based like its counterpart, 
the Accord.  The normative orientation to stay was in part borne out their not seeing the “risks” 
in the market, a decidedly business perspective.  The Alliance therefore can be seen to conduct its 
work from a vantage of benevolence.   
 
Liability & Enforcement  
Perhaps the most heralded provision of the Accord was its inclusion of a “legally binding” 
enforcement clause to ensure company signatories’ compliance, a point that proved powerful in 
causing North American brands to walk away.  The Accord tasked its labor signatories with 
holding company signatories accountable for fulfilling the member agreement.  Should company 
signatories be found in violation, a dispute could be lodged with the steering committee; should 
either party not agree with the decision, they could opt to escalate the matter to binding arbitration, 
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and any grant awarded would be enforceable in the domicile of the buying company.  While over 
the course of the Accord’s five years only two cases were ever even escalated to arbitration, the 
clause itself was heralded as a breakthrough, and was drawn upon frequently to ensure brands’ 
compliance.  As one Accord member explained, “There’s a whole dispute resolution process 
that’s been set up within the Accord that leads to the path of, if the two parties can’t solve it, then 
it would eventually end up in arbitration.  That [first] part has happened with many brands.”  
Labor and NGOs welcomed this revolutionary approach of legal liability for brands.  One 
respondent affiliated with the Accord reported that “the unions have said ‘Whatever we sign up 
to, the Accord is now the benchmark.’  It’s like the Accord is the new threshold.”  Some brands 
even welcomed this clause, and saw it as a primary differentiator from the Alliance.  A 
representative of one Accord brand reported,  
“There is both the Accord and then there’s the Alliance that some Americas formed, which 
is less strict in terms of what you actually sign on to.  We wanted to be as strict as possible 
and very clear on what it is that these brands commit to, because the more defined and the 
more strict it is, the better results we are going to achieve.”   
Herein we can see that the Accord’s approach to ensuring compliance via specific enforcement 
mechanisms was not only a breakthrough, but one that was seen as have far-reaching implications 
for how similar agreements might be structured in the future.  The “legally binding” clause of the 
Accord ensures companies’ compliance with its provisions, aptly exhibiting and codifying the 
obligation of signatory companies to help their suppliers create safer factories.   
 
In contrast, Alliance members cited the legally binding clause as a primary reason for creating 
their own initiative.  In response to a question at its announcement press conference about the 
major differences between the two initiatives, a representative of the Alliance stated that,  
“I would say the main difference – the reason we couldn’t sign the Accord – is Europe has 
a different legal environment than we do in the United States and Canada, and the Accord 
had some provisions that, in the way the U.S. and Canadian legal system work, would 
subject us to potential unlimited legal liability and litigation.” 
However, this interpretation is highly contested, because at its most basic, the Accord is simply a 
contract, a commonly-used tool utilized by businesses throughout the world to specify business 
arrangements, like purchasing.  However, the legal clause and inclusion of labor in the Accord’s 
governance structure proved to be the reasons that most North American companies refused to 
sign the Accord and create the rival Alliance.   
149 
 
“When we were unable to sign it, we suspected that there would be a lot of other U.S. large 
public companies who would also not sign it for the same reasons as us, associated with the 
legal liability and governance structure.  We started talking to other trade associations and 
retailers about forming an alternative with the same social and safety purpose but with a 
different governance structure and legal arrangement that we thought would be more 
palatable to significant U.S. companies given the governance expectations and litigation 
environment in the U.S.” 
Given the nature of the legal environment in North American and particularly the U.S., companies 
seek to limit their liabilities, which they did as well in the Alliance.  It illustrates the Alliance’s 
embodiment of a benevolent approach by its preservation of discretion and power and curtailment 
of liabilities for brands.  
 
The Alliance took a multitude of steps to limit the liability of its members under the agreement.  
From a governance perspective, it declared that “…all powers are expressly reserved to the 
Members, [and] which powers can only be exercised by a majority vote of the Members (unless 
expressly stated otherwise)” (Alliance, 2013b, p. 6).  And, while it suggested in its bylaws that 
membership was contingent upon members’ willingness “to subscribe to the principles set forth 
in the Certificate of Incorporation and Bylaws and legally bind themselves to the commitments 
set forth in the Members Agreement” (Alliance, 2013b, p. 2), it specified in its member agreement 
that no third party beneficiaries were created: “No Member has any right of action or other claim 
against another Member arising out of this Agreement, or such Member’s participation in the 
Alliance, all of which are hereby waived and released.” (p. 16).  Yet, it vested the power of 
enforcement of the agreement – including arbitration – solely with its board.  Given its governance 
via majority rule and board composition of all but one industry actor, it seemed highly unlikely 
that major disputes would occur, much less be adjudicated upon.  Further, the Alliance 
incorporated itself in the state of Delaware, infamous for its corporate protections. It registered as 
a 501(c)(6) nonprofit corporation, which shielded itself from tax liabilities while providing an 
avenue for member contributions to be considered philanthropic under U.S. tax code, and 
therefore tax deductible.  It also included strong clauses of “Force Majeure”, indemnification, 
insurance, and guarantee of individual member protections in the event of legal action.  Just like 
(North American) businesses, the Alliance went to great lengths to limit the liability of itself and 
its members.   
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Herein we can see different rationales deployed by the Accord and the Alliance.  Whereas the 
Accord viewed the inclusion of a legally-binding element necessary and useful to ensure that all 
brands were held individually responsible for doing their fair share – perhaps best aligned with a 
collective logic –  the Alliance viewed the clause in terms of financial liability, further 
underscoring its own roots in a  logic of benevolence and optionally helping improve the industry.   
 
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
The study finds that the Accord and Alliance were each underpinned by different logics, and that 
these points of departure were reflected in their orientation towards stakeholders, legitimacy, 
content and provisions, and proclivities on liability and enforcement.  By drawing on the 
“elemental categories” of the institutional logics perspective (Thornton et al., 2012), we can derive 
insights about how the underpinning logics of the MSI and BLI differed.   
 
As demonstrated in the findings, the MSI embodied a collective logic, while the BLI exhibited a 
benevolent one, which represent fundamentally different approaches to the provision of 
governance for sustainability.  For the Accord, Rana Plaza served as a catastrophic example of 
the structural and systemic problems in the Bangladesh RMG industry, and this root metaphor 
guided the governance of the Accord.  It adopted a strong stakeholder approach, ensuring that 
diverse stakeholders were included, afforded equal power, and tasked with their own 
responsibilities in contributing to the success of the initiative.  All actors bore some sort of 
obligations: factories had to remediate, brands had ensure upgrading operationally and financially, 
and trade unions had to monitor and enforce the actions of the brands.  The novel aspects of the 
agreement which challenged business’ traditional business models – such as mandates to maintain 
sourcing volumes and the agreement’s legal enforceability – began to facilitate new norms about 
the roles and responsibilities of buyers and labor.  Means were important; resolving disagreements 
was part of the learning process.  And the sum of the efforts sought to facilitate changes to industry 
norms; a normative fairness and idealism shown through.  Therefore, overall the Accord can be 
seen to embody a collective logic.   
 
The Alliance as a BLI, on the other hand, rooted its purpose and practices in the rapid 
implementation of measurable outcomes.  The scope of the problem was much more narrowly 
defined for the Alliance: factories needed to be made physically safer.  The Alliance’s business 
151 
 
acumen and capabilities enabled the effort to make progress much more quickly than its MSI 
counterpart.  Given that Alliance members shared a common perspective (industry, and more 
specifically, Western brands and retailers) signaling that the means through which the Alliance 
accomplished its work (inputs) didn’t matter so much as long as the ends were positive (outputs).  
Brands opted for efficiency and limited liability by pooling funds and creating common funding 
instruments, which pushed liabilities from individual brands to the collective group.  Such 
mechanisms enabled them to move quickly to make payments or provide loans when needed, and 
as well, made clear how much each brand was investing in the work of the initiative.  It’s not that 
through the Alliance model that brands necessarily paid less by utilizing funding pools than paying 
individually; but they were able to limit their liability in the sense that their contributions were 
based upon their discretion – rather than stipulated – and meant that any requests for funds – 
liabilities – would be borne by the group rather than themselves as individual brands.  
Underscoring all of these actions is the rationale which the Alliance members approached their 
responsibilities with to begin with: while it would have been easier to walk away – and some 
brands did – they felt an “ethical” responsibility to lead improvements to safety standards in the 
industry.  However, this also served an instrumental purpose by reducing their risks while assuring 
continued access to an important low-cost sourcing market.  The market and risks were top-of-
mind for Alliance members, and their work to improve safety was seen as voluntary but the “right 
thing to do”.  Therefore, overall, the Alliance embodies a benevolent logic.   
 
Overall, these findings can be rendered and extrapolated into the “elemental categories” of the 
institutional logics framework.   While the elemental categories total nine in the original 
theoretical framework, the findings only bore out satisfactory explanatory differences for six, with 
two of these highly related – legitimacy and authority – which have thus been collapsed into a 
single category, resulting in a total of five categories presented here to compare and contrast the 
differences between MSIs and BLIs.  Table 1 provides a summary of the empirical findings within 
the relevant elemental categories of the institutional logics perspective, which demonstrates the 
MSI’s underlying collective logic and the BLI’s benevolent one.   
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Table 1.  Summary of case findings plotted within the relevant categories of the institutional 
logics framework.   
 MSI Accord 
Collective Logic 
BLI Alliance 
Benevolent Logic 
Root Metaphor  Rana Plaza represented structural 
injustices  
Buyers must change business practices and 
take on new responsibilities  
Rana Plaza demonstrated business risks  
Buyers can choose to lead 
improvements or not  
Sources of 
Authority & 
Legitimacy  
Diverse stakeholders with equal power  
Strong accountability and enforcement 
mechanisms  
Rapid, results-focused implementation  
Power of the purse strings  
Basis of Norms  Diverse interests and perspectives  
Equal power between stakeholders  
Individual brand liability  
Singular interests and perspectives  
Business-like structure  
Pooled resources & liabilities  
Basis of Attention Internal policing and accountability 
(compliance)   
Measurable goals and targets, efficiency  
Basis of Strategy  Substantive provisions and obligations  
Facilitate new norms  
Principle-based  
Preservation of individual discretion and 
agency  
 
DISCUSSION: THE DIFFERING LOGICS OF MSIs AND BLIs 
The institutional logics perspective enables us to infer some of the key differences underpinning 
MSI and BLI models by building from the case of the MSI Accord and BLI Alliance.  First, it is 
important to understand how each PG organization understood the problem which it sought to 
address, the root metaphor in institutional logics terms.  Distinct problem formulations point to a 
key difference between PG models: MSIs tend to view crises or other issues as symptomatic of 
underlying structural or systemic problems, while BLIs focus narrowly on a discrete task or 
outcome.  This was true for the Accord and Alliance, and could also be said for differences 
between other divergent PG approaches, like the Fair Labor Association (FLA) and Business 
Social Compliance Initiative (BSCI).  Both initiatives audit to prescribed social sustainability 
standards but the FLA describes itself as a MSI with the stated purpose to “find sustainable 
solutions to systemic labor issues” whilst the BSCI refers to itself as “business-driven initiative” 
which “supports the continuous improvement of the social performance of suppliers” (Business 
Social Compliance Initiative, n.d.; Fair Labor Association, n.d.).  Here again we see both groups 
define themselves by their membership constitution – MSI vs BLI – but state their purposes 
differently: the MSI approaches the problems as “systemic” whilst the BLI exists to improve 
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“performance”, a characteristically business outlook.  So, problem conceptualizations vary 
between PG models, with MSIs approaching them more broadly and systematically than their BLI 
counterparts which see them more narrowly and outcome-oriented.   
 
Conceptions of responsibility also vary between the two models, which guide initiatives’ modes 
via differing bases of norms and attention.  In the case of the Accord and Alliance, the MSI held 
each brand member individually accountable to carryout work as part of its membership in the 
Accord, assume proportionate financial liability, as well as provide transparency and assurance of 
specific actions to its labor members.  This approach demonstrates both the substantive nature of 
its mode, as well as its diffusion of responsibilities to all involved actors.  In contrast, the Alliance 
adopted an arms-length approach through common funding pools instead of individual brand 
liability, whilst also preserving the agency of brands to determine how to comply with the 
agreement.  Similar differences can also be seen in the modes deployed by the NGO-supported 
Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) and the business-friendly Sustainable Forestry Initiative (SFI), 
competing sustainable forestry standards: the FSC is seen to be more rigid both in terms of the 
level of standard (content) as well as how it must be implemented (process), the SFI grants far 
more discretion to industry actors (Cashore & Stone, 2012).  These examples point to how MSI 
diffuse responsibilities to all actors involved, signaling its logic that each individual actor should 
contribute proportionally, while BLIs decouple responsibilities and limit members’ liabilities so 
as to preserve maximum discretion and agency for all involved actors.   
 
Further, the accountability modes vary between the two types of initiatives, with both the Accord 
and FSC demonstrating a higher bar for compliance and more stringent enforcement for the MSI 
as compared to the BLI corollaries, the Alliance and SFI, respectively.  Accordingly, MSIs can 
be seen as promoting responsibility through a more stringent enforcement of specific obligations, 
while BLIs seek to preserve actors’ agency so long as adequate progress is made on outcomes, 
their respective formulations of responsibility.  These differing orientations on liability and 
enforcement also signal MSIs’ prioritization of input legitimacy – processes and compliance 
matter – and BLIs’ inclination for outcome legitimacy through its focus on outputs, outcomes and 
speed.   
 
Underlying philosophies which guided strategy differ as well.  The MSI adopted what could be 
considered an idealistic perspective through its promotion of inclusion and equality between its 
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members.  It sought to tackle and address systemic issues and structural injustices to make 
progress on broader sustainability issues, as well as serve as a guide for future efforts.  It structured 
its own internal governance so as to afford power balance between actors and promote new ways 
of working.  The BLI took on a more pragmatic perspective, seeking to work within traditional 
confines of legal systems and existing business models, and focusing on measurable, outcome-
related results.  Similar differences can be seen between the FSC and SFI when comparing their 
base principles.  The FSC included principles like “tenure and use rights and responsibilities”, 
“indigenous people’s rights”, and “benefits from the forest”; the industry SFI outlined “aesthetics 
and recreation”, “avoidance of controversial sources…”, and “forest productivity and health” 
(Fernholz et al., 2011, p. 5).  The MSI strove to achieve equality and mutual value creation – 
admirable and idealistic – whilst the BLI reflected its outcome-oriented problem orientation by 
specifying more tangible and narrow principles, a rational perspective.  Idealism and pragmatism 
therefore can be seen as the philosophies which guide the strategies of MSIs and BLIs, 
respectively.  Table 2 uses the study’s findings and other examples to outline a framework for the 
differing underlying logics of MSIs and BLIs.   
 
Table 2.  The underlying collective logic of MSIs and benevolent logic of BLIs.   
 MSIs 
Collective Logic 
BLIs 
Benevolent Logic  
Root Metaphor 
Problems have an underlying cause  
New responsibilities as paradigmatic  
Narrow problem conceptualization  
New responsibilities as benevolent  
Sources of 
Authority & 
Legitimacy  
Stakeholders (social)  
Input legitimacy 
Collective power 
Market (economic)  
Output legitimacy  
Collective power 
Basis of  
Norms 
Distributed, equal power  
Explicit obligations  
All actors have individual responsibilities 
and liabilities  
Consolidated Power 
Distributed, decoupled responsibilities liabilities  
Preservation of individual agency  
Basis of 
Attention  
Governance processes (means deployed)   
Monitoring and enforcement   
Effectiveness (measurable outcomes)  
Efficiency (speed of implementation, costs)   
Basis of Strategy  
Idealism (new norms & processes)  
Substance   
Pragmatism (work within existing confines)  
Principles   
     
 
These differing logics align well with similar research which has sought to specify different 
“conceptions” in PG which also divide down membership lines (MSI and BLI).  It argues that 
MSIs allow for less discretion, utilize more substantive rules, and define their scope broadly, while 
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business-led groups adopt a narrower scope while allowing for more individual discretion because 
of its belief that its work is the “end in itself” (Cashore et al., 2004, p. 13).  While some of the 
terminology differs, the concepts are the same and the findings reinforce each other.   
 
Next, what do the different logics and modes of PG mean for their potential to address different 
types of sustainability challenges?  The results here suggest that MSIs – with their diverse 
representation, broad problem conceptualizations and idealistic orientations – may be the best 
model for addressing systemic issues, root problems, and structural injustices.  BLIs, given their 
aptitude for speed and results realized within pragmatic confines, seem likely to be best suited for 
addressing specific, narrowly-defined issues.  This may be due, in part, to the different capabilities 
embodied within the two models; for example, BLIs may have astute business acumen while MSIs 
are skilled at grassroots organizing (Y. Wang & Rajagopalan, 2015).  To harken back to our classic 
fish-or-fishing-rod dilemma, the best answer is dependent upon the nature of the problem itself; 
is the hungry person an impoverished soul living on the waterside, or a traveler whose car broke 
down in the middle of the desert?  While the issue is the same – hunger – the nature of it is 
diametric, one stemming from complex, systemic problems and the other from simple and 
uncommon ones.  Solutions – PG – may vary commensurately.   
 
As PG continues to gain ground in the oversight of global supply chains it is imperative to 
understand the varying approaches, and in particular, the differences between MSIs and BLIs.  
The results of this study build upon many related streams of literature.  First, the underlying 
assumptions (logics) which underpin global PG arrangements can help explain the dynamics and 
relations between actors, and as a result, their potential to contribute to sustainable development 
in global supply chains (Gereffi & Lee, 2016).  A particularly interesting lens for further 
examination of the relationships between actors within PG could be introduced through an “ethic 
of care” to examine governance hierarchies, problem definitions, and stakeholder orientations 
(Spence, 2016).  Other research could examine the effectiveness of different approaches or efforts 
on different types of supply chain issues, such as wages or occupational health and safety.  Going 
further, there may be unseen “dark sides” of different approaches to PG on particular types of 
companies, such as has been observed for small businesses in response to increasing pressures to 
make their CSR communications more explicit (Morsing & Spence, 2019).  Given the variation 
in structure and strategy for MSIs and BLIs, it stands to reason that companies with different 
characteristics (i.e. small and large) would experience them differently.  By explicating such 
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differences we can further our understanding and theorization of different approaches to 
governance.   
 
Next, the findings contribute to a large body of literature on both private governance by 
explicating differences in divergent approaches (Abbott & Snidal, 2010; Bernstein & Cashore, 
2007b; Cashore, 2002; Scherer et al., 2016).  This literature could use the logics framework 
offered here to more robustly explore differences in approaches and outcomes.  One way to do 
this could be from a structural contingency perspective (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999), which has 
been used similarly to theorize about logics in hybrid organizations (Greenwood, Raynard, 
Kodeih, Micelotta, & Lounsbury, 2011).  The scant literatures on comparative PG overall 
represents a compelling avenue for future research.   
 
Implications for Practice  
A common question received by the author is, “which is better – MSIs or BLIs?”.  This is often 
followed by a telling of their normative stance, which, depending on the stakeholder asking, 
unfolds as either: MSIs are the best because they include a broad array of stakeholders, and BLIs 
are bad because they’re run by industry, or, MSIs are exhausting and inefficient, and BLIs provide 
a way to move quickly.  Yet, the findings here do not necessarily bear out in a normative 
conclusion that one mode of organizing is “better” than the other; such a query fails to appreciate 
the purpose of PG.  Rather that ask which mode is “better”, we should be asking, “which mode is 
better for what?”.  In the example, is it better to give a hungry person a fish or a fishing rod?  That 
depends entirely on whether the hunger is due to systemic poverty or temporary bad luck.  The 
same principle applies for PG.  The “better” model depends upon the nature of the sustainability 
challenge itself, the breadth of which can hardly be addressed by a singular mode, model or 
approach.  Different challenges require different solutions, and divergent modes of organizing PG 
offer varied approaches in which to do this.   
 
CONCLUSION 
Business is increasingly tasked with both the responsibility of contributing to social and 
environmental objectives, as well as the provision of PG to address these sustainability matters.  
Collaborative approaches to governance are increasingly touted as the silver bullet to solving 
grand sustainability challenges, yet we know little about why different models exist, how they 
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differ, or the implications thereof.  This study adopted an institutional logics perspective to 
analyze the differing logics of MSIs and BLIs.  In doing to, it makes two primary contributions.  
First, using the case of the MSI Accord and BLI Alliance, it identified and unpacked the differing 
logics of different PG models, showing that MSIs embody a collective logic while BLIs are 
underpinned by a benevolent one.  In doing this, it offered a framework of these differing logics 
which can be used in future analyses.  Second, this paper built on the findings to discuss their 
potential and capabilities for addressing differ types of sustainability challenges.  Guided by their 
logics, MSIs are best suited for addressing broad, systemic issues, while BLIs lend themselves to 
narrowly-defined, output-oriented ones.  Collectively, these answered the paper’s research 
question by identifying how the logics of MSIs and BLIs differed, as well as the implications 
thereof.  Better understanding how the modes of PG vary between the various models furthers our 
understanding of the implications of different approaches, something critical for addressing 
questions about best practices and effectiveness.    
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Paper 3 
A Sheep in Wolf’s Clothing?  
How the Illusion of Hard Law Enacted  
Divergent Approaches to Private Governance 
 
 
Erin Leitheiser 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
After the horrific collapse of the Rana Plaza garment factory in Bangladesh, the resulting private 
governance initiative – the Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh – chose a new tactic 
of using hard law to enforce the (soft) voluntary agreement. But some companies refused to join 
because of it and instead created their own (soft) rival initiative.  Throughout the duration of the 
Accord the “legally binding” mechanism was exercised in only two cases, representing 99% 
compliance.  These polar opposite reactions – extreme aversion or compliance – begs the question: 
how did the inclusion of a “hard” enforcement mechanism affect how companies understood and 
fulfilled their responsibilities?  This paper investigates the novel approach through a sensemaking 
lens, concluding that the strength of the approach was due primarily to the “enactment” of an 
illusion of hard law by member companies.  The paper offers the term “illusory law” to refer to 
the phenomenon, and further contributes to the debate about hard and soft law as ends of a 
spectrum, rather than binary constructs.  Overall, the paper contributes to our practical knowledge 
about how to effectively structure private governance arrangements, as well as our theoretical 
understanding of the powerful role of sensemaking in shaping companies’ behavior.     
164 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Companies engage in CSR globally, yet their efforts are frequently posited as ineffective at best 
or part of a strategy of regulatory avoidance at worst (John Gerard Ruggie, 2017; Steurer, 2010).  
International CSR engagement frequently manifests as private governance which – by its very 
nature as voluntary, non-state driven governance – relies upon “soft” regulation to define 
obligations and specify enforcement (Bernstein & Cashore, 2007a).  However, as the expectations 
and responsibilities of companies to contribute to public goods increases, so too has interest in 
seeking innovative regulatory solutions to compel companies’ assumption of such governance 
tasks (Abbott & Snidal, 2013; Cashore & Stone, 2014).   The purpose of this paper is to explore 
the relationship between novel enforcement approaches to private governance and companies’ 
interpretations of and subsequent behaviors towards them.   
 
When the Rana Plaza factory collapsed in 2013, leaving more than 1,100 dead and 2,500 wounded, 
Western brands and retailers sourcing from Bangladesh were held culpable and therefore expected 
to take on responsibility for ensuring such a tragedy could not happen again.  Intense public 
pressure pushed major brands around the world to sign a private governance agreement to lead 
the reformation of fire and building safety in Bangladesh garment factories: the Accord on Fire 
and Building Safety in Bangladesh (hereafter “the Accord”).  One of the unprecedented features 
of this agreement was the inclusion of an enforcement clause that held companies responsible for 
their commitments in the ‘soft law’ agreement by using “hard law” mechanisms.  This approach 
was heralded by activists as a “major breakthrough” even while the language in the agreement 
was lamented as “vague” by brands.   Indeed, many North American brands walked away and 
created their own rival agreement – The Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety (hereafter “the 
Alliance”) – specifically citing that such a clause left them open to “unlimited legal liability” in a 
litigious society like the U.S; however, such interpretation is hotly disputed.   
 
Yet, over the course of their five-year commitments, both the Accord and Alliance made 
tremendous progress4 in improving the safety of the buildings in which their goods were produced.  
                                                          
4 At the time of writing (early 2019), both the Accord and Alliance had remediated more than 90% of the construction, 
fire and electrical issues at 90% of their factories.  It’s important to note that the sole focuses of both efforts were on 
safety in the factories, addressed via the physical remediation of the fire, electrical, and construction aspects in 
factories, along with the training of workers on safety.  Yet, many scholars criticize the efforts for not accomplishing 
progress in the overall labor movement (Donaghey, Reinecke, Niforou, & Lawson, 2014; Reinecke & Donaghey, 
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For the Accord, it took more than four years into the five-year agreement before the enforcement 
clause was used to escalate instances of alleged non-compliance, and even then the mere two cases 
escalated represented less than 1% of the Accord’s brand members.  The astonishingly high rates 
of factory remediation and brand compliance, coupled with the lack of exercise of the enforcement 
clause, then begs the question: how did the inclusion of a “hard” enforcement mechanism affect 
how companies went about understanding and fulfilling their responsibilities?   
 
This paper seeks to answer this question by adopting a sensemaking perspective to analyze how 
companies’ interpretations of the enforcement clause shaped their behavior.  To do this the study 
draws on data from historical documents (e.g. news stories, CSR reports), the Accord and Alliance 
membership agreements, and more than 40 interviews with actors directly or indirectly involved 
with the Accord or Alliance.  The empirics reveal that actors enacted a much “harder” notion of 
the clause than either legal analyses or observed enforcement actions suggest is actually possible.  
Their enacted reality guided their actions, underscoring that perception can be more powerful than 
reality in shaping actors’ behaviors.  The paper builds upon this notion by introducing the term 
“illusory law” as a way to further explicate notions of “hard” and “soft” law as ends of a spectrum 
and theorize about the implications of “hardening” previously soft, voluntary approaches to 
regulation.  In doing so it concludes that the “hardened” approach may be little more than a sheep 
in wolf’s clothing.   
 
As private governance proliferates as a mode through which companies are increasingly expected 
to contribute to the common good (Scherer et al., 2014), it is of critical importance to understand 
when, why and how companies seek to engage in such activities.  Innovative and novel approaches 
to the organizations and enforcement of governance are ongoing, yet we know little about why 
companies prefer some models of organizing over others.  We may observe empirical differences 
between the types of companies which engage – for example, European and American companies 
opting for different modes of engagement – but we know little about why this is the case.  
Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to use a sensemaking perspective to understand how and 
why companies’ similar interpretation of the Accord’s enforcement clause led them to select 
                                                          
2015a; Scheper, 2017), changing the internal labor standards required by participating firms (Schuessler et al., 2018), 
addressing entrenched structural problems and power dynamics in global sourcing (Alamgir & Banerjee, 2018; B. D. 
Baumann-Pauly, Labowitz, & Banerjee, 2014; Reinecke et al., 2018), or improving working conditions more broadly 
(Koenig-Archibugi, 2017).  However, as these issues were well beyond the scope or intention of the private 
governance initiatives, this paper does not seek to evaluate these or other issues outside of the organizations’ purposes.   
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different private governance models to fulfill their societal responsibilities.  This paper unfolds as 
follows.  First, it explores the trend of voluntary regulation on behalf of businesses and the 
differences between the hard and soft law mechanisms used to facilitate.  Next, it presents 
sensemaking theory and how it relates to private governance.  It then presents the case of the 
Accord before detailing the study’s methodology and data analysis.  Finally, it discusses the 
findings in a broader regulatory context and its theoretical and practical implications.   
 
HARD AND SOFT APPROACHES TO BUSINESS REGULATION  
Businesses engage in private governance for a variety of reasons.  One is an attempt to 
demonstrate their ability to self-regulate, often by making pre-emptive voluntary (“soft”) 
investments in effort to avoid “hard” regulation (Maxwell & Decker, 2006; Steurer, 2010; 
Urpelainen, 2011).  Commonly, this involves the adoption of voluntary standards – “soft law” – 
a trend seen with increasing frequency and complexity (Reinecke, Manning, & von Hagen, 2012).  
This is perhaps best elucidated by the rising trend in competing private standards in any number 
of industries, for example, the Forest Stewardship Council and Sustainable Forestry Initiative in 
forestry and Rainforest Alliance and Fairtrade in coffee.  Indeed, it is the soft and non-binding 
nature of private governance agreements that often makes them attractive for companies.   
 
It is increasingly recognized that hard and soft law are not binary terms, but rather, ends of a 
spectrum which represent their levels of obligation or “bindingness” (Abbott, Keohane, 
Moravcsik, Slaughter, & Snidal, 2000; Åkermark, 2004; Knudsen & Moon, 2017; Doreen 
McBarnet et al., 2007).  Hard law is traditional, legally-binding obligations that typically delegate 
authority for implementation to the state (Abbott & Snidal, 2000), though the degree of coercion 
many vary (Knudsen et al., 2015).  It also tends to be quite precise in terms of compliance and 
potential punishment for non-compliance.  Soft law can represent a ‘weakened’ version of hard 
law, legally non-binding norms, or even “purely political arrangements in which legalization is 
largely absent” (Abbott & Snidal, 2000; Shelton, 2000).  As discussed by Shelton, “Some scholars 
have distinguished hard law and soft law by stating that breach of law gives rise to legal 
consequences while breach of a political norm gives rise to political consequences” (2000, p. 11).  
Some scholars have argued that while  standards like these private governance schemes begin as 
“soft”, they can “harden” over time due to their necessity in securing market access, the potential 
for fallout amongst concerned stakeholders, or ‘technocratic governance’ when governments’ 
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reference private standards in regulation (Gilbert et al., 2011).  While the first two arguments 
explicate how soft law standards become increasingly prevalent, legitimized and therefore 
potentially give rise to tangible marketplace consequences, only the third represents a true 
“hardening” in the legal sense.  The “concept of legalization” has been argued to be comprised of 
varying degrees of obligation, precision and delegation (Abbott et al., 2000), spectrums which 
ultimately define the “hardness” or “softness” of law.  The harder the law, the more binding it is.   
 
Given that soft law can fall outside of the state’s authority entirely, scholars have used the term to 
refer to a form of self-regulation that operates without a governmental power (Scherer & Palazzo, 
2011).  According to Scherer and Palazzo, “self-regulation by soft law is characterized by 
voluntary action (low level of obligation), imprecise rules, and delegation of authority to non state 
actors” (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011, p. 912).  However, this is not to suggest that governments do 
not play a key role in shaping companies’ CSR activities (Gond et al., 2011).  Indeed, as discussed 
in further detail below, the Accord invoked the power of the state to harden its enforcement 
mechanism, an indication that  a new relationship between CSR and government may be emerging 
(Eberlein, Abbott, Black, Meidinger, & Wood, 2014).   
 
Enforceability is a key aspect of regulation – whether hard or soft law – and accordingly is 
distinguished from compliance.  Typically, private governance relies upon normative steering to 
insight compliance.  According to Rasche (2010, p. 503) private governance represents “non-
hierarchical modes [which] exercise governance based on the voluntary commitment of 
participating organizations.”  Enforcement of voluntary agreements and standards therefore relies 
upon deliberation and mutual agreement between parties with a view to ensure a fair and level 
playing field for all parties whom wish to enjoy the certification, label, access, or other benefit 
bequeathed by the initiative.  Such governance arrangements and standards may even create or 
amend institutions by constructing normative networks “…which are the interorganizational 
connections through which practices become normatively sanctioned and which form the relevant 
peer group with respect to normative compliance, monitoring and evaluation” (Thomas B. 
Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006, pp. 224–225).  Herein we observe that adherence to soft law rules 
set forth by private governance initiatives or the institutions that they create is enforced via 
normative steering and indirect sanctioning, like by expulsion from the initiative or naming-and-
shaming.  Hard law, in contrast, relies upon direct sanctioning from governmental authorities to 
enforce compliance.  At times public enforcement may be used to facilitate compliance with 
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private governance, but to do so it is a basic precondition that the soft law violation “falls within 
the scope of the authority’s competence and jurisdiction” (Verbruggen, 2013, p. 518).  However, 
it is rare for violations to fall both within the boundaries of private and public regulation, given 
that the former is often created to supplement the latter.  Therefore, from a compliance 
perspective, delegation and enforcement is seemingly as dichotomous as the public or private 
authority from which said rules stem.  As new forms of regulation emerge which utilize novel 
enforcement approaches, it becomes increasingly important to understand the interplay of hard 
and soft law.  
 
SENSEMAKING & ENACTMENT 
Change is inherently about noticing differences in one’s “normal” environment.  It necessitates 
the identification of abnormalities and comparing them to one’s expectations.  As the differential 
between these increases, so does the degree to which actors must work to understand them.   
Actors do this, in part, by undergoing simplification – an attempt to make a new or complex issue 
easier to understand – by relating it to past events or knowledge (Jennings & Greenwood, 2003).  
Yet, interpreting and searching for meaning is rarely done in isolation; actors frequently take 
action as part of their attempts to make sense of their violated expectations.  As repeated countless 
times throughout Weick’s book (2001), the phrase “How can I know what I think until I see what 
I say?” illustrates how action contributes to the production of meaning while also generating 
additional points for interpretation.  Actors’ efforts and cognitions which are brought to bear 
during the course of noticing, responding to, and developing explanations of changes represents 
sensemaking.  Thus, “sensemaking is about the interplay of action and interpretation rather than 
the influence of evaluation on choice” (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005, p. 409).  A key tenet 
of sensemaking is that actors actively help construct their “realities” which they then must 
retrospectively make sense of (A. D. Brown, Colville, & Pye, 2015).  Actors organize to make 
sense of flux, then enact that sense in order to make the world more orderly (Weick et al., 2005).    
 
Sensemaking plays an important element in how and why actors exercise agency that ultimately 
“enacts” their reality.  It is a multi-stage process that begins with ecological change, representing 
the deviations from normal – such as crises – which may not align with actors’ expectations, thus 
inducing the need for sensemaking (Maitlis & Christianson, 2014).  Actors notice changes and 
“bracket” information into simplified groupings or frames, which begins to provide meaning and 
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a “mental model” from which to understand and act.  Changes may continue to occur in the 
environment, as well as external inputs into those changes, which compels ongoing updating to 
the noticing, bracketing, and simplification.  Then, the real work of sensemaking begins: 
enactment.  Enactment is both a process – enactment – as well as a product – an enacted 
environment – which emerges because when actors respond they “often produce structures, 
constraints, and opportunities that were not there before they took action” (Weick, 2001, p. 225).  
These actions and cognitions answer actors’ question, “What’s the story here?” and “Now what?” 
(Weick, 2009; Weick et al., 2005).        
 
Yet, enactment represents only the beginning of orderliness in what is otherwise a state of flux.  
Multiple meanings may have been created by actors (Maitlis & Sonenshein, 2010), which then 
need to be narrowed down to articulate a plausible story or answer through selection.  Those 
retrospective cues which proved most salient during enactment justifies the prior interpretation 
and actions (Weick, 2001).  Preconceptions and existing frames form the foundation for the 
bracketing of elements, which then serve as the basis for acting on the elements, which frequently 
lead to a self-referential process whereby action confirms the preconceptions on which bracketing 
was based (Figge, 2014).  In this way, actors “enact” and “select” their own realities, consistent 
with their existing frames of reference.  The most plausible stories which result from this process 
are retained as in organizational memories as a learning process (Weick, 2001).  This retention 
represents the outcome of sensemaking, the enacted environment.  “Sensemaking thus involves 
not merely interpretation and meaning production but the active authoring of the situations in 
which reflexive actors are embedded and are attempting to comprehend…[I]dentities and social 
worlds are concomitantly referenced and fabricated.” (A. D. Brown et al., 2015, p. 267).  Retention 
refers to the substantiation of the plausible – but tentative and provisional – explanation brought 
forward by actors in their sensemaking process, reinforced through feedback.  This may, for 
example, take the form of self-reinforcement and rationalizations or the noticing of reinforcing 
cues in the external environment, such as replication elsewhere.   
 
It’s important to note that the realities enacted and selected by actors need not be factually true so 
long as they are convincing.  In this way, “fictions” can play a role in organizations and their 
sensemaking.  Sensemaking is both about interpreting cues in the here-and-now, but also 
extrapolating about what they might mean for the future.  “Fictionality” has been used to describe 
the role of imagined futures in organizations, which serve as the anchor for actors to organize their 
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activities (Beckert, 2013).  Yet, these can simultaneously also be an additional source of 
uncertainty through the “plethora of possible imaginaries” which they bring about (Beckert, 2013, 
p. 222).  The “realities” that actors enact – particularly within organizations – may be self-
fulfilling prophecies, as these imagined futures shape the actions and subsequent interpretations 
of actors whom seek stability and certainty in understanding their changed environment (Weick, 
1995, p. 53).  Much research has explored the role of “fictions” in organizations, arguing that 
fiction is constitutive of organizations themselves, which must be imagine and made sense of 
(Savage, Cornelissen, & Franck, 2018).   
 
Thus, sensemaking theory provides an effective frame through which to evaluate actors’ grappling 
with an uncertain environment.  Their cognitions and actions – when taken together – can help to 
determine what is “real” versus what might be “illusion” or “fiction”, what was existing in the 
environment versus what was their own creation.  When applied in the context of novel 
enforcement mechanisms, it can tell us a great deal about how and why actors comply (or not) 
with efforts that represent a change from the norm.  While this perspective can help explain the 
empirical phenomenon and its implications, the empirics, in turn, can also help further our 
understanding of the sensemaking process.  The case calls attention to the nuances which can arise 
when actors “enact” something similarly, but then draw upon different frames to inform their 
selection and retention, ultimately resulting in divergent enacted environments.   
 
METHODOLOGY 
This qualitative study is rooted in the empirical phenomenon of the Accord’s novel approach to 
enforcement, with the theoretical frame and findings arising abductively from the data, primarily 
interviews.  First, the case of the Accord and its enforcement mechanism are presented before 
describing the study’s approach to data collection and analysis.   
 
Case Presentation: The Accord on Fire & Building Safety in Bangladesh 
In densely-populated Bangladesh, construction climbs upward, often with shoddily built, 
illegally-constructed stories built atop each other on building foundations never intended for such 
load.  In the Dhaka suburb of Savar stood the Rana Plaza complex, one of these types of buildings, 
which housed a bank and office space on its lower floors and several garment factories on its 
upper floors.  So, when large cracks appeared in the structural columns on 22 April 2013, the 
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building was evacuated.  However, the next morning, whilst the commercial spaces on the bottom 
floor remained vacated, garment workers were forced back into their factories, being told falsely 
that necessarily repairs had been completed, and that they would lose their entire month’s pay if 
they didn’t.  Reluctantly, they returned.  Just hours later, the entire complex collapsed, tragically 
killing more than 1,100 garment workers and injuring more than twice as many more.  The 
accident sent shockwaves around the world.   
 
The Rana Plaza collapse happened not long after a series of other lethal accidents plagued 
Bangladesh’s RMG factories (Hasan et al., 2017).  A voluntary initiative amongst brands to help 
address these types of issues had been underway for some time, yet failed to gain traction until 
after the Rana Plaza tragedy (Clean Clothes Campaign, 2013a).  It was this prior agreement which 
first incorporated its novel enforcement clause.  But, the agreement stipulated that to come into 
effect it needed the support of four brand signatories, and despite months of efforts from trade 
unions and advocacy organizations, it could only secure two: PVH (parent company of brands 
Calvin Klein and Tommy Hilfiger, among others) and Tchibo.  Gap (U.S.) and H&M (Sweden) 
were also at the negotiating table for the agreement, but declined to sign it at this stage (Bair et 
al., 2017).  Then, after the collapse of Rana Plaza, it was quickly updated to become the Accord.  
After enormous pressure from labor and advocacy organizations, brands began to sign on quickly 
(Reinecke & Donaghey, 2015a), reaching 31 brands initially and growing to more than 220 by the 
end of its five-year tenure.   
 
The provisions of the Accord represented a major expansion in the roles and responsibilities of 
the signatory companies and proved innovative in both substance and governance.  They included 
novel, game-changing content-related provisions which required brands to sustain sourcing 
volumes, cease production as factories which didn’t remediate, maintain responsibility for 
factories even if they no longer sourced from them, and to serve as a “lead brand” – responsible 
for remediation oversight – in a number of factories proportional to the brand’s production in 
Bangladesh, and to do it all before the agreement expired in 2018.  From a governance perspective, 
the Accord positioned labor and brands as equals by affording them equal representation and 
power on its steering committee, and placed a representative from the International Labor 
Organization (ILO) as a neutral chair.  However, it was the Accord’s enforcement mechanism that 
proved to be the most novel; enforcement could culminate in international binding arbitration in 
the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague, and any awards resulting thereof subject to 
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enforcement in the courts of their home countries.  Notwithstanding the variety of interactions 
between public and private regulation, the Accord’s approach stood out as a new and novel 
development by using hard law to enforce soft law.  This led to the Accord proclaiming itself as 
“legally binding” (Accord, 2015, p. 5).  Whilst trade unions were the delegated enforcers under 
the terms of the Accord, responsible for monitoring brands’ progress (or lack thereof), they did so 
by relying upon government – or the threat of governmental involvement – to compel compliance, 
even without government’s express participation in the Accord itself.  This reliance-without-
involvement highlights how the Accord’s unique structure, composition and approach exemplifies 
the need to better understand the spectrum of bindingness of hard and soft law approaches in 
private governance.  As well, the observed empirics collected throughout the study and presented 
in the findings section demonstrate the powerful nature of the approach through the illusions it 
created which in turn shaped companies’ actions.  As presented later, these illusions shaped the 
behaviors of companies which joined the Accord, and also caused the major North American 
companies to walk away and create their own private governance initiative, the Alliance.  The 
combination of the theoretically- and empirically-driven questions resulting demonstrate the 
importance of understanding these issues in both theory and practice.   
 
Legal Basis of the Accord  
Before exploring how the Accord’s enforcement mechanism was perceived, it is first important 
to understand the “facts” of its legal context.  A frequently overlooked aspect of the Accord is that 
it was rooted in contract (civil) law.  Whilst the Accord is conventionally referred to as a single 
agreement – even in this very paper – with 220+ “members” or “signatories”, the Accord was 
actually executed via 220+ individual contracts between brands and one of the governing trade 
unions of the Accord (IndustriALL Global Union).  The contract itself was uniform and non-
negotiable – lending credibility to the common terminology lumping all signatories together under 
a single “agreement”– but represents a key difference in its legal method: contract law.   
 
Its prescribed enforcement approach, and implications thereof, were detailed in Article 5 of the 
Accord agreement, which stated that any disputes were to be brought to the Steering Committee 
for a decision.  As detailed previously, the Steering Committee was governed in equal proportion 
by brands and labor, thereby balancing the interests in adjudication. Should either party disagree, 
the Steering Committee’s decision could be appealed to a “final and binding arbitration process” 
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and “any arbitration award” resulting thereof “enforceable in a court of law of the domicile” of 
the offender (Accord, 2013, p. 2).  The full text of the Accord’s “dispute resolution” clause can 
be found in Appendix 1.   
 
For a “legal” clause, Article 5 is vague, an aspect that proved critical in the sensemaking process, 
detailed below.  Accordingly, it also prompted many expert parties to offer further analysis and 
reflection on the provision.  One of these analyses noted that it was the power granted to home 
country courts to enforce a potential arbitration award which U.S. retailers saw as problematic, 
but clarified that the role for domestic courts is only to enforce the outcome of binding arbitration, 
rather than adjudicate on the dispute or the Accord agreement itself (Hayes et al., 2013, p. 8).  
UNI Global – one of the Accord’s labor signatories – sought to quell fears about potential 
litigation after many of the large U.S. brands cited the Accord’s legal structure as too risky in their 
legal system.  UNI Global stated that they have given the brands: 
…every assurance that this Accord does not expose them to any litigation in the U.S. 
courts, apart from the possible enforcement of an arbitration award, which is a seldom 
used but important assurance that arbitration awards will be respected. … There is no 
right to third party litigation. There are no class actions, or punitive damages or fines 
made possible by this Accord (quoted in Hayes et al., 2013).   
Here we can see that courts would only be involved in the (rare) circumstance of needing to 
enforce an arbitration award.  To help provide additional clarity on the matter, Worker Rights 
Consortium issued a report which argued that the Accord was simply a contract, a legal 
arrangement which companies regularly utilize throughout the normal course of business (Hensler 
& Blasi, 2013). Given this structure, the report concluded that the Accord did not increase the 
liability of member firms.   
 
Seeming, the heralded “legally binding” nature of the Accord agreement was not as reliant upon 
hard law as it implied.  Indeed, empirically, neither of the two cases which escalated as far as 
arbitration actually underwent arbitration, much less progressed as far as home court enforcement.  
Instead, deals were negotiated between brands and unions moments before the arbitration hearings 
were set to begin (Interview Data).  Yet, even with assurances and legal analyses, the dispute 
resolution clause was enacted as something quite different for brands, which culminated in 
differing actions and justifications for Accord and Alliance members.   
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The unique approach of the Accord can be seen as a change in the institutional environment, 
serving as the foci from which actors had to make sense of the change.   Actors had to reconcile 
what was typically connoted by a private governance arrangement – something that was typically 
a friendly, multi-stakeholder partnership – with the new reality of introducing legal enforceability 
exercised by members policing one another.  In terms of reference points, a legally binding 
agreement seem more like regulation, and therefore something that must be complied with, lest 
the company be subject to consequences (penalties).  The findings section explores how actors 
responded to and enacted a reality for themselves that conjectured the Accord more as hard law 
than soft, even while the reality of the enforcement clause fell quite short of that.   
 
Data Collection  
This study uses multiple data sources to investigate the confluence of hard and soft law by drawing 
upon the case of the Accord.  Interviews comprised a key task in data collection, and 41 interviews 
with 36 unique individuals from 30 different organizations were conducted.  Interviews were 
conducted with Accord brand signatories (n=23, 10% of members), as well as Alliance members 
(n=8, 29% of members), given that the Alliance was created – as demonstrated in the empirics – 
principally because of the Accord’s enforcement clause.  Others interviewed include NGOs and 
trade unions (n=13), the public sector (n=1), as well as representatives of the Accord and Alliance 
organizations (n=6).  Some individuals – such as Accord leadership and highly-involved brands 
– were interviewed twice, at least one year apart.  In other cases, multiple people from the same 
organization were interviewed.  Some of the questions and information were sensitive, so results 
have been anonymized.  Interviews were conducted throughout 2016 and 2017, with some follow-
up interviews occurring in 2018.  Interviews adopted a semi-structured interview guide that was 
abductively updated between interviews to incorporate and reflect findings, themes, and other 
issues that may have arisen from the previous interviews.  Interview questions for Accord 
members focused on if and how the legally binding nature caused them to take different decisions 
or actions, as well as their reflections on implications for other companies, the Accord, and future 
private governance efforts.  For Alliance members, interviews sought to understand the role of 
the enforcement clause in the creation of the Alliance, and why it was seen as problematic given 
the litany of assurances otherwise.  All interviews were fully recorded and substantive portions 
transcribed, which produced more than 43 hours of audio recordings and approximately 900 pages 
of single-space transcripts.   
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Related documents have also been obtained for analysis.  This includes organizational-generated 
documents – such as NGO reports, company press releases, CSR reports and the like – as well as 
news articles and reports.  The documents targeted and used in the study have been used to conduct 
background research in preparation for the interviews, to document companies’ “official” views 
and perspectives on applicable matters, and investigate their framing of their engagements and 
efforts.  Governmental filings like lobbying disclosures, court (arbitration) documents, legislation, 
and other official documents have also been collected to better understand the implications of the 
Accord’s enforcement clause and related actions.   
 
In addition, the author has also had countless informal conversations with many actors involved 
in the Accord, including lawyers and legal experts, factory owners, NGO employees, trade union 
representatives, buyers, and more.  These opportunities – coupled with collecting data on the 
ground in Bangladesh – have helped provide additional context, grounding and insider knowledge 
of the operations and sentiments surrounding the Accord and Alliance.  The author wrote field 
memos based on many of these encounters, which both contributed to the findings of the study, 
as well as played an active role in its abductive approach; learnings from one interview, interaction 
or experience was used to approach the next with heightened knowledge and nuance.   
 
Data Analysis  
The data analysis employed a cross-case analysis approach – comparing and contrasting the 
sensemaking of Accord and Alliance members – and three rounds of abductive coding using 
NVivo software (Miles & Huberman, 1994).  The first round of coding identified “descriptive” 
codes for the data, labels which require little to no interpretation.  Example codes from this 
analysis include “unclear”, “legally binding as obstacle” and “greenwashing”.  These and other 
first-order, descriptive codes sought to code the data as presented by the respondent, with little to 
no interpretation required.  This stage was purely inductive.  All told, the study produced 158 
unique first order codes, 73 of which fell within the scope of this analysis.  The second round of 
coding – consistent with the study’s overall abductive approach – grouped descriptive codes into 
“interpretive” ones, which sought to interpret the data with sensemaking theory in mind.  These 
resulted in interpretive codes such as “signing under pressure” and “walking away from the 
Accord”.  The final round of coding – “pattern” codes – aimed to explain the data in light of the 
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applicable theory and framework used in the analysis: sensemaking.  A full coding tree detailing 
these three levels of analysis can be found in Appendix 2.  The full analysis that follows organizes 
and presents the data first ordered within the sensemaking framework (ecological change, 
enactment, selection, retention), and then by the interpretive codes derived from the analysis.  
Given the need to focus the data presentation and length, data does not appear for all first order, 
descriptive codes.      
 
FINDINGS: THE ENACTMENT OF AN ILLUSION  
The Accord’s novel enforcement approach of drawing upon hard law to enforce its soft agreement 
made for an uncertain environment, triggering sensemaking.  As actors drew upon existing frames 
in their environment, Accord and Alliance members interpreted the clause similarly, yet chose 
very different actions as a result.  Interestingly, both justified and retained their own version of 
the Accord’s reality (self-fulfilling prophecies), highlighting the need to better understand how 
and why sensemaking can differ so greatly.   
 
Ecological Change  
It is important to underscore what was fundamentally different about the Accord to understand 
how and why it triggered a sensemaking process in the first place.  The Bangladesh garment 
industry had a long history of safety problems, particularly due to fire and structural integrity 
failures, which were well known by the brands and retailers sourcing from that market.  But, the 
scale of the Rana Plaza disaster shifted responsibility to buying companies, as discussed 
previously.  While companies have a long history of addressing crises via “soft” CSR solutions, 
the Accord represented something qualitatively different.  The use of hard law to enforce soft law 
stood as a discrepancy to what was otherwise a typical CSR solution.  It was therefore the 
Accord’s enforcement mechanism that represented the ecological change for companies, inducing 
the sensemaking process.  The empirics revealed the multi-faceted dimensionality of this 
ecological change, manifest through the rhetoric touting the Accord as a “breakthrough”, its novel 
provisions and approach, and concurrent vague language which compounded the uncertainty.    
 
The Accord as a Breakthrough   
The shifts in responsibility sparked by Rana Plaza created the public will necessary to push brands 
into signing the Accord, which quickly became the new benchmark for corporate responsibility.  
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As one brand noted, “The Accord was built based on the accident of Rana Plaza, which signified 
the need that we [as brands] need to do even more.”  This was echoed by many other brands, 
whom also told of how the Accord “has increased our awareness that there is no end to the 
responsibility we have in sourcing countries.”  The expectation of what it meant to be a 
responsible brand had changed, and the Accord stood as the new standard for responsibility in the 
Bangladesh garment industry.  Indeed, this normative shift has also been echoed in academia 
(Haar & Keune, 2014).   
 
Second, the rhetoric surrounding the Accord quickly changed the normative perceptions of it.  
Virtually all accounts of the Accord heralded it as positive step forward for the RMG industry in 
Bangladesh, primarily due to its unprecedented scope and enforceability.  Mainstream media 
headlines turned favorable for companies – “Doing the right thing: when ethics beats 
compliance” (Reuters, 2013) – and even the skeptical advocacy organization Clean Clothes 
Campaign celebrated when the Accord finally came into effect by issuing a statement, “’We made 
it!’ Global Breakthrough as Retail Brands sign up to Bangladesh Factory Safety Deal” (Clean 
Clothes Campaign, 2013b).  The enthusiasm resulted in no small part from the normative stance 
that the Accord itself was a breakthrough.  At an industry event on a panel titled “Bangladesh Fire 
and Safety Accord: A New Standard in Global Framework Agreements?” one of the panelists 
called the Accord “one of the most significant breakthroughs,” on that is “radically different” 
and that needs to be emulated (Ryan, 2013).  Interviewees who participated in the research almost 
universally agreed that the Accord was a breakthrough, with one brand summing it up as “very 
unique and something we have never seen before” and a labor representative stating “The Accord 
is qualitatively different from any other agreement you have had before.” A report by the 
International Labor Office and Global Labor University echoes this sentiment, stating that the 
Accord is:  
…the first initiative in the history of industrial relations where all the related stakeholder 
of a certain global value chain took responsibility for workers’ safety and rights in a 
legally binding agreement.  That is why, after its formulation, researchers and labour 
rights experts dubbed it a ‘major breakthrough’ and ‘game changer’ in establishing safety 
and labor standards in global apparel value networks (Khan & Wichterich, 2015, pp. 11–
12).   
Such sentiments were also conveyed by research respondents involved with the Accord.  “One of 
the most important aspects is the legally binding nature of the Accord, which is a really a 
breakthrough in the CSR space.”  Indeed, the rhetoric surrounding the Accord signaled to brands 
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and the world that it was new and different, thereby cuing the need to make sense of what such a 
“breakthrough” meant.   
 
Novel, Legally Binding Approach  
As the Accord developed and brands were pressed to sign, companies had to face and make sense 
of the qualms they had with the original MOU: its enforcement mechanism.   
“They [labor] of course tried to pressure us [to sign the original MOU], to which we said, 
‘Look, you have to rephrase everything if we’re going to sign this.’  And then Rana Plaza 
happened and we ended up signing anyway.  It wasn’t because we didn’t care about the 
fires or anything; it was just that this document is really not something you, as a company, 
ought to sign if you have legal advice.” 
The legal aspect stood out to brands and others as the primary difference between the Accord and 
existing norms for collaborative action in the industry.  As one brand put it:  
“Of course there has always been an expectation…that companies take care of their 
[supply] chain.  So, the expectation has not changed, but what has, is the legal obligation 
that they have signed up to.” 
The legally binding approach – seemingly a first in the CSR world – proved to be the greatest 
change to which actors had to make sense.   
 
Overall, Rana Plaza and the resultant Accord can be seen as crisis or unexpected event which 
stimulates actors to make sense of the changes (Maitlis & Christianson, 2014).  Rana Plaza incited 
a shift in whom was held responsible for the safety problems in the industry, which lead to the 
development of the latent MOU into the Accord.  Due to its enforcement provision, the Accord 
was heralded as a breakthrough, and as such, set a new benchmark for corporate responsibility.  
And, as a new and different approach, it cued the beginning of actors’ sensemaking process.  At 
the same time that Rana Plaza and the legally-binding breakthrough of the Accord came to the 
fore, further externalities also contributed to the abnormalities and flux that brands needed 
reconcile.   
 
Vague Language  
One of the frequently lamented points by brands was the vague and unclear language used to 
specify the obligations of brands under the Accord.  While several of its provisions were unsavory 
to brands – particularly the language around maintaining sourcing volumes and ensuring the 
179 
 
financial feasibility of remediation – it was the enforcement clause that seemed to cause the 
greatest headache.  One brand representative explained, “it is extremely difficult to just sign up 
for something if you have no idea what the legal requirements are” and another pointed out that 
the confusion was widespread, stating: 
“It took a while to understand exactly what we signed, because it’s a legal document that 
we signed.  We had a lot of conversations with other colleagues in the industry, so we were 
not alone.  …It was difficult for us to understand how it affected our responsibilities.” 
Yet, seemingly, the Accord’s vague approach actually was intentional.  According to a non-brand 
respondent whom was involved with the crafting of the document:  
“It was purposefully phrased in a slightly vague manner in order to get brands to sign on 
to it. …Unclear language is what can get people to sign, because we can pretend that it is 
this way, and they can pretend it is that way, and then everybody is happy.” 
This was a perspective held within companies as well, as one brand reported, “It’s very vague.  
The legal department at my company said it’s a legal document, but because it’s so open, they 
don’t know what would actually happen in arbitration.”  The unclear nature of the language made 
it difficult for brands and others to understand their obligations.  However, the unclear nature of 
the language was not always met with sympathy, as one proponent of the Accord recalled, “In the 
beginning there was some crocodile tears, I thought.  But certainly some provisions were in need 
of clarification, that’s for sure.”  The lack of clarity furthered the need for sensemaking whilst 
also increasing the likely range of interpretations by different stakeholders.   
“Brands interpret it one way, and the unions interpret it in another way.  It’s very vague, 
so no one really knows what we’re supposed to do so that’s all open for interpretation.” 
Yet, for those in support of companies’ signing on, its vague language was an attribute.  All told, 
the vague nature of the Accord generally and its enforcement mechanism specifically underscore 
the need for sensemaking.   
 
Enactment  
As they grappled with the new expectations and responsibilities thrust upon them – and in 
particular, the mandate to sign on to the “legally binding” Accord – brands had to determine how 
to react.  The sensemaking perspective holds that actors must take action in order to understand 
and order their environment, and the activities in which they engage to do this serve as the 
reference point for their sensemaking.  For this case, enactment represents the actions that brands 
and other stakeholders took vis-à-vis the “legally binding” nature of the Accord. While additional 
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cues also factored into their process – via “ongoing updating” – enactment is the “action” or the 
“making” (Weick, 1995, pp. 37, 30).  Practically, this meant that brands needed to sign the Accord 
or not, a determination made based upon their cognitive frames which shaped their understanding 
of the enforcement clause.  If they did not join the Accord, they had to determine an alternative 
route for meeting the heightened expectations thrust upon them.   
 
Signing Under Pressure   
Despite the Accord’s vague nature which seemed to compound the already abnormal post-crisis 
environment, stakeholders simultaneously exerted significant pressure on companies to sign it.  
As one non-brand respondent reported:  
“A fair number of companies have said ‘Yeah, we signed this with a gun to our heads.  We 
just had to sign it.’  Some of these CSR staff or legal advisors said they would advise 
against signing it, but that the CEO would say ‘Stop it. Just sign it.  This is a big 
reputational issues at the moment.  We cannot not sign it.’  So there have been near riots.  
There have been fights with the brands in the beginning saying, ‘What the hell did we sign 
up to?!’” 
Apparently, the reputational issues at stake after Rana Plaza trumped brands’ desire for clarity 
and softer legal language.  As one brand recounted: 
“I talk a lot with our legal advisor and he’s like, ‘God, why did you sign this?  You’re 
crazy!’  I said, ‘Yeah, you should have been there.’  I mean, *laughs* we didn’t do it 
because we’re good-hearted or anything.  We were pressured to do this!” 
The pressure exerted by external stakeholders proved overwhelming and decisive in the face of 
an unclear agreement.   
 
Whilst the majority of the companies included in this research did express the feeling of pressure, 
a few also stated that they were happy to sign the Accord.  H&M – quick to point out that it was 
the Accord’s first signatory – stated that “For us, we wanted to go on board with the strictest 
agreement because we want to really see improvements.” This too demonstrates an enactment of 
sensemaking; H&M had been one of the brands which negotiated the original MOU prior to Rana 
Plaza but refused to sign it, yet the company determined that the Accord was the best path after.  
Herein we can see the power of ecological change in altering firms’ cues and actions, and 
consequently, their enactment.   
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Walking Away from the Accord  
Whilst many brands – at least the European ones – signed up for the Accord, many North 
American brands grappled with the terms of the Accord vis-à-vis their domestic legal systems.  
“U.S. brands consider everything very carefully from a legal perspective.  They have much more 
of a legal entry point,” explained one respondent, while another articulated the kinds of questions 
being asked by American companies:  
“There are different rules and regulations in the US.  If they do not live up to this, what 
will it mean for the company? Could someone sue them?  They have a completely different 
[liability] culture. So maybe it was necessary for them [to walk away].”  
North American companies tend to view initiatives like the Accord through a liability lens, a very 
different perspective than that of most European brands.   
 
Conversations around the degree of liability induced by the Accord were front-and-center in the 
debate about whether or not to sign the Accord, as recounted by one member of the Alliance.  
“We were very concerned that there is unlimited legal liability for companies that sign the 
Accord.  And the unions were unwilling to limit that liability.  Then the structure that is 
set up from a legal and governance perspective is that if there is a disagreement amongst 
the companies and the other parties, there would be an arbitration litigation structure that 
we felt was not responsible for us to sign up to.”  
The prominent role afforded to labor also served as a key friction point for the eventual members 
of the Alliance, as demonstrated here and throughout many of the interviews conducted with 
Alliance members.  But, it was the structure of the agreement via its enforcement clause that 
empowered labor to enforce the agreement upon brands which brands deemed the most 
problematic. As this company and others noted, the perception of liability – while demonstrated 
earlier to not be an actual issue – caused them to deem the Accord irresponsible for their business. 
Herein we can see how fictions or illusions – not grounded in empirical reality – can be enacted 
and dominant actors’ frames and justifications.  Indeed, they viewed the inclusion of the 
enforcement clause as counterproductive.   
“We wanted a nimble organization that addressed the specific needs related to workers’ 
safety that existed within the country.  And in some ways we saw the legally binding 
element an impediment to that.” 
Therefore, their “enactment” of the legal clause as a source of “unlimited legal liability” 
culminated in their creation of the Alliance.  The Alliance shared the same broad goals as the 
Accord but did so through an industry-centric model with limited liability.  The illusion conjured 
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by North American brands led them to enact an environment where the Accord equated unlimited 
liability, thereby necessitating the creation of the Alliance.   
 
Selection  
As actors enacted their responses to the Accord, the next step in their sensemaking process was 
to understand their enactment and winnow outstanding flux.  If enactment is about engaging in 
activities which serve as the locus for evaluating changes, selection is about the simplification and 
reorganization of cues in actors’ environments and articulating interpretations in alignment with 
their mental models.  Which cues and feedback are relevant?  Do the actions taken make sense 
vis-à-vis the changed environment?  Which explanation the most plausible?  To do this, actors 
reflect upon past experiences in effort to narrow the scope and interpret the changes.  These 
reflections provide clues which can reduce the possible meanings accounting for the changes, 
typically reinforcing actions already taken, self-fulfilling prophecies.   
 
Differing Legal Environments  
The largest chasm in this case appeared between North American and European brands and their 
different conceptions about what it means to be “legally binding”, and the realities that they 
enacted accordingly.  These differences explain why the majority of the North American brands 
walked away and created the Alliance.  An Accord member provided perspective on the stark 
differences in membership between the two initiatives, citing differences in legal interpretations 
as the plausible explanation.   
“[The] arbitrary court element…probably also explains why it was so difficult to get 
American brands to join.  They would see it much more in the US-legal context, that the 
moment you assume formal responsibility people will take you to court, and not just the 
arbitrary court.  So I can understand why it is difficult for them to join [the Accord].”  
North American companies – particularly those from the U.S. – tend to synonymize “legal” with 
“liability”.  When coupled with the litigious environment of the U.S., the Accord was then 
interpreted not simply as a binding contract with provisions that could be enforced, but rather, a 
mechanism which could be used to open companies up to lawsuits and liability more broadly.  
When asked about the differences between the two initiatives during the press conference 
launching the Alliance, Jay Jorgenson, Walmart’s Global Chief Compliance Officer and counsel 
representative for the Alliance stated:  
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“I would say the main difference – the reason we couldn’t sign the Accord – is Europe has 
a different legal environment than we do in the United States and Canada, and the Accord 
had some provisions that, in the way the U.S. and Canadian legal system work, would 
subject us to potential unlimited legal liability and litigation.  And I want to tell you, I 
really respect the companies here in the room that have put up thus far – I think it’s $146 
million – to fix the situation in Bangladesh.  We don’t want one dollar of that to go to 
lawyers.  We want every cent of that to go to the factories.” 
In addition to citing the legal system as justification for not signing the Accord, the Alliance also 
strongly insinuated that the Accord’s enforcement mechanism would divert funds from factory 
improvements.  Regardless of its voracity, the claims made by the Alliance reaffirmed their frames 
of the Accord’s enforcement clause as synonymous with “unlimited legal liability”.  One 
respondent elaborated on some of the other potential drawbacks of the Accord’s enforcement 
mechanism.   
“Large U.S. companies signed the Alliance first and foremost because of the North 
American litigation system, but secondarily, when you’re the general counsel or the CEO 
or the CFO of a public company, to sign your company up for unlimited liability is, in my 
opinion, malpractice.  Literally.”   
Interpretations of what the Accord meant – unlimited legal liability – therefore carried negative 
implications not just for the companies, but potentially also further implications for themselves, 
factories, and potentially others.  The cognitive frames between European and American 
companies therefore served as an important differentiation for these companies, demonstrative of 
the power of sensemaking; American brands equated the enforceability of the Accord with gross 
liability, while European brands did not.  Alliance brands therefore reasoned and reinforced their 
actions by purporting an illusion of the worst case scenario.   
 
A handful of North American brands did sign the Accord, but they were the exception rather than 
the rule5.  Referring to the legal environment in the U.S., one respondent explained:  
“That’s why you see that most U.S. companies – certainly most U.S. public companies – 
have signed onto the Alliance and not the Accord, with a few exceptions because there are 
a few people who had either business or political reasons to either choose the Accord or 
to choose both.” 
                                                          
5 22 U.S. brands and 2 Canadian brands were members of the Accord by its closure in 2018.  These were largely 
small brands, and collectively represented about 11% of the Accord’s membership.  In contrast, while the Alliance 
had only 27 members by its end, together they represented more than 80% of apparel imports from Bangladesh to 
North America.   
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The cognition and motivations of those North American brands which “crossed over” to the 
Accord was therefore explained as not having to do with their interpretation of what “legal” 
means, but rather, due to other reasons.  Those “crossover” brands were primarily small firms, 
and therefore unlikely to be scrutinized as intensively as their larger counterparts, as well as PVH 
and Fruit of the Loom; PVH had been an original signatory to the preceding MOU and has a long 
history of working collaboratively with organized labor, while Fruit of the Loom originally joined 
the Alliance but was pressured by customers of its university business to also sign on to the Accord 
later (Interview Data).  These factors, coupled with their comparatively small proportion of 
Bangladesh imports to the American markets, help explain these as outliers rather than conflictual.   
 
Benefits of a Binding Agreement  
Many Accord members, on the other hand, took a different view of the matter.  For them, many 
actually saw the legally binding nature as a positive aspect.  This stands in sharp contrast to the 
softer, less binding form of the Alliance as a way to promote factory safety.  With the Alliance, 
“you sign on to a lot less.  You sign onto improving safety, but it is not as binding as the Accord.”  
This “binding” nature was seen as a key aspect in the agreement’s effectiveness.  “The Accord is 
much more binding and much more ambitious in what you sign on to, which absolutely [affects 
its progress and achievements].”  The Accord’s ability to produce results was credited by many 
to its enforcement mechanism, that in order to make progress, the Accord had to be “legally 
binding”.  To some brands, the enforceability was as critical to success as their collective leverage 
as 220+ brands.   
“There’s more pressure because it’s legally binding, and I know a lot of people are that 
had it not been that we wouldn’t have moved on this.  Then it would have just been an 
MOU.  Just within the last two years, a lot of things are happening [in Bangladesh].  
Just going into these factories and seeing all the fire doors and the sprinklers, it’s really 
become a lot safer.”    
Respondents across the board – companies, trade unions, NGOs – cited the performative nature 
of the Accord’s enforcement clause in ensuring companies’ compliance.  Ergo, companies’ 
enactment of the Accord and their ensuing work to comply with its obligations were credited to 
the Accord’s enforcement clause.  These responses indicate the importance of the Accord’s legally 
binding nature to get companies to comply, as well as signal the potential for its use again in the 
future.  Thus, the cues and mental models which actors’ used in their selection process – the 
benefits of the legally binding nature of the Accord – reinforced their decision to sign.   
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Existing Precedence & Practices  
Accord members also referred to other developments in their environment to help them make 
sense of their agreement’s enforcement clause.  By drawing upon on other related issues, it helped 
them to narrow down the possible meanings of the Accord.  For example, virtually all large 
companies now regularly report on their CSR.  Further, regulations in various nations have begun 
to require that companies track, engage and report in particular ways in their value chains.  As 
one respondent explained:  
“The more progressive companies realize that the development if inevitably going in the 
direction of more mandatory due diligence.  There’s the UK antislavery act, the French 
law on mandatory due diligence, the Dodd-Frank Act for conflict minerals; that’s all 
mandatory due diligence.  People in the business and human rights field all see this as 
inevitable development where there is more and more expectation of supply chain 
transparency.  I think they do realize that sooner or later they will have to do it anyway.” 
The increasing requirements of mandatory due diligence helped soften the obligations of the 
Accord.  For businesses operating in these environments, the mandatory requirements also 
established existing precedence for such requirements in their operations, as well as signaled the 
potential for further mandates in the future.  This caused companies to start to see the Accord as 
a pre-emptive opportunity to avoid potential future regulation.   
“I think there was a lot of pressure on brands to sign up to [the Accord].  Because they 
have a tendency, let’s be honest, to stay away from mandatory things, and also to lobby 
against legislation, being very willing to work on capacity-building or continuous 
improvements on efforts.  They’re usually very hesitant to sign-up to anything mandatory 
or support any kind of new legal framework.” 
In an effort to avoid regulation, the Accord may have provided a “least worst” option for 
companies.  As one non-corporate stakeholder reported about the companies the respondent 
worked with:  
“Increasingly, you see different forms of what is already in the UN Guiding Principles 
as a voluntary expectation [of companies] becoming more of a legal expectation, and I 
think that [such a development] is an inevitable path that companies better start 
realizing. I think they are starting to realize that they better be doing that before they are 
required to do it.”   
In these ways, we can see how existing precedence – in national laws and international 
frameworks – helped soften the obligations of the Accord.  Companies are known to seek 
opportunities to avoid regulation, and the Accord represented a potential opportunity for 
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companies to do just that.  Together, these helped Accord members rationalize their enactment of 
the Accord, in spite of its enforcement mechanism.   
 
In sum, members of both the Accord and Alliance largely drew upon past experiences and 
interpretive frames to help rationalize and reinforce their perceptions of the Accord, thereby 
“selecting” the frames to rationalize their enactment.  Interestingly, actors selected the information 
and frames which rationalized their enactment, regardless of whether they chose to sign the 
Accord or walk away.   
 
Retention  
When particular frames and cognitions are substantiated through reinforcement and preserved, 
this refers to the retention aspect of sensemaking.  Retention can also provisionally indicate the 
durability of such frames and actions in the long run, for example, through their replication 
elsewhere, which signals their validity.  In this case, we again see how the divergent frames and 
enacted environments of Accord and Alliance brands were self-reinforced, justified, and 
substantiated.   
 
Imitation  
The Alliance had received a great deal of pressure from civil society organizations and negative 
coverage in the media, first for brands’ refusal to join the Accord, and later, for the Alliance’s 
softer approach to enforcement.  When asked about how rhetoric around the legally binding nature 
of the Accord may have affected the Alliance and its brands, one affiliate reported that it 
“definitely made our lives a little miserable in the beginning.  … It’s unfortunate and it’s 
something we had to try to deal with.”  One of the ways that the Alliance chose to “deal with” the 
negative feedback was to consult with its lawyers and confirm that it could also refer to itself as 
“legally binding”.   Accordingly, it added a question to its website’s FAQs section:  
Is the Alliance legally binding? 
Yes. Membership to the Alliance is a five-year commitment – and the agreement and its 
terms that are legally binding on all of its Members. The Alliance Board of Directors – 
chaired by an Independent Director – has the authority to seek binding arbitration against 
any Member who does not satisfy its obligations under the agreement, and to publicly 
expel them for failure to abide by other commitments set forth in the Members Agreement. 
As presented previously, whilst the Alliance agreement did technically allow for self-policing 
between members, its structure made this unlikely and indeed no such actions were taken through 
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the duration of the Alliance’s tenure.  Yet, clearly the Alliance sought to imitate the language in 
the Accord.  Such an act signaled both to the Alliance members the reverence for the “legally 
binding” rhetoric, as well as to Accord members and others that its “legally binding” nature was 
highly significant.   
 
(False) Perception as Justification  
Alliance members also drew upon their own perceptions of the Accord to further validate their 
actions and retain their stance that they were justified in creating the Alliance in the first place.  
Alliance members noted that the enforcement mechanism of the Accord incited very different 
processes and approaches to addressing issues within that agreement.   
“Because of the way the Alliance was set up, we didn’t have to go through the legally 
binding element of, ‘okay, [do this], and if you don’t, we use the Accord and take legal 
action until you [do],’ which is the way the Accord was formed.  The Alliance didn’t have 
to go through that process.” 
Such rationalizations were further justified through rumors and information, whether accurate or 
not, about the frequency and processes of the use of the enforcement clause.  “From the little I 
know about the Accord, it sounds to me like they are in endless arbitration.  And that was exactly 
what I was hoping to avoid.”  As presented earlier, while the trade unions did indeed invoke the 
enforcement clause to ensure brands’ compliance, only two cases were ever escalated to 
arbitration.  The differential between the perceptions of “endless arbitration” juxtaposed with the 
reality of very few arbitrations demonstrates the power of perception and illusion in rationalizing, 
reinforcing and retaining earlier decisions.  Ergo, the North American brands reinforced and 
retained both their enactment of the Accord as strict and liability-inducing as well as their enacted 
environment via the Alliance.   
 
Replication  
Accord members also rationalized and retained their justifications and frames of the Accord’s 
enforcement mechanism, noting how it had changed the nature of industrial relations within 
supply chains:   
“I see a real change in corporate responsibility in the supply chain.  And by that I mean 
the turning point around legally-enforceable agreements between labor and management 
that came from the Accord.  It’s changed the dynamics of supply chain industrial 
relations.”  
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This was particularly true for labor and NGO perspectives, which viewed the Accord’s approach 
to enforcement as a positive development which should be emulated.  As one shared, “I hope that 
brands will increasingly accept a legal responsibility…where they sign up to something legally 
binding…and realize that is the way forward.”  In their view, the Accord’s enforcement clause 
demonstrated a “legal responsibility” for safety in brands’ supply chains which was a positive 
development that raised the bar in what types of private governance arrangements would be 
preferable in the future.  As shared by one respondent:  
“The trade unions have said, ‘The Accord is now the benchmark; we’re never going to 
sign something less binding than the Accord.’  The Accord is the new threshold.  They’re 
not going back to something absolutely voluntary because they don’t believe in that 
anymore.  The Accord has elevated the expectations [of] the new normal.” 
Such expectations were not just held by labor, however.  Some of those in the public sector also 
saw opportunity in the Accord, and therefore sought to replicate the enforcement approach 
elsewhere, notably in the Netherlands’ Textile Covenant, which, as one respondent explained:  
“…is semi-legal. It’s voluntary for brands to sign, but because they sign it with the 
government, there’s a very clear expectation that they commit to that.  There is also an 
arbitration clause which was very clearly taken from the Accord as an example.  [Brands’] 
lack of implementation may be subject to a dispute – and similar to the Accord – would go 
through a dispute resolution process…that may ultimately [go] to arbitration.  The model 
of arbitration as the basis for the enforcement of the agreement has been copied there.”   
The replication of the Accord’s novel enforcement clause elsewhere further reinforced and 
validated its approach.  Overall, we can see that the justifications and frames deployed in the 
enactment by Accord and Alliance members were retained throughout the sensemaking process.   
 
DISCUSSION 
The case of the Accord demonstrates the powerful differences in actors’ enactment during 
sensemaking.  Brands that signed the Accord – thereby enacting an environment in which their 
compliance could be enforced – had to come to terms with an agreement which was heralded as 
a breakthrough at the same time its lack of specificity left it vague and open to interpretation.  
These brands largely justified and rationalized their choices and interpretations by finding positive 
aspects of it, such as the ability to ensure compliance of all signatories, make collective progress, 
and potentially avoid harder regulation in the future.  Even while some brand members may have 
been less than enthusiastic about the Accord’s approach, its enforcement mechanism 
demonstrated its power in inciting compliance; fewer than one percent of its members were 
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subjected to escalation, and even those never made it to arbitration. The effectiveness of the 
approach led labor and public actors to replicate the approach elsewhere and note it as the new 
standard moving forward, signaling the retention and durability of the approach.  For Alliance 
members, their existing interpretative frames, influenced by the North American legal systems, 
coupled with (sometimes false) perceptions of the Accord reaffirmed their creation of the 
Alliance.  Still, all of these actions were predicated on the “legally binding” nature of the Accord, 
which as demonstrated previously, was weak at best.  Despite the rhetoric, companies couldn’t be 
sued in their home courts nor subject to “unlimited liability and litigation”.  What can account for 
the actions – and enactment – taken by brands, and what does it mean for the future of private 
governance?   
 
Divergent Enactment  
The case of the Accord’s enforcement mechanism also powerfully demonstrates the varying paths 
and implications of sensemaking dependent upon the frames and models deployed during the 
sensemaking process.  While both Accord and Alliance members both “enacted” an illusion of 
the Accord’s enforcement mechanism to be much more strict and liability-inducing than it actually 
was, brands diverged in how they took action in response to that cognition, creating parallel 
enacted environments.  The divergent nature of companies’ reactions (enacted environments) – 
either high compliance or extreme aversion – is an interesting example of how similar enactment 
resulted in differing enacted environments.  The prevailing frames and models which shape 
companies’ interpretations clearly play a key role in their reactions to new regulatory approaches.  
When considering the Accord’s enforcement clause, interpretations were broadly similar even if 
rather inaccurate, but the implications of this assessment varied greatly between American and 
European companies which evaluated it vis-à-vis the differing legal contexts and norms of their 
home environments.   
 
Viewing the outcomes of the Accord’s enforcement clause in this way can help further our 
understanding of sensemaking as a process.  The Accord and Alliance represent a unique 
circumstance where actors shared the same “enactment” – that is, conjuring the Accord’s 
enforcement clause to something more than it was – but drew upon very different interpretative 
frames to understand and explain this, and consequently, chose different actions which resulted 
in their different “enacted environments”: the Accord and Alliance as divergent private 
190 
 
governance approaches.  According to Weick, enacted environments are “the residuum of changes 
produced by enactment…  The product of enactment…is an orderly, material, social construction 
that is subject to multiple interpretations” (Weick, 2001, p. 226).  The differences in frames and 
consequent action by organizations clearly made a large impact on how they chose to deal with 
the flux that they experienced in their environments.  As private governance is on the rise as a 
way to manage social and environmental impacts, particularly within global value chains, it is 
imperative to understand when and how companies are likely to engage.  This case demonstrates 
that even if critical aspects of governance are near-universally interpreted – here, the enforcement 
clause – that companies may choose very different paths for engaging (or not) in those governance 
processes.  Figure 1 depicts how Accord and Alliance actors differed in their sensemaking 
processes by explicating the differences between “enactment” and the “enacted environment”.   
 
Figure 1.  The Accord and Alliance as demonstrative of divergent “enacted environments” in the 
sensemaking process.   
 
 
While the Accord and Alliance case is a powerful one, future research could further empirically 
explore and theoretically develop the distinction between enactment and enacted environments.   
 
Illusory Law  
The legal context of the Accord appeared much more rigid and hard-nosed than it actually was, at 
least in its early days.  Companies determined their actions, the media formulated their 
judgements, and activists and experts in the area heralded it as a breakthrough due to the Accord’s 
enforcement provision.  Yet, as assured via legal analyses offered in the early days of the Accord, 
the enforcement clause had little power with which to live up to the hype of inciting “unlimited 
legal liability”; now years later, we can see with clarity that not only were disputes never 
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adjudicated in home courts that not a single case ever made it all the way through the arbitration 
process.  Yet, the empirical reality remains that brands – both those who chose to sign on to the 
Accord, as well as those which walked away and created the Alliance – enacted, selected and 
retained environments based upon the illusion of the Accord as “legally binding”.  Further, as the 
Accord seeks to continue its operations under the same model, more than one out of ten brands 
have refused to (re)join, and one North American brand opted to leave the Accord and join the 
Alliance instead, due in no small part to the enforcement mechanism (Interview Data, Field 
Memos).  This is demonstrative of the power of illusion; even while all of the evidence suggests 
that the enforcement clause poses little risk to brands, they continue to enact an environment 
where it is seen as problematic.  Herein we see a reversal of the age-old metaphor; disguising soft 
law as hard law is a sheep in wolf’s clothing.   
 
With trade unions and other advocates calling for future initiatives to also include this type of 
legal provision, it may be helpful to define the approach, offered here as illusory law.  Illusory 
law can be defined as hard or soft law that is stricter in appearance than function, thereby creating 
an illusion that incites greater compliance than would have otherwise been the case.  Illusory law 
may appear in hard law when government creates a law where either or both compliance and/or 
enforcement is infeasible, or in soft law when penalties or enforcement are purported to be greater 
than is truly possible.   
 
Illusory law is not just a soft law phenomenon: it is also evident in many hard laws. One such 
example is one of the provisions within the U.S. Dodd-Frank Act that previously required 
companies to report on the origin of all conflict minerals within their supply chains.  Global value 
chains of conflict minerals are convoluted and complex, and have yet to become fully traceable.  
Companies therefore reported their due diligence on tracing and reporting, and no company faced 
charges for the information reported (Browning, 2015).  Then in 2017, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission adopted a “no action position”, meaning it would not sanction instances 
of non-compliance (Quinlivan, 2017a), implicitly endorsing the illusory approach to Dodd-Frank 
and its enforcement.  Yet, the substance of the conflict minerals portion of the directive remains 
so as to continue to spur progress in the area (Quinlivan, 2017b).  It remains to be seen if and how 
other similar state-led regulatory efforts may operate similarly, such as the U.K.’s gender pay gap 
reporting and the French Duty of Vigilance laws.   
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The concept of illusory law further develops the notion of law as a spectrum ranging from hard to 
soft (Abbott et al., 2000; Shelton, 2000).  Some illusory laws may be aspirational in nature, 
designed to spur progress in a particular area – as seen with the Dodd-Frank Act or gender pay 
gap law – and others may seek to ensure compliance – such as with the Accord.  In either scenario, 
the result of illusory law is performative in nature, in part due to the sensemaking and enactment 
it incites.   
 
As private governance continues to proliferate, so too does the need to better understand the range 
of tools and mechanisms available to ensure compliance.   Further investigation and theorization 
along these lines is ripe for future research.  Lines of investigation could explore how the hardened 
or illusory approach might be applied elsewhere, something which could be particularly useful 
for work on product certifications.  The approach could also be investigated on different 
institutional levels, for example, as a mechanism utilized in transnational governance – as it was 
in the Accord – as well as for more national or local approaches.  While the case of the Accord 
and Alliance is a telling one, its unique nature also limits its generalizability, something future 
research could build upon.   
 
CONCLUSION 
The story and function of using hard law to enforce soft law is a complicated one.  In this instance, 
the enforcement mechanism of the Accord was heralded as a “breakthrough”, an approach 
unprecedented in scope and intent.  Media, activists and governments praised companies that 
signed on to the Accord, frequently citing its “legal-binding” nature as its most shining feature.  
Yet, when the substance of the legal provision is examined, the use of hard law was neither 
possible nor utilized.  Regardless, the perception of it enacted an “illusory law” on behalf of 
companies, leading them to take different actions which created divergent enacted environments 
of private governance.  The use of what has been termed as “illusory law” has been proposed as 
a way to conceptualize and generalize about the positioning of hard law as an enforcement 
mechanism for soft law.  The mere use of illusory law was performative in effectively compelling 
companies to comply with the new measures, but also – in part due to the high level of compliance 
– by fundamentally changed the norms and expectations of responsible business behavior.  The 
findings from this study contribute to our knowledge not just about novel approaches to 
compliance and enforcement in private governance, but also in furthering our understanding of 
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the role of sensemaking in companies’ engagement with them.    
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APPENDIXES  
 
Appendix 1  
Accord on Fire and Building Safety Membership Agreement, Dispute Resolution Clause  
 
Dispute resolution. Any dispute between the parties to, and arising under, the terms of this 
Agreement shall first be presented to and decided by the [Steering Committee], which 
shall decide the dispute by majority vote of the SC within a maximum of 21 days of a 
petition being filed by one of the parties. Upon request of either party, the decision of the 
SC may be appealed to a final and binding arbitration process. Any arbitration award shall 
be enforceable in a court of law of the domicile of the signatory against whom enforcement 
is sought and shall be subject to The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards (The New York Convention), where applicable. The process for 
binding arbitration, including, but not limited to, the allocation of costs relating to any 
arbitration and the process for selection of the Arbitrator, shall be governed by the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985 (with 
amendments as adopted in 2006). (Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh, 
2013) 
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Appendix 2   
Coding tree: descriptive > interpretive > pattern codes.   
Codes in italics denote those which appears in multiple categories, dependent upon their 
respondent (e.g. Accord or Alliance member).  
Descriptive Interpretive  Pattern  
Accord as breakthrough  
Accord as model, leader  
Rana Plaza as instigating factor  
Trade Unions – Labor  
Accord as a Breakthrough  
Ecological 
Change 
Binding nature  
Business model  
Dictates actions  
Drop factories  
Existing MOU agreement  
Expectations  
Explicit responsibilities under the Accord  
Government function  
Legal  
Responsibilities  
Skepticism  
Sourcing volumes  
Transparency  
Novel, Legally Binding 
Approach  
Answers not readily available  
Goal of commitments  
Intent of the Accord  
Unclear  
Vague Language  
Ethical responsibility  
Government relationship – home  
Media  
Motivation  
Pressure to sign  
Quick creation of Accord  
Rana Plaza – could have been us 
Reputation  
Signing up   
Urgency  
Signing Under Pressure 
Enactment  Alliance as nimble   
Brand differences  
Collaboration  
Credibility 
Ethical responsibility  
Go it alone strategy  
Greenwashing  
Motivation  
Results-oriented  
US vs EU 
Walking away from the Accord  
Brand differences  
Differing values-cultures-expectations-norms 
Dynamics between actors  
Differing legal environments   Selection 
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Legally binding as obstacle  
Liability  
Limited scope  
Market differences  
Pool resources  
Regulation as non-negotiable  
Risk orientation  
Threat of legally-bindingness  
US vs EU 
Arbitrations  
Benefits of Accord 
Compliance  
Enforcement  
Free riders  
Necessary to be legally binding  
Need for the Accord – Justify  
Benefits of a binding agreement   
Existing precedent  
New normal  
Regulation vs Voluntary  
UNGPs 
Existing Preferences and 
Practices  
Imitation  
Media  Mirroring  
Retention 
Accord future  
Alliance future  
Lack of transparency  
Perception  
Value derived  
(False) Perception as 
justification  
Convergence, Common Standards  
Establishes precedence  
Facilitates new norms  
Lessons applied elsewhere  
Other initiatives 
Replication 
Replication  
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